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ABSTRACT 
 
With economic liberalization, several new actors, like international consultants, 
financial institutions, and foreign architects and designers, have emerged in 
urban India. Others like politicians, real estate developers, landowners, civil 
society groups and government bureaucrats are reinventing themselves to adapt 
to and take advantage of a rapidly transforming urban environment. Building on 
primary and secondary data collected in India over 2008-09, this dissertation 
examines the role that developers, landowners, politicians, business leaders, 
citizen groups and civic activists play in post-liberalization urban India, and the 
alliances they form to achieve specific developmental and governance 
objectives. Building on theories of western urban politics, writing on 
contemporary urban India and theories of globalization this thesis argues that, 
increasingly, Indian cities are being shaped by coalitions between various key 
actors that include participants both from within government and outside.  
 
In this dissertation, I examine how a minority of well-connected urban elites 
(ranging from landed farmers to business executives and financial consultants) is 
able to leverage personal social and political networks to form ad-hoc coalitions. 
Studying power structures in two Indian cities: Bangalore and Pune, I find that 
planning and policy processes are increasingly being shaped by a minority of 
elites in Indian cities that focus largely on the interests of a sub-section of the 
urban population. These elite actors rely not only on formal planning processes 
but also on more informal means of exerting influence and gaining access to 
power through personal community, caste and other social networks. The actions 
of such elite groups are being given legitimacy and are gradually being 
institutionalized through various governmental policy and legislative reforms at 
 xi 
the national, state and municipal level. Data from Bangalore and Pune show that 
the national government’s reform program and its implementation by the state 
governments is privileging the participation of (mostly elite) non-state actors that 
come from and serve the interests of specific urban residents, typically higher-
income groups, at the cost of other urban populations. Consequently, a more 
hybrid model of planning is emerging in Indian cities, in which elite non-state 
actors are working together with governmental actors to plan and govern Indian 
cities. 
  1 
 
CHAPTER I  
  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 “Perhaps the biggest problem we face in theorizing planning is our 
ambivalence about power…the main literatures on power—whether of the 
state, money, or civil society—have thus been imported from outside our 
field” 
(Friedmann, 1998: 249-250) 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the study of Indian cities, 
both within and outside the country, some of which has focused on examining the 
urban politics in India (Roy, 2009a). This dissertation adds to that growing body 
of work by emphasizing the role of specific actors in urban processes and the 
strategies that these actors employ. This is especially important in the Indian 
context because research that does look at issues of power remains largely 
normative and often does not focus on an understanding of “Realpolitik and real 
rationality that characterizes studies of power” (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 353). In 
particular, until recently research on urban India has largely ignored the role that 
politics plays in urban development and governance. In 1947, as a newly 
independent country, India was preoccupied with developing state policies and 
experimenting with governmental structures. Consequently, the study of Indian 
politics has been focused on examining the role of government actors at the state 
level, while urban issues have received comparatively little attention (Kohli, 1986; 
Gupta, 1989; Kohli, 2004). There are a few historical accounts of the 
development of India as well as some of specific cities that include sections on 
the politics of city formation as a part of a larger narrative – colonial and 
postcolonial (Khilnani, 1999; Nair, 2005). Researchers have also examined the 
  2 
politics of particular sections of urban society: the middle class and civil society 
(Chatterjee, 2004b), the urban poor (Baviskar, 2002; Roy, 2003; Chatterjee, 
2004b) and the politics of culture and identity (Hansen, 2001).  
 
In addition, as the central government moved to decentralize responsibilities to 
urban local governments with the implementation of the 74th Constitutional 
Amendment Act in 1992, several authors have begun to write about issues of 
urban governance (Benjamin, 2000; Dupont, 2007; Keivani and Mattingly, 2007; 
Kennedy, 2007).1 However, it is only recently that researchers have begun to 
take a look at non-state actors involved in contemporary urban processes, their 
interactions with state actors and the politics of these processes (Hansen, 2001; 
Roy, 2003; Kamath, 2006; Benjamin, 2008; Weinstein, 2008). A particular area of 
interest in these studies has been the relationship between the government at 
the national, regional and local levels and other actors outside government, 
highlighting the role that informal networks play in urban development and 
governance processes. Some of this work has focused specifically on the 
manner in which the urban poor use their social and political networks, especially 
their relationships with municipal-level government officials, to establish their 
(often tenuous) claims to space in the city. For example, Benjamin (2008) 
discusses ‘occupancy urbanism’ in Bangalore, observing that the urban poor 
leverage their connections with municipal level officials to assert their right to the 
city.2 Looking at the other side of the coin, Roy (2003) examines the manner in 
which planning in Kolkata (Calcutta) is intentionally ambiguous, giving state and 
city government officials considerable power over marginalized populations and 
land transactions in the city.3 In this dissertation, I examine the ways in which a 
minority of well-connected urban elites (ranging from landed farmers to business 
                                                
1 The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act was passed by the Indian national government in 1992 mandating 
the devolution of governance and decision-making responsibilities to local-level government, among other 
changes. This Act and its consequences are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
2 Although the name of the city of Bangalore was formally changed to ‘Bengaluru’ in November 2006, the 
two continue to be used interchangeably by residents. I use Bangalore throughout this dissertation for 
consistency since several of the events discussed in this dissertation took place prior to the official change 
of name.  
3 I provide a more detailed examination of the literature and how it relates to this dissertation in Chapter 2.  
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executives and financial consultants) is able to leverage social and political 
networks to enable these elite groups to achieve specific developmental and 
governance objectives. Specifically, in this dissertation, I study power structures 
in Indian cities, focusing on the ways in which elite actors form coalitions around 
development agendas. In doing so, I aim to provide a deeper understanding of 
who benefits from contemporary urban development and governance practices in 
India. This has important implications for urban policy and planning practice as 
well, particularly to make urban planning practice more equitable in Indian cities.  
 
Growth in the Indian urban population (United Nations Population Fund, 2007) 
has coincided with rapid rates of economic development and the gradual opening 
up of the economy to foreign investment. This growth has been accompanied by 
demands especially from various segments of the higher social classes in Indian 
cities (for example, from business leaders to Resident Welfare Associations) for 
improved infrastructure, better governance and a growing need for land and real 
estate development. As a result, the Indian government has begun to encourage 
large-scale involvement of the private sector, domestic and international, in 
various aspects of urban development.4 Private sector involvement has 
increased significantly in areas that were formerly the domain of governmental 
agencies including infrastructure development and housing (Banerjee-Guha, 
2002; Mathur, 2005). The building of these development projects in the Indian 
context is accompanied both in rhetoric and physical design by the aspiration of 
city residents (particularly from the upper classes), and business leaders to 
become a ‘global’ or ‘world-class’ city, echoing the sentiments of city and state 
government leaders. This desire, often expressed by state and national level 
                                                
4 Private sector involvement has taken on a variety of forms ranging from independent projects initiated by 
specific development companies to public-private partnerships that governmental agencies are forming with 
several private sector actors that span the spectrum from corporate and business houses to NGOs. The 
various governance initiatives discussed in Chapter 4 are one example of these partnerships that 
government is forming with the private sector. Examples of work done on private sector involvement include 
Kamath, L. (2006) Achieving global competitiveness and local poverty reduction? Examining the public-
private partnering model of governance in Bangalore, India. Urban Planning and Policy Development. New 
Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey; Weinstein, L. (2009) Redeveloping 
Dharavi: Toward A Political Economy Of Slums And Slum Redevelopment In Globalizing Mumbai. 
Department Of Sociology. Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago. 
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politicians as well as prominent business leaders and the media, to achieve 
‘global city’ status is also evident in emerging urban policy, including the recent 
creation of advisory bodies like urban taskforces (for example, the Bangalore 
Agenda Task Force set up by the Karnataka state government in the late 1990s, 
or the ‘Bombay First’ group that emerged as a recommendation of the 
Maharashtra government-commissioned McKinsey & Company’s 2003 ‘Vision 
Mumbai’ report) and governments undertaking reforms to help Indian cities 
become ‘global’ (Times News Network, 2006; PTI, 2009b; The Hindu, 2010; 
Goldman, 2011).  
 
Yet, not all efforts have been successful and in both successes and failures, the 
role of those stakeholders controlling access to specific assets such as land has 
been pivotal. In particular, growing dissidence from marginalized groups such as 
small farmers and agriculturists against multiple urban planning agendas has 
repeatedly demonstrated this. The recent violent protests in West Bengal at both 
Singur and Nandigram against proposed mega project developments 
demonstrate the growing power of local, erstwhile marginal communities like 
agriculturalists and the strength of the regional political alliances that these 
farmers were able to forge (Ray and Dutt, 2007; Roy, 2009b).5 This growing 
dissidence from marginalized groups and their strategies to exert influence (in 
West Bengal, and elsewhere in India) are comparatively better studied and 
understood (Benjamin, 2008; Berland Kaul, 2010; Ghertner, 2011) than the ways 
in which elite groups mobilize to push their agendas forward and shape planning 
and politics, leading to an incomplete understanding of the terms of contestation 
around urban development. In this dissertation, I focus on two specific instances 
                                                
5 For more information on these projects, see: Bunsha, D. (2006) Zone of conflict. Frontline. Chennai, The 
Hindu Group of Publications.; Ray, S. G. & Dutt, A. (2007) Bengal shows the way. Tehelka. New Delhi, 
Tehelka; Financial Express Bureau (2008) Tata pulls out of Singur, blames Trinamool stir. The Financial 
Express. Web ed. New Delhi, The Indian Express Group. Ray, S. G. & Dutt, A. (2007) Bengal shows the 
way. Tehelka. New Delhi, Tehelka; Roy, A. (2009b) Why India Cannot Plan Its Cities: Informality, Insurgence 
and the Idiom of Urbanization. Planning Theory, 8 (1), 76-87. 
  5 
of elite mobilization around urban governance and real estate development in 
Pune and Bangalore.6  
 
The last two decades have seen the empowerment of several actors (such as 
real estate developers, local entrepreneurial politicians, farmers with medium to 
large landholdings, urban designers, planning consultants, and civil society 
organizations), and the appearance of others who were almost entirely absent 
before (like international architects, development firms and global financial 
companies) (Dupont, 2007; Jha and Sinha, 2007; Sharma and Thomson, 2010). 
The distribution of power as well as existing power structures in India are 
changing as a result of new opportunities made possible by the on-going 
economic reform program that began in the early 1990s as Indian urban regions 
and regional corridors emerge as engines of economic growth as well as centers 
of political decision-making (Brenner, 2004; Mathur, 2005). One specific outcome 
has been the increase in demand for and the price of land in and around Indian 
cities and the regional corridors that connect them (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2006; 
AFP, 2007; The Economic Times, 2007). The combination of the rising price of 
and demand for urban land and the growing opportunities for a wider group of 
actors to participate in urban development has encouraged several urban actors 
to capitalize on their assets. For example, although farmers in Pune, 
Maharashtra had owned large tracts of prime land for generations, converting 
this land into a large integrated township was only profitable after economic 
liberalization created the demand for large-scale development in their city. 
Moreover, a changing economic climate also made it possible for this farmer 
community to build on their assets (their land and their political networks) and 
undertake the development project themselves without losing their land.  
 
                                                
6 I acknowledge that is essential to also examine the impact that growing elite mobilization is having on 
marginalized groups in Indian cities and the manner in which these marginalized urban and peri-urban 
populations are reacting, contesting and adapting to a changing urban political environment. However, a 
fuller investigation of these aspects of elite mobilization falls beyond the scope of this dissertation and I hope 
to return to these issues in future research. 
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It is in this context that I examine the urban politics of real estate development 
and related governance issues in two Indian cities: Pune and Bangalore. 
However, rather than focus on the processes alone, I explore the role that 
stakeholders play in these processes. I examine which actors have power and 
are able to leverage their particular assets, ranging from control over land, 
access to technology, to political connections and financial capital. In this study, 
my focus is specifically on the social and political networks of elite groups in 
Indian cities such as large landed farmers, state-level politicians, business 
leaders, and prominent middle-class citizen groups (like Janaagraha in 
Bangalore).7  
 
Political power in India has its roots in a fragmented base that includes caste, 
culture, identity, community and socio-economic class. However, researchers 
have observed that in several Indian cities, power remains concentrated within a 
small fraction of the population, typically the higher social classes (Fernandes 
and Heller, 2006; Benjamin, 2007; Harriss, 2010; Singh et al., 2010). In addition, 
access to resources such as financial capital, education, governmental authority 
and land is distributed across similar groups. Moreover, although governmental 
responsibility for urban areas is spread across several regional and municipal 
institutions, the administrative power structure in Indian cities is such that 
decision-making abilities are concentrated at higher-levels of government, 
leaving municipal and city government officials to perform service delivery 
functions (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Weinstein, 2009). State or regional 
governmental politicians and bureaucrats retain control over decision-making 
through state-government appointed officials and institutions often leading to 
weak city governments, but take little active interest in catering to urban issues 
(Weinstein, 2010).  
 
                                                
7 ‘Janaagraha’ is a non-profit organization based in Bangalore that works on urban governance and 
development issues in Indian cities. Most prominently, Janaagraha’s founder Ramesh Ramanathan was 
very closely involved in the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
For more on Janaagraha and the work that the organization undertakes, see: http://www.janaagraha.org/  
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The combination of the dearth of power vested in local (city-level) governments 
as well as the fragmented nature of local political power in Indian cities (within as 
well as outside government) has created a situation where actors who seek to 
benefit from urban redevelopment cannot rely only on state actors playing a 
proactive role in helping them to do so.  As a result, these actors turn to their 
individual social and political networks, building coalitions across these networks 
to achieve their goals. This makes examining such ad hoc and opportunistic 
network building around redevelopment initiatives especially important to our 
understanding of urban politics in India. This dissertation attempts to develop a 
framework to understand how elite groups of urban actors mobilize and exert 
what kinds of power in urban India and why. 
 
1. Theorizing Urban Politics in India: 
Cities in India are experiencing change at two broad scales: the first is at the 
level of the built environment: change in the physical form that real estate 
development takes (for example, the change from single-family homes to 
apartment buildings, from small apartment buildings to large apartment 
complexes and townships) as well as changes in real estate development 
processes (the manner in which real estate developers are expanding, 
outsourcing design and construction, drawing on international financial markets). 
The second change is taking place is at the level of urban policy and 
governance: many city and state governments are changing urban development 
and governance policies to make it easier for specific groups of people to obtain 
and develop urban land as well as influence the formation of urban governance 
policies.8 An understanding of the overall political context in which these 
                                                
8 For example, the state of Karnataka has a special policy in place that enables high tech industries and 
large developers catering to these industries to acquire large amounts of land in and around Bangalore at 
low prices in addition to waiving various taxes and fees. For more on how changing government policy is 
catering specifically to high tech industries in Bangalore, and how this is impacting marginal populations in 
the city, see: Benjamin, S. (2006). Inclusive or Contested? Conceptualising a Globalized Bangalore via a 
closer look at territories of the IT dominated territories in East and South Bangalore, IDPAD. Idpad, ; 
Benjamin, S., Bhuvaneswari, R., Rajan, P. & Manjunath (2006). ‘Fractured’ Terrain, Spaces left over, or 
Contested? A closer look at territories of the IT dominated territories in East and South Bangalore, IDPAD. 
Idpad,  
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processes of coalition building take place is crucial to studying urban politics and 
coalition building in India. This section describes the larger milieu within which 
Indian urban politics takes place. I also begin here creating the theoretical 
scaffolding that will underlie the analysis of the case studies in later chapters, 
examining various theories of urban politics that question issues of power and 
agency in their applicability to the case of urban India.9  
 
The Indian political context is distinctive: a multi-party democracy increasingly 
governed by coalition governments, a loose federal structure borrowed from the 
United States, a central bicameral legislature modeled on the British 
parliamentary system, and until recently, a centralized planning system inspired 
by the Soviet model.10 While this political system created a strong national 
government and offered considerable autonomy to the state governments, local 
government has suffered.11 Since this dissertation deals with power and politics 
at the city-level, it is crucial to understand the nature of urban local government in 
India, its functions and its relationship with state government.  
 
Several factors have contributed to a weak local governmental structure in India, 
both at the urban and rural level. To begin with, urban development has been 
largely ignored in the national government’s development plans. After 
independence, the Indian government adopted a planned approach to 
development through a succession of Five-Year plans. The first three of these 
National Five-Year plans concentrated almost exclusively on economic and 
financial planning while largely ignoring the relationship between economic 
development and spatial planning (Jakobson and Prakash, 1967). Moreover, as 
Jakobson and Prakash have observed, “none of the plans contain clearly defined 
                                                
9 This is merely a preliminary discussion of the literature intended to lay out broad themes. A more detailed 
literature review and analysis is contained in Chapter 2. 
10 Pressured by the World Bank and IMF, the Indian government began phasing out the government 
controlled socialist model in 1990-91 in favour of a more economically liberal approach.  
11 India has a three-tiered government system: the national or the federal level government, followed by the 
state or regional level government and finally city or municipal-level government. Throughout this 
dissertation, I use the word ‘state’ government to mean regional-level government in India and ‘local’ 
government to mean city-level government.  
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objectives and targets for urbanization” (Jakobson and Prakash, 1967: 40). With 
intense industrialization in the 1950s and 60s, urban growth in India accelerated 
but lacking any clear plan or direction, most of this growth was largely 
spontaneous and implemented in an unplanned manner (Rosser, 1972). Despite 
there being attempts at planning at the neighbourhood scale, the proportion and 
proliferation of unplanned or non-Master planned areas (that were and continue 
to be an integral part of urban economies) in Indian cities was far greater than 
those areas that were part of the formal planning process (Benjamin, 2005b). 
This was in part an outcome of the lack of capacity and authority on the part of 
city governments, since most major planning decisions were taken by the state 
governments (Weinstein, 2010). As a result, a significant proportion of 
development took place in an ad-hoc fashion with private operators providing 
piecemeal urban services where government was unable to do so thereby 
creating the impression of lack of governmental planning.  
 
A second factor stems from the governmental structure in India. The diagram 
(Figure 1) below broadly shows the administrative hierarchy of government. The 
executive at the national level of government comprises of the President, the 
Prime Minister, his cabinet and the bureaucracy; the bicameral legislature (the 
Parliament) with its two houses: the Lok Sabha or the House of the People and 
the Rajya Sabha or the Council of States; and the judicial system headed by the 
Supreme Court.12 The state governmental structure is a scaled-down version of 
the Central government, mirroring its structure and organization. The executive at 
the state level therefore comprises of the Governor, the Chief Minister and his 
Cabinet but typically only one chamber of the legislature: the Legislative 
Assembly or the Vidhan Sabha. The members of the Legislative Assembly are 
extremely powerful within states, and have very strong local connections 
                                                
12 The Lok Sabha has a total of 545 members, directly elected by the people of India every five years. The 
Prime Minister and his cabinet are collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. The President nominates 12 of 
the total 250 members of the Rajya Sabha. The remainder is allocated among the states corresponding to 
population and is elected by members of the state legislatures. For more detail, see: Kochanek, S. A. & 
Hardgrave, R. L. (2008) India: government and politics in a developing nation, Boston, MA, 
Thomson/Wadsworth. 
  10 
particularly since they are the lowest legislative unit in the tiered hierarchy of the 
Indian governmental structure and therefore closest to the people (Kochanek and 
Hardgrave, 2008). In the Indian governmental system, administrative power and 
decision-making authority is concentrated at the top of the hierarchy: with the 
Prime Minister, his cabinet and the higher level bureaucracy at the national level 
and with their respective counterparts in regional governments at the state-level, 
thereby weakening local government in India (Kochanek and Hardgrave, 2008; 
Weinstein, 2009).  
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Figure 1: Administrative structure of the Indian government. Source: (Human Settlements Division 
UNESCAP, 2002; Weinstein, 2010) 
 
Since local governments in India continue to have a similar structure to those the 
British created – the current form of local government in India is based on Lord 
Ripon’s Resolution, adopted in 1882 – it has been suggested that India’s weak 
municipal governments are a colonial legacy (Fahim, 2009; Weinstein, 2010). 
The basis for Lord Ripon’s Resolution was to allocate limited administrative 
power to Indian leaders without sufficient financial powers – the “emphasis was 
on the maintenance of essential services like sanitation and water supply and not 
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on urban development as such” (Ashish Bose quoted in Rosser, 1972: 79). This 
was, in part, based on the colonial government’s desire to retain authority over 
municipal functions that directly impacted their interests like land use and 
industrial policy (Weinstein, 2010). Besides, Indian leaders who were appointed, 
and from 1870 onwards, elected, to local municipal office under the British aimed 
to use their position more for larger political purposes rather than urban 
administration (Rosser, 1972; Fahim, 2009).  
 
Third, despite the role that cities, villages and their residents played in the 
independence movement, there was no move to distribute power among local 
municipalities after independence. The decision of the colonial government 
initially, and later of the framers of the Indian constitution to not vest local 
governments with complete authority over their own jurisdictions also stemmed 
from an anti-local bias (Weinstein, 2010). Many leaders of the independence 
movement, including Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first Prime Minister, 
believed that local elites made decisions along communal rather than democratic 
principles and that therefore, the political structure would be more democratic, if it 
were less local (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). The British approach of not 
allocating the more substantive “real financial and political power” (Rosser, 1972: 
80), especially authority relating to urban development decisions, to local 
government persisted after independence. As Weinstein (2010) argues, although 
the framers of the constitution highlighted federalism as one of the key elements 
of independent India, they did not define responsibilities for local (urban and 
rural) governments but only for central and state level government. Moreover, as 
Weinstein (2010) points out, due to a concern over regional fragmentation along 
ethnic, religious or linguistic bases, the makers of the constitution vested large 
amounts of power in state governments, in part, to hold the union of states 
together. In particular, financing and implementing urban development (including 
housing, infrastructure, economic development and poverty alleviation) was the 
responsibility of the state governments (Weinstein, 2010). State governments 
continue to look at their local counterparts as competitors rather than 
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complementary associates and although state governments have the option of 
devolving power and resources to municipalities, most chose not to (Fahim, 
2009; Weinstein, 2010). As a result, local government in India, particularly urban 
local government, does not have much authority.  
 
Larger Indian cities like Mumbai (Bombay), Delhi, Chennai (Madras), Kolkata 
(Calcutta), and particularly relevant to this study, Bangalore and Pune are 
governed by a municipal corporation comprising of a democratically elected 
municipal council and a mayor.13 The state government also appoints a municipal 
commissioner who heads the executive. Moreover, state governments have the 
right to overrule decisions made by the municipal corporation, should the 
corporation be considered inadequate to the demands of maintaining the city. As 
a result, the state governments or the officials that they appoint wield significant 
power and control over local urban governments. Consequently, city 
governments tend to be weak and largely incapable of (or prevented from) 
exercising independent decision-making.  
 
Acknowledging this issue, the Parliament passed the 73rd and 74th amendments 
to the Indian constitution in 1992 that required decentralization of government 
and decision-making.14 These constitutional amendments enable both local rural 
and urban governments to take decisions with regard to their jurisdictions.15 
However, almost two decades since these amendments were passed, there is 
yet to be any actual devolution of responsibility to urban local governments. The 
language in the 74th Amendment itself is weak and vague, for example, 
                                                
13 Since the passage of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in India are 
categorized into Municipal Corporations, Municipalities and City Councils depending on the size of the urban 
area being governed, with municipal corporations being in charge of the largest and city councils, the 
smallest. Municipal corporations and municipalities are fully representative (i.e. elected) bodies whereas city 
councils may fully or partially comprise of nominated members. For more on this issue, see: Government of 
India (1992) The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. , http://urbanindia.nic.in/, http://panchayat.gov.in/  
14 Although I present a brief overview here, I discuss these reforms and their repercussions for Indian urban 
government in depth in Chapter 3. 
15 The 74th Amendment pertaining to urban areas was added on as an afterthought and is therefore not as 
forceful or articulate as the 73rd Amendment dealing with rural local government. For more on the 74th 
Amendment, see, for example, Pinto, M. (2008) Urban Governance in India - Spotlight on Mumbai. IN Baud, 
I. S. A. & Wit, J., de (Eds.) New forms of urban governance in India: shifts, models, networks & governance. 
First ed. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, Calif; London; Singapore, Sage. 
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encouraging devolution of powers from state governments to municipal 
governments to move “on a firmer footing the relationship between the State 
Government and the Urban Local Bodies” (Government of India, 1992). Since the 
central government is hesitant to directly involve itself in the redistribution of 
power between the state and city governments, it has limited itself to merely 
encouraging state governments to devolve responsibilities to municipal 
governments (Weinstein, 2010). There are few incentives offered to state 
governments to implement the reforms, or indeed few negative repercussions of 
not implementing them. Also, elected politicians, particularly at the state-level, 
are resisting this change in the fear that it may cause them to lose the powers of 
patronage that they currently command (Harriss, 2010).  
 
In India, local governments have limited powers to act, and their actions are 
subject to the approval of the state government. The abundance of bureaucrats, 
politicians, parastatal bodies and other such organizations has created 
considerable confusion regarding devolution of responsibility and accountability 
(H. S. Sudhira et al., 2007; Weinstein, 2010). Few, if any, governmental 
organizations are able to act on emerging opportunities to effect change – partly 
due to red tape and jurisdictional issues. The impact of the lack of effective 
power at the local levels of urban government has created a tension between 
various political and power interests in Indian cities. A growing multiplicity of 
actors and institutions (as governments create ever more administrative bodies 
like taskforces and special commissions as well as new local urban 
governmental organizations), appointed by and acting at different governmental 
levels, has created tremendous administrative, managerial and political 
difficulties in planning growth and development in Indian cities. Additionally, in 
the last two decades, there are several new actors that have emerged outside 
government as well. This growing diversity of stakeholders is transforming the 
urban politics of India (Milbert, 2008). As a result of the failure to share power 
and responsibility with lower levels of government, local groups are creating 
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spaces in which they may demand power to participate in urban governance and 
development processes (Pinto, 2008).  
 
To illustrate, in December 2006, the Greater Bangalore City Corporation (Bruhat 
Bengaluru Mahanagar Palike or BBMP) was notified as the primary urban local 
body for the Bangalore city region. This replaced erstwhile local bodies like the 
Bangalore City Corporation, neighbourhood level municipal councils and the local 
governments of 111 newly incorporated villages (H. S. Sudhira et al., 2007). With 
the constitution of the BBMP, Bangalore now has an elected city council that is 
headed by the Mayor of the city. This has reshuffled administrative power in 
Bangalore and has caused considerable confusion both within government and 
among the city’s residents regarding the role and responsibilities of the various 
governmental agencies functioning in Bangalore. While in principle the BBMP is 
responsible for administering, planning and developing the Bangalore city region, 
in practice the region continues to be managed by a plethora of parastatal 
agencies like the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and the Karnataka 
Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB).16 Moreover, as a relative newcomer 
to the urban governance arena in Bangalore, the BBMP is constantly bypassed 
in decision-making processes (Times News Network, 2010; Deccan Herald News 
Service, 2011; Kumar, 2011).  
 
In this dissertation, I argue that a fragmented power base and a changing Indian 
economic and political environment are encouraging the growth of urban 
coalitions that are beginning to shape urban development processes and spatial 
change. I introduce the idea of coalitions here in broad-brush strokes but develop 
this idea further in later chapters, drawing on both the theoretical literature as 
well as field research. Urban coalitions have emerged in a variety of forms in 
                                                
16 Parastatal bodies in India are governmental units that appointed and controlled by state (regional) 
governments that take on specific functions (like land acquisition and development, industrial development 
and urban governance) for the state government. For example, the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) 
is a parastatal body, appointed and controlled by the Urban Development Department of the Karnataka state 
government that partially manages urban development in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region. The 
Karnataka state government also appoints the head of the BDA.  
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many Indian cities, some of which are represented in the cases discussed in this 
dissertation, including an informal alliance between an agricultural community on 
the outskirts of Pune that grew to become a real estate development company; 
the many-layered informal networks comprising of middle-men, government 
bureaucrats, and local landowners used by real estate developers in Bangalore 
to accomplish their development objectives; government taskforces like the 
Bangalore Agenda Taskforce (BATF); and alliances between local media, 
academics, residents and government officials born out of local activism like the 
Green Pune movement.17  
 
Urban alliances or coalitions of the type examined in this study have their roots in 
personal social networks and are formed around the ability of various 
stakeholders to mobilize specific resources and use their personal relations as 
bargaining tools (Kamath, 2006; Weinstein, 2009). These coalitions are 
characterized by flexibility, especially with regard to their functioning, structure 
and composition, since they are much less hampered by governmental 
regulations and bureaucracy or electoral politics. As compared to established 
governmental and quasi-governmental institutions that are currently charged with 
planning and governing Indian cities, alliances of this kind are infinitely adaptable 
in terms of the number and type of participants, how long the alliances exist and 
their purpose or goals. The coalitions are also flexible in the form they take and 
can choose to focus on specific urban issues – while some engage with specific 
issues relating to land and its development; others have a larger agenda of urban 
reform of which land-related issues are only one part.  Urban coalitions like these 
                                                
17 Other examples of coalitions include Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs), the voluntary neighbourhood 
alliances mushrooming in several Indian cities Zerah, M. H. (2007b) Middle class neighbourhood 
associations as political players in Mumbai. Economic and Political Weekly, 42 (47), 61-68; Harriss, J. 
(2010) ‘Participation’ and Contestation in the Governance of Indian Cities. IN Shatkin, G. (Ed. Workshop on 
‘Contesting the Indian City: State, Space and Citizenship in the Global Era’. Kolkata, India.; informal 
spontaneous alliances between landowners and politicians like in the case of Singur where farmers and 
opposition leaders banded together to protest against proposed megaproject development on farmland; or 
groups working for the rights of low-income populations like the “Alliance”, a coalition between the Society 
for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC) and the National Slum Dwellers Federation and 
Mahila Milan working to obtain basic civic amenities for informal settlements in Mumbai. 
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have no institutional home and lie between the formal and the informal and are 
largely comprised of members from elite groups in the city.  
 
I find that although specific groups within the Indian middle class exercise 
influence in decision-making in Indian cities, there is no single group that has 
enough power to control development and governance policy, leading to a need 
for collaboration and co-operation. Power in Indian cities is distributed across 
different elite groups – ranging from what Fernandes and Heller (2006: 500) call 
the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ including rich farmers, merchants and small property 
owners; the ‘new middle class’ comprising of those with advanced professional 
degrees and cultural capital occupying positions of power in various institutions; 
and finally, salaried workers in public and private sector enterprises (Fernandes 
and Heller, 2006). Each of these groups has access to a specific set of resources 
(such as financial capital, property, educational/technical expertise and 
governmental authority) that makes them valuable to the urban coalitions that are 
emerging to fill the gap created by the absence of a central font of power.  
 
I also find that while a single group does not have the power or resources to 
influence change, these different middle class factions mobilize their resources 
through shared social and political networks that are leveraged to form urban 
coalitions, enabling them to share access to resources and achieve specific 
developmental and policy goals. The specific caste, cultural and community 
associations that these social and political networks grow out of differ from city to 
city – for example, in the case of Pune, the dominant middle class factions 
include rich landed farmers and highly educated professionals whereas in the 
case of Bangalore, the dominant groups comprise of a new ‘elite’ comprising 
particularly of those from the IT industry, and senior-level bureaucrats. As a 
result, the specific mechanisms and relations involved in coalition building will 
differ from one city to another, and often within the same city as well, depending 
on the groups involved. This dissertation focuses on Bangalore and Pune in the 
  18 
post-liberalization period, examining how urban political power is exercised 
through urban coalitions in the context of urban governance and development. 
 
In order to show more directly what I mean, let us take an example from real 
estate development in Pune. The master plan for the city typically lays out the 
urban planning agenda (including among other things, urban development, 
development of water and sewer infrastructure, land use planning and 
transportation planning) for a specified length of time (typically 10 years). 
Although the master plan for Pune has been under consideration since 1987, the 
city government responsible for the planning process has been unable to move 
forward with plan implementation, partly as a result of delays in approval from the 
state legislature and in part because of the reactionary approach to development 
of the Pune city government.18 Moreover, as a result of delays in plan approval, 
the plan itself has become outdated necessitating updates and redrawing of the 
plan document and leading to even more delays in implementation. As interviews 
with government officials, developers and residents revealed, development of 
housing and infrastructure development have been affected by this delay. 
Projects delayed include a proposed ring road around Pune and the development 
of an Information Technology park on the outskirts of the city.  
 
On the other hand, several private developers have developed large mixed-use 
townships in Pune, offering IT companies the option of leasing or renting office 
space in the township, in addition to housing, commercial, retail and educational 
facilities either within the same development or very close to it. These private 
developers have also been able to provide infrastructure such as reliable, 
uninterrupted power supply, water and well-maintained roads within the 
                                                
18 This sentiment was expressed to me multiple times by several interview respondents that included real 
estate developers, journalists and academics in Pune. According to these respondents, the Pune Municipal 
Corporation did not plan ahead for the future growth or development of Pune instead choosing to deal with 
urban planning and development issues on an ad-hoc basis, as the need arose. The proposed ring road 
around Pune is just one example. For more, see: Biswas, P. S. (2011) Pune civic body sits on 120 
development projects. DNA. Web ed. Pune, Diligent Media Corporation Ltd; DNA (2011) Encroachments, 
illegal constructions plague Pune city. DNA. Web ed. Pune, Diligent Media Corporation Ltd; Nitnaware, H. & 
Times News Network (2011) Incomplete works cause problems in Somwar Peth. The Times of India. Web 
ed. Pune, Bennet, Coleman & Co. Ltd. 
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township, making these much more attractive locations as compared to the 
government-sponsored park. In order to do so, private developers have drawn on 
their personal social networks to gain access to state level government officials 
and politicians in order to obtain permissions and approvals for these township 
projects at a much faster rate than it would have otherwise taken to obtain 
permission from the city government through the formal planning process.19 
Private developers in Pune therefore develop coalitions with specific individuals 
in the state and city government, using their networks within the local 
government in Pune as well as the state government of Maharashtra to 
successfully accomplish their development projects. This is a win-win situation 
for both the city government and the developers: developers get approval faster 
and are able to speed up development, while the government is able to provide 
infrastructure to particular sections of the city at almost no cost. One such 
township – Magarpatta City – is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.   
 
Most work on Indian politics either examines the working of the ‘state’ at a high 
level (Kohli, 1987; Kohli, 1990; Kundu, 2003; Aijaz, 2008) or emphasizes city-
level grassroots mobilization and people’s movements (Benjamin, 2000; 
Baviskar, 2003; Shaw, 2007b). However, these studies have left unexplained the 
details of how city government and the politics of development interact with and 
take advantage of higher-level changes that are key to understanding 
contemporary urbanization in India and beyond. Several scholars have examined 
the manner in which marginalized populations negotiate the political terrain of 
Indian urban development and build relationships with municipal level officials 
and community leaders at the neighbourhood scale (Roy, 2003; Chatterjee, 
2004b; Benjamin et al., 2006; Benjamin, 2008; Chatterjee, 2008b). Less clearly 
                                                
19 Although several developers eventually obtain the official permits required for construction of their 
projects, there are as many projects that proceed without official permission. There are also several that 
begin construction and even begin occupation before getting the official permits. This is true not only of 
Pune, but of several other Indian cities as well. One of the most prominent examples of unauthorized 
development is Delhi, where almost half the city’s developments were considered to be in violation of the 
master plan and built without governmental approval. For more, see: Singh, S. (2006), Delhi: Demolitions 
and Sealings. Outlook India, December 5, 2009, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?232582; DNA 
(2011) Encroachments, illegal constructions plague Pune city. DNA. Web ed. Pune, Diligent Media 
Corporation Ltd. 
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understood are the modalities through which elite groups of actors exercise 
power. This study takes a step in that direction, by examining the role that power 
structures and political networks play in urban development and governance 
processes in India and how specific elite urban actors mobilize to take advantage 
of current economic and political conditions to attain particular goals.  
 
While these questions have been under-theorized in Indian urban studies, other 
scholars working in a variety of other contexts have extensively discussed similar 
issues, particularly in applications of regime theory and the growth machine 
thesis (Stone, 1989; Kirby and Abu-Rass, 1999; Fainstein, 2001; Zhang, 2002; 
Wood, 2004; Dahl, 2005; Kulcsar and Domokos, 2005; Strom, 2007; Yang and 
Chang, 2007; Shatkin, 2008). Although regime theory has not been used 
explicitly in published work in the Indian context, there have been some studies 
in recent years that examine the dynamics of contemporary urban politics in 
India, focusing on specific political actors in Indian cities (For example, see 
Kamath, 2006; Weinstein, 2008; Weinstein, 2009; Ghertner, 2011). Frameworks 
used by the growth machine thesis and regime theory can therefore provide a 
useful though somewhat unusual starting point for understanding these changes 
in India.20  
 
Both regime theory and the growth machine thesis raise questions about urban 
development and governance that are very relevant to contemporary Indian 
urbanization. The growth machine thesis as suggested by Logan and Molotch 
(Logan, 1976; Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987) focuses on urban land: 
its control, development and transfer, and on those actors concerned intimately 
with land. Drawing on studies of urbanization in the US, the growth machine 
thesis raises questions not only about ‘who governs’ but also ‘for what’. Its 
adherents claim that local politics revolve around land and its development; and 
that this politics is dominated by a pro-growth coalition of key urban actors, which 
                                                
20 I present a brief overview of the urban political theory literature here but also discuss it in detail in Chapter 
2. 
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ultimately shapes urban future through its transformation of local policy (Logan et 
al., 1999).  
 
Urban regime theory takes a broader approach and addresses issues of social 
power and the role that coalitions comprised of interested parties play in the 
development and governing of cities, of which control over land is but one issue 
(Stone, 1989; Fainstein, 1995; Lauria, 1999). Regime theorists are interested in 
the question of who makes up the governing coalition, how they came together 
and with what consequences (Stone, 1989). It focuses largely on the relationship 
between those that wield economic power (usually large corporations) and those 
in government. Regime theory also situates cities within a larger global 
framework, acknowledging the impact that processes of globalization and 
worldwide economic restructuring have on the social order within cities 
(Fainstein, 1995). I explore the idea of coalitions and the notion of social power 
borrowed from the growth machine thesis and urban regime theory, using them 
as a starting point to examine power structures and the role that stakeholders 
play in Indian cities.  
 
While these ideas provide a useful starting point to examine power structures 
and the role that stakeholders play in Indian cities, the conclusions that emerge 
from the Indian urban experience are distinct. Local politics in Indian cities too 
revolve largely around issues related to land, its use and development. 
Moreover, as discussed by regime theory in the US context, local politics in India 
are also closely linked to issues of urban governance and development and 
coalitions in Indian cities are built as much around urban governance and policy 
issue as around land development. However, while in US cities, these coalitions 
often have roots in business or political (i.e. governmental) networks, I argue that 
in the Indian case, these coalitions build on a variety of caste, class and 
community networks. Specific individuals draw on their different personal social 
networks (for example, fellow students at school, family associates and friends) 
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and form coalitions across these networks in order to help them to accomplish 
particular developmental or governance-related goals.  
 
Growth coalitions as discussed in these theories are usually a result of a 
partnership between powerful local economic actors, represented by city 
businesses and governmental authority in the form of an elected mayor. Both 
growth machine and regime theory assume considerable local agency on the 
part of the mayor as well as local businesses in mobilizing regimes around a 
specific shared development agenda. However, the case in India is somewhat 
different: although cities do have mayors, they often lack the power to actually 
mobilize coalitions. The lack of a center of power in Indian cities makes it 
necessary for actors interested in urban development to bring together various 
individuals or groups in a coalition that could then leverage their combined 
strengths in order to achieve development goals. Coalition members in India are 
typically elite urban actors who share longstanding social relationships with each 
other. As opportunities arise, urban actors build on these personal relationships 
to create ad-hoc coalitions with specific goals in mind. These goals could vary 
from successfully accomplishing a real estate development project to changing 
the urban governance policy in the city. Local actors leverage their personal 
relationships with other influential actors building on individual social networks 
that have their roots in caste, kinship and class associations. Since these 
associations vary from city to city in India, the nature of the coalitions does as 
well.  
 
Also, unlike in these theories that argue for a single governing coalition or a 
growth machine, in Indian cities, there could be multiple coalitions functioning at 
any particular point. In part, this is the outcome of a pluralist politics in India. In 
addition, power in urban India is fragmented: there is no single interest group or 
center of political power that controls enough resources (financial, political or 
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governmental) to be the driving force in a single coalition.21 The nature of urban 
political power in India therefore almost requires numerous coalitions that reflect 
that various power groups in the city. There are several interest groups in Indian 
cities that wield significant influence and power, and this is reflected in the 
multiplicity of coalitions.   
 
To begin to develop a theory of power in Indian urban politics, this study 
examines the role that coalitions play in urban development, how urban coalitions 
in India mobilize and function, what gives their members access to power and 
how government is responding to these changes.22 I find that urban coalitions in 
India are emerging as a response to highly fragmented political power in Indian 
cities. The diffused nature of power in Indian cities makes it necessary for 
stakeholders to combine their influence with that of others to get things done, 
prompting such coalition formation and opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
various stakeholders, both within and outside government. Reflecting a change in 
the roles of both public and private sectors in India, these coalitions are formed 
by groups of individuals that have access to a set of key political, social and 
financial resources. Such resources that allow individuals to exert their influence 
grow out of shared social networks.  
 
Recent work on social networks in developing countries more broadly, and in 
India specifically, has focused on a wide range of issues from the impact of caste 
and class on education choices (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006), marital and 
employment choices (Luke et al., 2004; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009) to the 
role that social networks play in local politics (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2007). In 
this dissertation, I examine the resources that are available to members of these 
social networks (whether caste and community associations, business networks 
                                                
21 Fragmentation of municipal and regional level power is not unique to India. However, what is different is 
that as a result of this fragmentation, we see the emergence of multiple small coalitions directed towards 
very specific goals rather that one large overarching coalition that has total control over urban development 
and governance.  
22 For the purposes of this study, I define ‘power’ as the ability or capacity (official or unofficial) to exercise 
control.  
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or alumni associations from elite educational institutions) that allow them to build 
coalitions across these networks in order to achieve specific development goals. 
Social networks can include caste and class based networks (for example, in the 
case of the farmers in Pune, caste and kinship relations accounted for significant 
social cohesion within the community that provided the basis for the development 
coalition that eventually emerged); ties to critical elite institutions like universities 
(for instance, several members on Bangalore’s urban taskforces are associated 
with prominent educational institutions in the city); or shared economic interests 
around land (like those shared by information technology business leaders and 
real estate developers in Bangalore or the collective economic interest of the 
farmers in Pune in developing their land). 
 
The catalyst that converts a social network into a coalition is the ability of one or 
two key individuals like the leader of this particular farmer community in Pune, 
Mr. Magar, to recognize or sometimes create an opportunity out of emerging 
circumstances and consequently form a coalition of key individuals with access 
to specific resources. These individuals need not be central controlling figures of 
authority like a mayor or a prominent corporate leader. Although socially and 
politically well connected, Mr. Magar is not politically active himself and neither 
was he among the leading entrepreneurs in Pune until he successfully developed 
Magarpatta City.  His success lies in the fact that he was able to leverage his 
personal connections to form several small alliances or coalitions that allowed 
him and his community to successfully develop their land. He drew on 
associations with friends and associates from his undergraduate days, family 
associations with politicians and bureaucrats as well as business relations in 
addition to leveraging the strong kinship network that existed within the Magar 
community in Pune. Mr. Magar was at the center of several overlapping social 
networks that he was able to bring together into a successful, cohesive 
development coalition. His role as a key figure that was able to tap effectively into 
these multiple networks to achieve specific goals (such as the consolidation of 
land, obtaining development permissions and raising finance) is a characteristic 
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of urban coalitions in India as well as an outcome of fragmented power bases in 
Indian cities.  
 
2. Methods: 
The aim of this dissertation is to develop a framework that helps us understand 
how urban stakeholders are adapting, reacting and taking advantage of 
economic and social changes in post-liberalization India. The study focuses on 
the kinds of power and modalities of politics involved in these processes, the 
relationships between particular stakeholders and their strategies, including small 
groups of individuals who are collectively shaping urban India. More specifically, I 
was interested in examining the manner in which elite groups in Indian cities 
were able to exercise their influence and power in the context of urban 
redevelopment. It was also important to locate this question of power within the 
larger changing economic, political and social environment in India. Moreover, it 
would involve raising questions about causes of contemporary phenomena, 
drawing on multiple sources of evidence, and it would not be easy to separate 
the specific set of events (urban redevelopment and governance issues) being 
studied from the larger context of political and economic change in India. Given 
these constraints, a case study approach emerged as the most suitable 
methodology for this project (Yin, 1994; Campbell, 2003). The data for this 
dissertation comprise of primary and secondary data collected between 2008-
2010 in India.23  
 
Research began with two rounds of preliminary fieldwork in the summers of 2006 
and 2007. During this time, I visited several Indian cities and conducted a series 
of initial interviews with governmental officials, architects, planners, developers 
and NGO leaders. The aim of this exercise was to start identifying key players 
involved in urban development in India. I began by determining specific 
                                                
23 Some of the data were collected prior to the 2009 economic crisis and may not reflect recent changes. In 
general, however, Indian cities (especially the smaller ones) have witnessed a slowdown in the rates of 
urban development and returns that investors are earning on investments in real estate. There has also 
been a sharp reduction in international funds investing in urban development projects in Indian cities. 
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governmental institutions and officials in each city so as to get a clear picture of 
government responses to the changing urban environment in India. I also 
identified and met with authorities (academics, investigative journalists and 
senior government researchers) on urban studies in India (especially in Delhi, 
Mumbai and Bangalore). I relied on initial interviews and informants in each city 
to point me towards other potential respondents. Based on my early fieldwork, I 
was able to identify specific cities and redevelopment initiatives in these cities 
that offered the opportunity to study power structures and the relationships 
between various players involved in these efforts. Moreover, as a result of these 
preliminary field trips, I broadened my study to include specific urban governance 
reform initiatives that were crucial to a better understanding of urban 
development processes. I chose to focus on Pune and Bangalore since both 
cities offer the opportunity to study urban coalitions around governance and 
redevelopment efforts with roots in very different social networks and yet are 
examples of successful coalition building, as I discuss in more detail in the 
following section.  
 
Further fieldwork was undertaken beginning in May 2008 and was conducted 
over five subsequent trips, each lasting two to three months, in Bangalore, Pune 
and Mumbai. Initial fieldwork in each city involved identifying and making contact 
with key players such as developers, planners, former and present government 
officials and leaders of citizens’ groups, involved in urban development and 
governance. I drew on key informants that I had established a working 
relationship with during my earlier visits to get this process started. Most of the 
data collected for this dissertation comprise of primary data in the form of semi-
structured personal interviews and non-participant observation. In addition, I also 
documented the process of development in Pune and Bangalore through 
photographs. Valuable secondary data were collected in the form of newspaper 
articles, government reports, reports from various consulting firms and working 
papers, collected on site in India as well as through various library services 
offered by the University of Michigan.  
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While collecting primary data through interviews, I used a set of questions to 
guide the interview process but respondents were free to direct the conversation 
towards their respective areas of expertise and knowledge. Drawing on 
Fainstein’s methodology in The City Builders (2001), I used a reputational 
method to identify respondents, relying on them to point me to others who would 
be potentially valuable informants. In total, about 40 interviews were conducted 
across three cities: Bangalore, Pune and Mumbai. The length of the interviews 
ranged from 30 minutes to two hours. A few of the respondents were interviewed 
more than once. Several respondents requested anonymity and are therefore not 
identified directly.  
 
 Questions asked targeted a variety of subjects ranging from real estate 
development to urban governance issues. I asked questions about who had 
initiated the project; where the financing had come from; what the process of land 
acquisition had been like; what had influenced the design of the project; what role 
governmental agencies had played and to what extent different stakeholders 
were involved in particular aspects of the project. I also asked questions about 
the urban governance structure in each city as well as the role of the state 
government and its agencies in the planning and development of both Bangalore 
and Pune to see how individuals understood and interacted with the formal 
governance structure. To understand how local actors were involved in urban 
governance efforts, I met with and interviewed several individuals – from the 
government as well as people from the corporate sector, academics, journalists 
and members of NGOs who were involved in particular initiatives in Pune and 
Bangalore. I asked them how they had become involved in these alliances, what 
role they played and what role the group played in planning processes in each 
city. A more detailed list of questions is attached in Appendix I.  
 
  28 
3. Meet the cases: Introducing Bangalore and Pune 
 
Figure 2: Situating Pune and Bangalore geographically on the national map.  
Source: National Geographic; Cloudmade Downloads 
 
¯
0 300 600150 Miles
Legend
Coastline
Case Sites
Map made by Neha Sami
January 2012
Source: National Geographic; Cloudmade Downloads
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This dissertation focuses on the transformation in urban India since economic 
liberalization. Therefore, while conducting preliminary research in 2006-07, I 
focused on cities that had experienced urban growth since and possibly as a 
result of economic liberalization. Over the summer of 2006, I visited several cities 
in India that fell into this category including New Delhi – Gurgaon (the National 
Capital Region or NCR), Jaipur, Bhopal, Pune, and Bangalore. In each of these 
cities, I met with a wide variety of urban actors including real estate developers, 
governmental officials, NGO leaders, academics, urban planners and architects. 
Based on initial interviews, I prepared a shortlist of cities that included Bangalore, 
the NCR, Kolkata (Calcutta) and Pune. All of these cities are facing challenges 
as a result of urban expansion. Gurgaon, for example, has grown almost 
exponentially in the last two decades: it has grown from a sleepy suburb of the 
capital to being home to several international and domestic technology 
companies, and to real estate giants like Unitech and DLF.24 However, Bangalore 
and Pune represented a variety of characteristics that made them appropriate for 
this study that I discuss in detail below. 
 
I focus on two key aspects in Bangalore and Pune. First, I examine urban 
governance initiatives that have had considerable influence on the planning 
process in both cities. Second, I look at the real estate development process in 
each city, focusing on one large mixed-use project in each city. I use both these 
aspects as a means to understand how local elite actors are leveraging their 
existing social networks, power relations and financial capital to form specific 
goal-directed coalitions to take advantage of opportunities that have emerged 
after economic liberalization. Coalitions in Bangalore and Pune reflect historical 
relationships and power structures. However, the social networks that these 
coalitions are built upon are distinct and particular to each city. The primary 
social networks in Pune are based on shared caste and community ties – the 
Magar farming community discussed in Chapter 5 has very strong kinship 
                                                
24 Unitech (http://www.unitechgroup.com/index-next.asp) and DLF 
(http://www.dlf.in/dlf/wcm/connect/DLF_Common/DLF_SITE/HOME) are among the largest national-level 
real estate development companies in India.  
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networks that were vital to the successful formation of the development coalition 
that developed Magarpatta City. On the other hand, the social networks that drive 
coalition building in Bangalore are based on shared social class characteristics, 
comprising primarily of members of an emerging ‘new’ elite such as leaders from 
the IT industry, financial consultants, senior bureaucrats and academics. This 
allowed me to compare the coalitions that had their roots in very different social 
characteristics but were similar in intent (focused on urban development and 
governance).  
 
Category Pune Bangalore 
 
Population  5,518,688 8,474,000 
Economic growth rate 7.4% 10.3% 
 
Area 450 sq. kms 741 sq. kms 
Key industries 
Agriculture and agro-based industry, 
IT, Biotech, Education, 
Manufacturing - specifically: auto, 
electric goods, consumer goods 
IT and ITES, Education, 
Manufacturing: textile, 
heavy engineering, 
defense 
Table 1: Comparing Pune and Bangalore.  
Sources: http://bbmp.gov.in/; http://www.punecorporation.org/pmcwebn/index.aspx; 
http://puneonline.in/Profile/Economy/ 
 
The two cases chosen in this thesis each represent a different type of Indian city: 
one is already a major national and global player, while the other is a smaller, 
regional center. Both Bangalore and Pune share similarities: both cities are 
centers of education, have largely middle-class populations, are home to large 
military cantonments, and were significantly impacted by economic liberalization 
processes. Both cities were and continue to be centers for more traditional 
sectors like industrial engineering, manufacturing and textile. However, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, both cities also exhibit very different types of social 
and political networks that their members are leveraging to achieve specific 
goals. This thesis examines how various elite groups in each of these cities are 
dealing with and adapting to a changing economic environment and the 
outcomes that this change is creating in their urban form: both physically and 
politically. Each of the groups discussed in the cases to follow were best 
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positioned to take advantage of opportunities afforded by economic liberalization 
by capitalizing on their existing networks and access to resources. 
Road map for the thesis: 
The next chapter will situate this work in the context of larger bodies of literature 
that this thesis draws on, including: 
• Theories of globalization and its impact on cities, especially those that focus 
on global-local interactions; 
• Historical and contemporary urban studies from developing countries, 
particularly South Asia, especially those examining socio-political issues. 
• Western urban political theory, particularly regime theory and growth 
machines/coalitions. 
 
Chapter 3 will lay out in detail each group or stakeholder involved in the process. 
The aim is to paint a clear picture of the role that each of these groups has 
played and is now playing in Indian cities. The focus will be on coalitions at two 
specific scales: the first being real estate development and the other, the broader 
scale of urban governance and policy. This chapter will examine evolving 
institutional frameworks and also act as an introduction to the next two chapters 
that focus on specific examples.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the data that were collected during fieldwork. Chapter 
4 examines transformations in urban governance and policy that are being 
implemented by city and state governments in each city. For example, in the 
case of Pune, the government is being led to implement change by specific 
instances and cases of development (for example, the township act that was 
created after Magarpatta; also, changes in the master plan in Pune as a result of 
NGO protests). In the case of Bangalore, however, the government is itself 
attempting to lead change in the way development transactions take place and 
also regulate who is able to participate in these transactions. The focus here is 
on the emergence of a coalition between corporate leaders (IT/biotech), NGOs 
and an educated middle class. Emerging urban governance policy in Indian cities 
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aims to decentralize urban governance and grant a stronger role to local political 
actors. There are growing attempts to create a public-private relationship that is 
enduring – lasting across political and electoral boundaries.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on land development: examine how developers and 
government in each city have reacted differently to similar stimuli: influx of IT, 
increase in demand for housing and office space. Analysis will focus on one large 
development project in each city: Magarpatta township in Pune and 
Shantiniketan in Bangalore. The focus is on land, and who gets to use it, in what 
capacity. Specific groups of people come together to promote the development of 
certain parcels of land – more of a business arrangement. This is essentially a 
private sector arrangement that uses government to serve its purpose. The 
difference in the particular way in which development in Pune takes place as 
compared to Bangalore is an indicator of how specific groups in each city have 
capitalized on their assets to take advantage of economic opportunities. It also 
shows the different ways in which real estate development functions in both 
cities. 
 
Finally, in conclusion, Chapter 6 assesses the lessons learnt from the analyses 
of the preceding chapters. It examines the implications for theory, in particular, 
reflecting on whether or not aspects of theories like regime theory are useful for 
studying the Indian context. It also considers the significance that this study has 
for future urban policy in India. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
In the last two decades, Indian cities have experienced economic, physical, 
social and political change that is unprecedented in the rate at which it is taking 
place as well as in its scale (Shaw, 2007b; Chatterjee, 2008b). The Indian 
economy has grown on average by about 6 per cent per annum from 1990-2010 
with a significant proportion of this growth concentrated in urban areas (Just et 
al., 2006; Allen et al., 2011). During this time, the price of urban land has been 
steadily increasing (Mathur, 2005; Jones Lang LaSalle, 2006; Just et al., 2006). 
New forms of urban development like large mixed-use townships with high 
quality infrastructure are emerging on urban peripheries. Private sector 
involvement in infrastructure provision has also grown, and the national 
government has implemented urban policy reforms requiring greater 
decentralization (Government of India, 1992; Mathur, 2005; Dupont, 2011).  And 
as the ‘middle class’ in Indian cities grows richer, more vocal and influential, 
significant urban populations are becoming increasingly marginalized 
(Fernandes, 2000; Baviskar, 2003; Fernandes, 2004; Ghosh, 2005; Chatterjee, 
2008a). All of these factors have changed the dynamics of politics in Indian cities.  
As Chatterjee (2008b: 53) has argued, “The new conditions under which global 
flows of capital, commodities, information and people are now regulated – a 
complex set of phenomena generally clubbed under the category of globalization 
– have created both new opportunities and new obstacles for the Indian ruling 
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classes.”  However, we still know little about how these larger global flows are 
impacting and influencing the actions of the “ruling classes” as well as those 
being ruled.  How do existing power structures respond to national and 
international level changes? What does the entry of international players like 
foreign institutional investors and real estate developers mean for local networks 
between landowners, farmers, and government bureaucrats? How do existing 
social relationships and alliances mediate the impact of large-scale forces of 
change?  
 
While the state was and continues to be the most dominant mediating apparatus 
in India today, the extent of its authority has reduced significantly (Mathur, 2005; 
Chatterjee, 2008b). As the Indian economy continues to open up, non-state 
actors are gaining importance and playing a more active role in shaping urban 
development and governance in India. Regional and city level governments as 
well as individual politicians are courting private sector investment – both 
domestic and foreign (Jenkins, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2000; Rudolph and Rudolph, 
2006; Singh and Srinivasan, 2006; Chatterjee, 2008b). Moreover, as local 
governments struggle to come to terms with a changing urban landscape, they 
also have to juggle various competing interests: on the one hand, governments 
are trying to entice domestic and foreign private capital to locate in their particular 
region; on the other, they are struggling to provide basic infrastructure and 
governance services, mobilize local resources as well as continuing to provide 
planning and deliver services at the local level to an ever-growing urban 
population (Human Settlements Division UNESCAP, 2002; Kamath, 2006). This 
has created the perfect opportunity for non-state actors like corporate leaders, 
real estate developers, members of NGOs and citizens’ welfare groups, 
landowners and farmers to push for an increased role in urban development and 
governance processes.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework, the scaffolding on 
which to build the structure of this dissertation’s argument. Responding to calls 
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for a distinct urban theory of the global south for the global south, I take the first 
steps towards building a theory of urban politics in India that is simultaneously 
grounded in the Indian experience while locating Indian cities in the larger global 
economic context (Roy, 2009a; Robinson, 2010). While the following chapters 
use empirical research to examine urban politics in India, this chapter will explore 
the theoretical foundations for such an endeavor and locate it within the broader 
literature.  
 
Despite the growing interest in contemporary Indian cities (Roy, 2009a) and 
recent engagement with issues of power and politics (Chatterjee, 2004b; 
Benjamin, 2006; Benjamin, 2008; Roy, 2009a; Weinstein, 2009; Berland Kaul, 
2010; Ghertner, 2011), we still know little about how elite groups of actors in 
urban India today are able to assert themselves. Recent work (for example, see: 
Benjamin [2008], Fernandes [2004, 2006, 2009], Kamath [2006], and Weinstein 
[2010]) shows that elite actors in contemporary India (ranging from corporate 
leaders and financial consultants to the newly returned NRI or non-resident 
Indian and leaders of non-profit organizations) wield considerable power and are 
able to exert their influence on urban development and governance processes in 
Indian cities, although how precisely they are able to assert themselves is not yet 
well understood.  
 
In this dissertation, I argue that because power in Indian cities is by nature 
diffused and fragmented, there is no single individual or group, within 
government or outside it, that is able to singlehandedly effect change. However, 
due to a fragmented power base, it is possible for individuals and groups that 
hold specific resources to come together in coalitions that can then harness 
these resources to achieve particular goals. These coalitions are ad-hoc and 
opportunistic, often temporary in nature, emerging to take advantage of the 
changing economic environment of post-liberalization India. Specific individuals 
build coalitions from their existing social networks that draw on shared 
associations such as shared business interests, community, kinship and caste 
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networks, and ties to elite educational institutions. This chapter builds on 
research on globalization theory and its impacts, urbanization in India as well as 
urban political theory to develop a framework within which to situate the empirical 
work of the following chapters. I begin by examining the nature of power in Indian 
cities, and then locate this within the extensive body of work on globalization 
theory and its impacts. I also draw on insights from urban regime theory and the 
growth machine thesis to begin building a theory that can be used to understand 
the politics and power of the elite in Indian cities.  
 
To appreciate the transformations that Indian urban politics is experiencing, it is 
important to locate Indian cities within the broader framework of globalization and 
economic change. Before the sweeping economic reforms of 1990-91 and the 
enthusiastic move towards neoliberalism, post-independence Indian cities were 
limited in their exposure to international economic forces and movements of 
global capital.25 In the last two decades, this exposure has considerably 
increased: several Indian cities (Mumbai, Delhi and the National Capital Region, 
Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, and Pune, to name a few) have emerged as 
attractive investment and service destinations for multinational corporations; a 
growing number of international architects, planning consultants and real estate 
firms are involved in public and private urban development (Chaudhary, 2007; 
Jha, 2007; Menon, 2007; PTI, 2007b; Khaleej Times, 2011); and international 
consulting firms like McKinsey & Company, Jones Lang LaSalle, and SCE 
Creocean are advising and assisting city and state governments on issues of 
urban planning and development.26 It is therefore clear that the Indian urban 
                                                
25 While India has historically always been very closely integrated with the global economy, after 
independence in 1947, the new Indian government focused on an import-substitution, heavy industry 
economic strategy. From then until the economy opened up in the 1990s, very few international players 
were allowed into the Indian economy and those that were, were heavily regulated. The discussion of 
globalization and liberalization of the Indian economy in this dissertation focuses on the period since the 
economic reforms of 1990-91. 
26 McKinsey and Company (http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/india/), Jones Lang LaSalle 
(http://www.joneslanglasalle.co.in), and SCE Creocean (http://www.sce.co.in/corp/) are among an increasing 
number of international consulting firms that have a growing presence in India. Consulting firms like these 
provide services ranging from real estate advice, urban planning and design, technical expertise (such as 
the creation of Geographic Information Systems or GIS) and financial advice to governments, private sector 
firms as well as non-profit organizations. Examples of projects undertaken include the Bombay First report 
(McKinsey and Company) and the Bangalore Comprehensive Development Plan (SCE Creocean).  
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scene is no longer restricted to only domestic players. However, to develop a 
nuanced understanding of contemporary Indian urbanization, it is equally 
important to recognize the peculiar local characteristics of cities and regions that 
mediate these larger-scale forces. 
 
Globalized forms of production and global flows of capital create outcomes that 
are products of local culture, however hybridized they may be (King, 2000). It is 
therefore essential to build a theoretical framework that situates local politics 
within the rubric of higher-level changes. The remainder of this chapter is 
dedicated to creating an approach to understanding the changing dynamic of 
Indian urban politics in a manner that takes into account larger changes while 
locating them appropriately within the local context of Indian cities. It weaves 
together a reading of the literature on globalization, focusing particularly on work 
that examines the impact of global forces on cities that do not rank high in the 
‘global city’ hierarchy or “the alpha – beta – gamma worldwide rankings” (Roy, 
2009a: 821) with discussions of regime theory and the growth machine.27 It then 
locates this discussion within contemporary debates on the Indian city.  
 
2. Locating the Indian City: 
“The city, or more properly ‘the urban’, has had a fugitive existence in the 
political, cultural, and sociological imaginations of modern India”  
(Nair, 2005: 1).   
 
Writing on the urbanization of Bangalore, Nair (2005) documents how the Indian 
village dominated the visions of politicians, planners and academics alike in the 
early years of Indian independence. The first major impetus for urban studies in 
India came in the 1950s when the Planning Commission sponsored profiles of 20 
major cities (Ramachandran, 1989; Nair, 2005). These were mostly descriptive, 
                                                
27 The ‘alpha-beta-gamma’ ranking system refers to the hierarchical ranking of world cities produced by 
researchers at the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network 
(http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/), that ranks various cities based on their level of integration into the world city 
network, measured by the extent to which multinational corporations and international institutions were 
present in these cities. The exact methods are explained in more detail here: 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb300.html  
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largely demographic reports and were typically conducted by geographers.  
These were followed in the 1960s-70s by a few detailed studies, mainly of the 
‘Presidency’ cities like Bombay and Calcutta (Ramachandran, 1989; Nair, 2005). 
However, there has not been a more enthusiastic reception of urban studies in 
the social sciences in India (Nair, 2005), confirmed by the fact that a recent 
(2007) volume on change in urban India is the first collection of this kind since 
the late 1970s (Shaw, 2007a).28  
 
In the last decade or so, a number of studies on specific Indian cities have been 
published (for example, Neild, 1999; Hansen, 2001; Srinivas, 2001; Roy, 2003; 
Heitzman, 2004; Chattopadhyay, 2005; Hosagrahar, 2005; Nair, 2005; Shaw, 
2007b). Some have focused on a historical account of their city of choice like 
Neild’s account of the development of colonial Madras or Nair’s book on 
Bangalore in the 20th century. Others are specific social, cultural, economic or 
political narratives like Hansen’s (2001) work on right-wing politics in Bombay, 
Srinivas’s (2001) narrative on religious traditions that shape the urban form of 
Bangalore or Roy’s (2003) account of poverty and gender politics in Calcutta. 
Although each has a different focus, there are common themes that run through 
these works. Some of these studies deal at least partially with Indian urbanization 
in a post-liberalization environment and with the changing nature of Indian cities. 
A familiar theme that also emerges is that of social justice and equity in the 
Indian city, focusing specifically on marginalized groups such as the urban poor 
and women. Another issue of almost universal concern is that of unplanned 
growth of cities and inadequate service provision where city governments are 
unable to keep up with the pace of urban development, resulting in deteriorating 
urban conditions. More recent studies have also focused on specific aspects of 
                                                
28 For more detailed information on studies conducted on urban India, see Bose, A. & Demographic 
Research Centre (India). Urban Section. (1970) Urbanization in India; an inventory of source materials, 
Bombay,, Academic Books.. In addition to these studies, there were also several other instances in which 
the Indian government engaged with the urban (the design and development of Chandigarh), the founding of 
some urban studies programs such as the School of Planning and Architecture (SPA), Delhi and the Centre 
for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT), Ahmedabad (funded by the government of India and 
the Ford Foundation). However, the argument that I make here is that, these efforts notwithstanding, social 
scientists in India as well as governmental programs have focused largely on rural India, leading to a neglect 
of urban studies. 
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suburban or peripheral growth in India or on specific interest groups (Benjamin, 
2000). The focus has been on industrial and economic development, particularly 
as an outcome of economic liberalization (Kennedy, 2007) and on urban 
governance and resource allocation issues (Baud and Dhanalakshmi, 2007; 
Dupont, 2007; Ruet et al., 2007; Zerah, 2007a).  
 
Engaging with writing on post-liberalization urban India, this dissertation adds to 
the literature by examining politics and power structures that are emerging in this 
new environment, focusing particularly on elite actors and the manner in which 
they exert their influence in urban development and governance issues. I study 
how urban development projects are accomplished through the formation of 
coalitions of elite actors, made possible by the fragmented nature of power in 
Indian cities and based in social networks and relationships that form around 
shared characteristics such as community, caste, and common economic and 
business interests. In this section, I examine the fragmented nature of power in 
Indian cities, within government and outside it.   
 
Until recently, urban India never featured very prominently in national or regional 
governmental policy. Municipal governments have historically been weak, 
functioning primarily as service-delivery agencies of the state government as 
colonial governments retained most of the authority over urban decision-making 
processes (Weinstein, 2009). Although local self-government played a very 
important role during the independence movement, it faded from prominence in 
post-independence India. As Corbridge and Harriss (2000) and Weinstein (2009) 
have argued, leaders of the independence movement such as Nehru, Patel and 
Ambedkar believed that the political system would be more democratic if it were 
less local and free from the petty politics that they believed influenced municipal 
government (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Weinstein, 2009). As I discuss more 
in later chapters, the decision to not vest power in local authorities was therefore 
a deliberate one, stemming from a clear anti-local bias at the national level. 
Nehru’s idea of grassroots democracy, of having the people participate in India’s 
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development, was and continues to be absent from the urban arena, in the 
planning and development of Indian cities (Bannerjee, 2005). This bias is 
prevalent especially in contemporary state (regional) governments in India as 
they tend to view local (city) governments at competitors rather than 
collaborators (Weinstein, 2009). In spite of legislation that requires 
decentralization of governmental authority at the local level, state governments, 
and the parastatal bodies that they appoint, continue to control most of the 
decision-making processes with little or no input from municipal governments 
(Baud and de Wit, 2008).  
 
After independence, those who worked in the Indian civil service preferred 
positions in the Centre and State governments over those in municipal 
governmental institutions (Buch, 1987b). Consequently, it tended to be that those 
who were rejected for higher offices applied to posts in local government, leading 
to deterioration, over time, of the quality of municipal officials (Rosser, 1972; 
Buch, 1987b). A report on Indian urbanization undertaken for the Ford 
Foundation in the early 1970s also found that “the low prestige of local 
government service extends downwards from commissioners to all staff levels. 
The poor pay scales and service conditions have consistently failed to attract 
talented and qualified officers, and the vicious circle of low prestige, poor staff, 
high inefficiency has proved impossible to break” (Rosser, 1972: 71).  
 
The governmental reaction to a rapidly weakening municipal management 
structure was to attempt to find substitutes for municipal institutions, often in the 
form of development authorities (Buch, 1987b). Development authorities grew 
out of ‘Improvement Trusts’ that the British government had instituted. The 
Improvement Trusts were special bodies responsible for the planning and 
implementation of large-scale development projects, since the British believed 
that local self government in India, run by Indian politicians, could not be trusted 
with capital development projects (Rosser, 1972). In 1957-58, the Delhi 
Improvement Trust was transformed into the Delhi Development Authority, which 
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provided the model for the creation of other development authorities in the 
country (Rosser, 1972; Buch, 1987a). As a result, Rosser (1972) argues, there 
was a historical separation of functions with the development aspects becoming 
the responsibility of statutory bodies appointed by state governments and 
maintenance and service provision left to the elected municipal councils. The 
planning and development of local infrastructure and services such as 
transportation, water supply and waste management, housing and electricity 
were under the purview of separate development authorities or agencies, a 
practice that continues in contemporary Indian cities. Each of these agencies 
operated in an insular fashion, leading not only to the weakening of local 
government but also fragmented decision making (M. Bhattacharya quoted in 
Rosser, 1972: 81-82), which remains an issue in urban government in India 
today (see, for example, Pinto, 2008).29  
 
In addition, the planned approach to development that India adopted at 
independence largely ignored urban requirements. While there was significant 
emphasis on agricultural and industrial development, their spatial implications 
were not given much consideration. Urbanization, particularly in relation to 
industrial development, was first given attention in the Third Five Year plan, 
resulting in a model town planning act (Ramachandran, 1989). It also provided 
financial support for the creation of master plans in major Indian cities. 
Subsequent plans continued to pay some attention to urban development and 
policy although it ranked low in priority and most efforts undertaken were 
piecemeal in nature (Ramachandran, 1989). Moreover, since the Five Year plans 
had a sectoral outlook, the little that was granted to urban development was lost 
in the cracks between different sectors (Sivaramakrishnan, 1978).30 The Five 
                                                
29 I also found this to be the case while conducting fieldwork in Bangalore, Pune and Mumbai. I discuss this 
fragmentation of administrative power and governance with respect to Bangalore and Pune in more detail in 
the following chapter.  
30 The Five Year plans were framed around economic sectors and outlined specific measures that 
government could undertake to promote these areas of the Indian economy. Agriculture and heavy industry 
formed a significant proportion of the earlier plans Corbridge, S. & Harriss, J. (2000) Reinventing India: 
liberalization, Hindu nationalism and popular democracy, Cambridge, UK 
Malden, MA, Polity Press ; 
Blackwell..  
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Year plans typically limited themselves to advising the state governments on 
urbanization, stopping short of actually mandating reforms (Ramachandran, 
1989). The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India lists local governments 
along with “the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement 
trusts, districts boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities 
for the purpose of local self- government or village administration” in the state list, 
giving the power over these functions to state governments (Buch, 1987a; 
Ministry of Law and Justice (Legislative department), 2007: 322). As a result, the 
role and functions of local government essentially draw from the powers that the 
state government grants it. The recent urban governance reforms in the 74th 
Amendment also leave the extent and range of powers that are to be 
decentralized to local bodies to the discretion of the state governments 
(Government of India, 1992). State governments therefore continue to control 
urban planning through various nominated bodies like the development 
authorities discussed above.  
 
However, as the Indian economy becomes increasingly integrated into global 
markets, power structures within state (regional) and city governments are 
changing the manner in which they engage with various existing and emerging 
stakeholders in Indian cities (Chatterjee, 2004c; Chatterjee, 2004a; Weinstein, 
2009). New arrangements of state power have emerged partly as a result of this 
process of economic integration and globalization with clear implications on how 
governments in India function. For example, with liberalization, the central 
government has considerably reduced the degree of control it has over state 
governments, encouraging greater state-level initiatives, especially with respect 
to attracting investment (Ahluwalia, 2000): specific examples of entrepreneurial 
state leaders who took advantage of this situation include the former chief 
ministers of Andhra Pradesh (Chandrababu Naidu) (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2006) 
and Karnataka (S.M. Krishna) (Ghosh, 2005).31 Regional governments and 
                                                
31 This has not been uniform over all of India: some states have been more successful than others at being 
entrepreneurial. For more see, for example: Ahluwalia, M. S. (2000) Economic Performance of States in the 
Post-Reforms Period. Economic and Political Weekly, 35 (19), 1637-48; Aghion, P., Burgess, R., Redding, 
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political regimes have gained in importance nationally. This is evident from the 
relative decline in importance of national level political parties like the Congress 
or the right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the simultaneously increasing 
role that regional political parties are playing not only in state governments but at 
the national level as well (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Jha and Sinha, 2007). 
There has also been an increased amount of private participation and authority at 
the local level in both land development as well as urban governance 
(Chatterjee, 2004a; Weinstein, 2009) accompanied by a rise in new forms of 
local democratic engagement.  
 
The urban political framework in the pre-liberalization era, particularly in the 
1980s allowed a good deal of space for political bargaining by marginalized and 
disenfranchised groups, particularly the urban poor, as characterized by 
Chatterjee’s ‘political’ society, a popular politics that takes place in “the space 
where populations are governed and looked after, often by ignoring or violating 
civic norms (Chatterjee, 2008a: 91; Roy, 2011). As Chatterjee explains, the 
majority of India’s population occupies this ‘political society’: inhabitants who 
have at best a tenuous claim to citizenship and its rights but must continuously 
navigate the apparatus of several governmental agencies through a series of 
political relationships, which often circumvent or even violate existing laws and 
civic norms (Chatterjee, 2004b; Benjamin, 2008). This state of affairs was in 
keeping with the welfare state approach to development and governance that the 
Indian government took prior to liberalization (Kohli and Mullen, 2003; Chatterjee, 
2004b). These population groups worked as a whole to “produce a local political 
consensus”(Chatterjee, 2004c: 66) that mobilized to channel governmental 
welfare programs towards themselves, applying pressure on key governmental 
mechanisms and capitalizing then, as they do now, on “vote bank politics” 
(Benjamin, 2008).32  
                                                                                                                                            
S. & Zilibotti, F. (2008) The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in 
India. The American Economic Review, 98, 1397-1412. 
32 Benjamin (2008) explains, “vote bank politics” as a process whereby poor groups lay claim to public 
investments in basic infrastructure and services in return for guaranteed access to election voter lists. The 
term “vote bank” was first coined by the sociologist M.N. Srinivas (1955, 1964) to explain the political 
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However, since liberalization, there has been a drastic shift in the attitudes of 
government and of those who govern with respect to those who are governed. It 
is not that there has been a dramatic transformation in the composition or role of 
‘political’ society, but that ‘civil’ society or the ‘demographically limited’ “domain of 
associative life of citizens enjoying legally protected rights of freedom, equality 
and property” (Chatterjee, 2004b: 39; Chatterjee, 2008a: 91), personified by the 
urban middle class has become more vocal and increasingly demonstrative 
(Baviskar, 2003).33 While earlier the domain of urban politics was largely ignored 
by the urban middle class, the economic transformation that has accompanied 
liberalization has enabled and encouraged this group to demand “from the 
administration and the judiciary that laws and regulations for the proper use of 
land, public spaces, and thoroughfares be formulated and strictly adhered to” 
(Chatterjee, 2004a: 140). The emergence of the urban middle class and its 
renewed interest and participation in urban politics is indeed driving an agenda of 
“bourgeois urbanism” (Chatterjee, 2004a; Fernandes, 2004; Harriss, 2010; 
Ghertner, 2011: 505). However, as Ghertner (2011) persuasively argues, the 
emergence of the urban middle class and its increasing participation and 
influence in urban governance is also an outcome of new forms of governance 
(Benjamin, 2006). With increased public participation mandated by the 74th 
Constitutional Amendment, city governments are using middle class groups like 
Resident Welfare Associations (Harriss, 2010) or Advanced Locality 
Management Units (Zerah, 2007b) to encourage citizen participation. Another 
                                                                                                                                            
process in southern India whereby local politicians were able to mobilize voters during elections by offering 
access to specific resources such as basic infrastructure or entitlement to land in return for votes. Srinivas, 
M. N. & Béteille, A. (1964) 212. Networks in Indian Social Structure. Man, 64, 165-168; Weinstein, L. (2009) 
Redeveloping Dharavi: Toward A Political Economy Of Slums And Slum Redevelopment In Globalizing 
Mumbai. Department Of Sociology. Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago. 
33 For specific examples on the growing participation of the urban middle class in Indian cities, see, among 
others: Baviskar, A. (2003) Between violence and desire: space, power, and identity in the making of 
metropolitan Delhi. International Social Science Journal, 55 (175), 89 - 98. Fernandes, L. (2004) The Politics 
of Forgetting: Class Politics, State Power and the Restructuring of Urban Space in India. Urban Studies, 41 
(12), 2415-2430; Benjamin, S. (2007) Lifestyling India's metros: the elite's civic reform. IN Sudarshan, R. M. 
& Pande, S. (Eds.) Ensuring public accountability through community action: A case study in east Delhi. 
New Delhi, Institute of Social Studies Trust, New Delhi; Zerah, M. H. (2007b) Middle class neighbourhood 
associations as political players in Mumbai. Economic and Political Weekly, 42 (47), 61-68; Ghertner, D. A. 
(2011) Gentrifying the State, Gentrifying Participation: Elite Governance Programs in Delhi. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35 (3), 504-532.  
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mechanism through which the urban middle class is able to influence decision-
making is through the involvement of non-profit organizations in urban 
governance, either through Ward Committees (Nainan and Baud, 2008) or 
through more informal means (Ghosh, 2005; Ghosh, 2006).3435 
 
Power in Indian cities is therefore fragmented, making it difficult for any single 
group or individual whether in government or outside to dictate the direction of 
development and policy in Indian cities. The Indian governmental apparatus (at 
the national, regional and local levels) is currently incapable of meeting the 
demands of international capital and inter-city competition as well as those of 
urban residents, whether from civil or political society. The government response 
to this lack of capacity and its inability to keep pace with rapidly changing urban 
environments has been twofold: the first has been to adopt a carrot-and-stick 
approach to urban reform by tying financial assistance from the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) to the successful implementation of 
the reforms required by the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act; the second has 
been to invite private sector actors to participate in governance and 
development, for example, to complete specific infrastructure and development 
projects (Ministry of Finance, 2007; Gohain, 2011) or participate in planning and 
                                                
34 I discuss one such instance in Chapter 4, using the example of Bangalore where a non-profit organization, 
Janaagraha, was one of the key participants of the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) and was 
instrumental in advancing a specific middle-class agenda. For more on the role of Janaagraha in the BATF 
specifically, see: Kamath, L. (2006) Achieving global competitiveness and local poverty reduction? 
Examining the public-private partnering model of governance in Bangalore, India. Urban Planning and Policy 
Development. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. 
35 Ward Committees are a new level of local self-government mandated by the decentralization reforms of 
the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. They were intended to create a three-tier system of urban 
governance to mirror the already-existing three-tiered system of rural government. For more on Ward 
Committees and their performance in various Indian cities, see, for example: de Wit, J., Nainan, N. & 
Palnitkar, S. (2008) Urban decentralization in Indian cities: Assessing the performance of neighbourhood 
level Wards Committees. IN Baud, I. S. A. & de Wit, J. (Eds.) New forms of urban governance in India: 
shifts, models, networks & governance. First ed. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, Calif; London; Singapore, 
Sage. Ghosh, A. & Mitra, M. (2008) Institutionalizing People's Participation in Urban Governance: An Inter-
City Perspective of Wards Committees in West Bengal. IN Baud, I. S. A. & de Wit, J. (Eds.) New forms of 
urban governance in India: shifts, models, networks & governance. First ed. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, 
Calif; London; Singapore, Sage; Nainan, N. & Baud, I. S. A. (2008) Negotiating for Participation: 
Decentralisation and NGOs in Mumbai, India. IN Baud, I. S. A. & de Wit, J. (Eds.) New forms of urban 
governance in India: shifts, models, networks & governance. First ed. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, Calif; 
London; Singapore, Sage. 
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governance processes (Ghosh, 2005; Kamath, 2006; Baud and de Wit, 2008).36 
The Indian government is therefore creating spaces in which non-governmental 
actors can assert themselves and participate in urban governance and 
development processes. Governance and government in India is being 
transformed as a result of the multiplication of stakeholders, gradually moving 
towards a new framework of governance (Milbert, 2008).  
 
It is both in response to this emergence of new spaces in India as well as an 
outcome of diffused power in Indian cities that specific elite actors (real estate 
developers, corporate leaders, landowners, middle class activists) are forming 
ad-hoc urban coalitions targeting specific goals. Members of these coalitions hold 
access to key resources such as financial capital, administrative and 
governmental privileges, advanced technology and access to land. Individuals 
build on personal social networks to bring together specific actors with access to 
the necessary resources that will enable them to achieve goals that range from 
developing agricultural land to reforming urban governance policy. Although elite 
actors in Indian cities have always had access to key resources like financial 
capital and land, I argue that there is a unique set of circumstances in 
contemporary urban India prompting the formation of urban coalitions. The 
liberalization of the Indian economy in 1990-91 and the subsequent move 
towards privatization and influx of foreign investors and corporations has created 
opportunities for these elite actors in Indian cities to profitably leverage their 
existing resources. This has been complemented by policy changes that Indian 
government has undertaken, for example, the decentralization of government, 
which despite slow implementation has definitely provided elite actors an 
increased opportunity for participation. However, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that these opportunities for participation privilege particular sections of society 
                                                
36 I discuss the JNNURM in more detail in the following chapter. Briefly, it is a central government initiative 
launched in December 2005 to implement urban reforms (governmental and infrastructural) in Indian cities. 
The Indian government plans to spend approximately $20 billion over a seven-year period through this 
initiative. The central government recently (2011) announced the second phase of the JNNURM to be 
implemented in 2012.  
  47 
and will not necessarily mean uniform access for all members of urban society, 
especially marginalized urban populations (Milbert, 2008; Ghertner, 2011). 
 
I argue that urban coalitions are one example of the ways in which local actors 
are responding to the changes that global economic forces have brought to India. 
Moreover, as I discuss in the following section, the impact of globalization on 
India has not been to erode the role of national or sub-national governments but 
to enable the rescaling of power and authority within the nation by creating new 
“state spaces” and configurations of power (Brenner, 2004; Sridharan, 2008; 
Weinstein, 2009) in addition to providing economic opportunity to specific 
sections of urban society. 
 
3. Theorizing Urban Politics: From the Global to the Local 
For the first four decades since independence, India remained a relatively closed 
economy (Kothari, 1997). The Indian government focused on a ”state-led import-
substitution industrialization” (Kohli and Mullen, 2003: 198) economic policy. A 
gradual process of opening up the Indian economy began in the 1980s with the 
first loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), following which markets 
were allowed a freer hand in the Indian economy (Kothari, 1997). However, the 
economic reforms implemented in 1990-91 were the most influential and wide-
ranging. With these reforms, the Indian government began a process of 
dismantling the elaborate system of licenses and controls that had been put in 
place since independence (Kothari, 1997; Aghion et al., 2008) and began 
opening up key sectors of the Indian economy to foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Since these reforms were undertaken in the 1990s, the Indian economy has 
grown annually at an average of 6 per cent (Allen et al., 2011). The inward FDI 
stock for the country as a whole has risen from 1.5 per cent of Gross Domestic 
Product or GDP in 1995 to 12.9 per cent of GDP in 2009 (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2010). Real estate markets 
and investments in India are currently projected to be among the fastest growing 
in the Asia-Pacific region, second only to China (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2006).  
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The majority of these economic reforms were targeted at urban areas in India 
(Shaw, 2007b). While the four Indian metros – Mumbai (Bombay), Delhi, Kolkata 
(Calcutta) and Chennai (Madras) – dominated the urban system for most of the 
20th century, economic liberalization has fostered the growth of erstwhile 
secondary cities like Hyderabad, Bangalore and Pune (Shaw, 1999). From 1990-
2008, the urban contribution to India’s GDP increased from 46 per cent of the 
national share to 58 per cent and is projected to rise to about 70 per cent by 
2030 (Sankhe et al., 2010). In particular, real estate development has emerged 
as a key sector driving growth in Indian cities (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2006). 
Despite the global economic downturn in 2008-09, the Indian real estate sector 
has grown at an average of 10 per cent per annum since 2008 (Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), 2011). This growth is 
attributed at least partially to the liberalization of the real estate sector in 2005, 
following which there has been a growing domestic as well as foreign interest in 
investing in Indian real estate (Galloway and DiRocco Jr., 2011).37 This has 
meant renewed pressure on already scarce urban land in Indian cities with 
several groups competing for access to land (Dupont, 2007). 
 
As Indian cities grow, there is a tension between creating a city that serves 
domestic and international businesses, an increasingly vocal and active urban 
middle class and their demands and a city that facilitates the “everyday social 
reproduction of working people” (Zukin, 2006: 135). In common with globalizing 
cities the world over, urban India is rapidly reconfiguring its space, catering 
increasingly to the demands of international and domestic capital (Benjamin, 
2000; Chatterjee, 2004b; Benjamin, 2006).38 It has often been argued that as 
cities become more and more integrated into the global economy, there is a 
                                                
37 I discuss real estate development more in Chapter 5, focusing particularly on two development projects in 
Bangalore and Pune.  
38 Marcuse and van Kempen (2008: 263) use the term “globalizing cities to reflect two different points: that 
(almost) all cities are touched by the process of globalization and that involvement in that process is not a 
matter of being either at the top or the bottom of it, but rather of the nature and extent of influence of the 
process.” Marcuse, P. & Kempen, R. V. (2008) Conclusion: A Changed Spatial Order. IN Marcuse, P. & 
Kempen, R. V. (Eds.) Globalizing Cities. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
  49 
growing social polarization between a new emerging class of young professional 
workers and the older industrial and manufacturing workers and other low-wage 
employees, often immigrants (Friedmann, 1995; Sassen, 2006b; Sassen, 
2006a). However, the manifestations of this inequity and its causes are diverse 
and are rooted in the specific historical, social and cultural contexts of each 
region (Shatkin, 2007).  
 
The ‘dualism’ in the economy of Indian cities is exemplified by the separation 
between their ‘local’ and ‘corporate economies’ (Benjamin, 2000: 35; Harriss, 
2010).39 Benjamin (2000) explains the implications of these economies for urban 
planning, politics and governance. According to him, ‘local’ economies typically 
emerge in the grey areas that fall just beyond the purview of the city’s master 
plan, share a tenuous relationship with land occupancy and often illegally 
appropriate space for economic, residential and social needs. Those employed in 
these ‘local’ economies – typically the urban poor and low-income groups – 
interact with authority through municipal government: the Municipal Corporation, 
city councilors, and low-level bureaucracy (Benjamin, 2000: 35). Their 
relationships inhabit the space of Chatterjee’s political society (Chatterjee, 
2004c). ‘Corporate’ economies exhibit almost diametrically opposite 
characteristics. Typically populated by “rights-bearing, enfranchised bourgeois 
citizens” (Roy, 2011: 227) exemplified by Chatterjee’s civil society (Chatterjee, 
2004c), ‘corporate’ economies interact with authority through state, parastatal 
and national governments and their agencies that have little local representation 
but take most decisions that affect the planning and development of Indian cities. 
This leaves disenfranchised, poor groups at a tremendous disadvantage. This is 
an even more critical issue as Indian cities face pressure to compete for 
investment globally. As demands on land, infrastructure and urban services 
increase, “rigid land use controls in the expanding corporate enclave areas 
                                                
39 Benjamin (2000) explains the difference between the terms as follows, using Bangalore as an example: 
for the most part, ‘local’ economies constitute the informal sector, providing the majority of the city’s 
population employment, particularly the urban poor; ‘corporate’ economies, on the other hand, comprise of 
the industrial, bureaucratic, and in the case of Bangalore, the IT, elite. 
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exclude most pro-poor economic activity and threaten poorer groups’ fragile 
claims to land. Poor groups suffer demolition, resettlement, increased land prices 
and a governance system in which their local representative structure has little 
power” (Benjamin, 2000: 35).  
 
In the last two decades, the role of private sector actors in urban planning and 
governance processes has increased, for example, through the creation of public 
private partnerships for infrastructure provision as well as governance reform 
(Kamath, 2006; Ministry of Finance, 2007; Mahalingam, 2010). As the 
participation of private sector actors or ‘corporate’ economies and other civil 
society actors in urban planning processes increases, it raises questions about 
the role of the state. Keil (1998: 622) has argued that with the move towards 
neoliberalism and greater integration with international markets, global capitalism 
‘weakens’ the nation-state, thereby reducing its influence domestically as well as 
internationally. However, this dissertation rejects such simplistic analyses that 
point to erosion of the nation-state and highlight the importance of global 
processes and forces over those acting at the sub-national, i.e. regional and city 
levels. It emphasizes that the impact of globalization has not been to erode the 
role of national or sub-national governments but that it has enabled the rescaling 
of power and authority within the nation by creating new “state spaces” and 
configurations of power (Keil, 1998; Brenner, 2004; Weinstein, 2009).  
 
Economic liberalization and the move towards neoliberalism in India has resulted 
in a transition towards new forms of regulatory regimes (Roy, 2003: 142) 
although this has not meant the weakening of the Indian national government. 
On the contrary, the Indian government continues to perform its role as a 
regulator, albeit in concert with other non-governmental actors. The economic 
reform process in particular has conferred greater economic freedom on the state 
governments in India, allowing regional government leaders to be more 
entrepreneurial (Ahluwalia, 2000; Rudolph and Rudolph, 2006). As the Indian 
economic policy encouraged privatization, urban regions have emerged as key 
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sites for economic growth (Sankhe et al., 2010; Dupont, 2011). Simultaneously, 
by enacting urban policy reform, the Indian government has attempted to transfer 
governance functions to urban local bodies, thereby shifting the scale of state 
action as well, rendering local governments in particular more autonomous 
(Sridharan, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, recent studies of the decentralization reforms have shown that the 
state’s attempts at rescaling governance have been fitful at best (National 
Institute of Urban Affairs (N.I.U.A.), 2005; Baud and de Wit, 2008; Harriss, 2010). 
A recent report conducted by the National Institute of Urban Affairs (N.I.U.A.) 
(2005) found that “some states have performed better than others. An important 
observation is that while there has been full compliance in respect of provisions, 
such as constitution of three types of ULBs (Urban Local Bodies), reservation of 
seats, and constitution of SFCs (State Finance Commissions), the same cannot 
be said for other provisions, namely constitution of Wards Committees, District 
Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees” (National Institute 
of Urban Affairs (N.I.U.A.), 2005: viii). The report also found that in most cases, 
decisions at the local level continued to be subject to the final approval of the 
regional (state) government. Therefore, state governments were complying with 
the reforms to the extent of creating a partial local governance institutional 
framework, but leaving it largely powerless when it came to actual decision-
making and implementation capacities.  
 
Given that the Indian government has been slow to enact or perhaps, enforce, 
rescaling efforts, there has been a growing number of ‘civil society’ (Chatterjee, 
2004b) actors that have begun to take the initiative in doing so. I argue that the 
urban coalitions that are the focus of this dissertation represent one such 
attempt. Elite actors in Indian cities are taking advantage of the opportunities that 
have emerged as a result of the economic and governance reforms that the 
Indian government has tried to implement. For example, as I discuss in Chapter 
5, landowners in Pune, Maharashtra formed a coalition based on kinship 
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networks, social and political connections to profitably develop their erstwhile 
agricultural land into a large integrated township. However, this was also possible 
only as a result of several economic incentives that the Indian national 
government and the Maharashtra state government had implemented as a part 
of the overall liberalization program.40 Similarly, as I discuss in Chapter 4, several 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been creating ‘participatory 
spaces’ (Sridharan, 2008: 293) and demanding the right to take part in urban 
governance processes.  
 
Indian cities today are therefore emerging as “key sites of contemporary state 
institutional and spatial restructuring” (Brenner, 2004: 2) The number of vocal 
stakeholders involved has increased, each of whom interacts with other urban 
actors in their own unique way. While some channel the power of ‘civil society’ to 
exert their influence, others use ‘vote-bank politics’ (Benjamin, 2008). Urban 
planning and development in India is therefore the site of continuous and 
constant conflict and upheaval (Baviskar, 2002; Bunsha, 2006; Fernandes, 2007; 
Berland Kaul, 2010). To begin theorizing this complex web of urban political 
change in India, I look to theories of urban politics that were developed to answer 
similar questions of power and politics in the context of a globalizing world, albeit 
in a different geographical milieu.  
 
While these questions have been under-theorized in Indian urban studies, other 
scholars working in a variety of other contexts have extensively discussed similar 
issues, particularly in applications of regime theory (Stone, 1989; Kirby and Abu-
Rass, 1999; Fainstein, 2001; Zhang, 2002; Wood, 2004; Dahl, 2005; Kulcsar and 
Domokos, 2005; Strom, 2007; Yang and Chang, 2007; Shatkin, 2008). Although 
regime theory has not been used explicitly in published work in the Indian 
context, there have been some studies in recent years that examine the 
dynamics of contemporary urban politics in India, focusing on specific political 
                                                
40 Interviews with bankers, lawyers and developers in Pune revealed that despite the fact that the national 
and state governments had enacted these reforms, the landowners in Pune were the first group in the city to 
actually take advantage of these. Several developers followed suit however.  
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actors in Indian cities (for example, see Kamath, 2006; Weinstein, 2008; 
Weinstein, 2009; Ghertner, 2011). Frameworks used by regime theory can 
therefore provide a useful though somewhat unusual starting point for 
understanding these changes in India.  
 
Regime theory raises questions about urban development and governance that 
are very relevant to contemporary Indian urbanization, addressing issues of 
social power and the role that coalitions between interested parties play in the 
development and governing of cities, of which land is but one issue (Stone, 1989; 
Fainstein, 1995; Lauria, 1999). It became a prominent means of analyzing urban 
politics following Clarence Stone’s work on Atlanta. According to Stone, a regime 
is “an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources 
that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (Stone, 
quoted in Stoker, 1995: 58-59). It originates in a political economy perspective 
that rejects both pluralistic assumptions that governmental authority is adequate 
to form and implement policies as well as structuralist assumptions that 
economic forces determine policy (Stone in Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). 
Regime theory is interested in understanding “how and under what conditions do 
different types of governing coalitions emerge, consolidate and become 
hegemonic or devolve and transform” (Lauria, 1997: 1-2).  
 
Regime theory also provides a way of relating “local and extra-local forces” 
(Stone, 1998: 2) by locating cities within a larger global framework, examining 
how processes of globalization and worldwide economic restructuring impact the 
social order within cities (Fainstein, 1995). It also views “power as fragmented 
and regimes as the collaborative arrangements through which local governments 
and private actors assemble the capacity to govern” (Mossberger and Stoker, 
2001: 812). Regime theorists assume that once elected, government officials 
must “govern in coalition with those private actors who have the resources to 
assist them in attaining their policy goals and personal ambitions” (Fainstein, 
1995: 35). The effectiveness of government therefore depends on the 
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combination of state and non-state resources, and on the cooperation between 
those who hold access to these resources (Stone, 1993). Moreover, regime 
theorists do not view government officials as “disinterested technocrats, instead 
seeing them as political actors who can either promote or contest the dominance 
of capital by shaping the discourses that surround the implementation growth-
oriented politics” (Shatkin, 2007: 9).  
 
Although this theory was proposed to mainly understand and explain 
urbanization process in the United States, it has been used to study urban issues 
in the U.K., even though scholars have questioned the relevance of the 
theoretical framework arguing that the institutional structure and the mechanisms 
that lead to the formation of alliances are very different in the two countries 
(Davies, 2003). It has also been applied in the context of European, Australian, 
South American and Chinese cities (Fainstein, 1995; Lauria, 1997; Stoker, 1998; 
Stone, 1998; Fainstein, 2001; Zhang, 2002; Stone, 2004; Xu and Yeh, 2005; 
Zunino, 2006). The main concerns with applying regime theory to urban politics 
outside the United States stem from the assumptions that the theory makes 
about the socio-political context within which regimes operate. Regime theory 
assumes a liberal political economy where government officials are elected 
through an open and competitive process and the economy is guided largely by 
privately controlled investment decisions (Stone, 1993; Shatkin, 2007). Moreover, 
the American regime reflects “a distinct context of racial politics, post-Fordist 
urban development, liberalism, and localism” (Shatkin, 2007: 9). Therefore, when 
attempting to apply frameworks from regime theory to cities outside the US, it is 
essential to take into account the very different social, economic and political 
histories that shape power structures and the urban politics in these cities.  
 
The Indian context presents particular challenges for the applicability of regime 
theory. The basic assumptions of regime theory are the existence of a liberal 
political economy and the presence of a democratic electoral process. While 
India is a democracy at all levels of government, the Indian economy is only 
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gradually moving towards a more liberal, market-based structure, where the 
private sector is playing an increasingly important role. The Indian government at 
the national and state levels continues to remain a powerful regulatory authority 
and monitor the extent of private sector involvement in the economy. In addition, 
the extent of private sector involvement (while growing) is still limited to key 
sectors of the economy that have been deregulated and the government (through 
various public sector undertakings) is still a major economic player in India. 
Therefore, the assumption that government officials, once elected, must govern 
together with the private sector to achieve their policy goals is not entirely true in 
the case of India. It is only recently that the government has begun to tap into 
private sector resources to enable it to reach policy and planning goals (Ministry 
of Finance, 2007).  
 
Second, regime theory strongly emphasizes the importance and the role of local 
city governments, and especially the mayor, in mobilizing and sustaining a 
regime. There is little room for regional governments and the role that politicians 
and government officials acting at this level play in local city-level decisions. In 
Indian cities, for example, mayors are only figureheads, lacking any real power.41 
There is very little ‘real’ power that is vested in local, municipal governments. The 
state (regional) government takes decisions regarding urban planning and 
governance in conjunction with various parastatal bodies (like development 
authorities), also controlled by regional governments. In fact, state government 
officials often consider city governments as competitors rather than collaborators 
and are concerned about loss of patronage networks to city government officials 
(Weinstein, 2009). In most cases, city governments have little say in the 
decision-making process, and are tasked only with the implementation of the final 
plan or policy (Weinstein, 2010).42 Any theory that attempts to explain urban 
                                                
41 I discuss governmental structure, including the role and responsibilities of mayors and other officials, in 
more detail in the next chapter.  
42 This also came across in various interviews that I conducted with government officials (both retired and 
present) in Bangalore, Pune and Mumbai. Recounting his frustration with the Karnataka State Ministry of 
Urban Development, one planning official at the Bangalore Development Authority explained to me that all 
plans created by city planning officials were subject to the approval of the state government that could and 
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politics in India will therefore have to take this state-local government relationship 
into account, especially because state government leaders often play a strong 
role in attracting private sector investment to urban regions within their states 
(Ahluwalia, 2000; Rudolph and Rudolph, 2006; Chatterjee, 2008b). 
 
Regime analysis also falls short in attempting to explain political issues that may 
not be related to economic development – such as those of identity and gender 
(Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). It does not take into account groups that may 
not be part of the ruling elite, for example, marginalized groups like farmers, 
women and the urban poor. These groups are important as well as vocal 
stakeholders in the process of urban development in Indian cities (Dupont, 2007). 
Moreover, these groups, which Partha Chatterjee has described as forming the 
core of India’s ‘political society’ (Chatterjee, 2004b), also play an important role in 
electoral politics, forming a large vote bank that most political parties are eager to 
tap (Benjamin, 2008).  
 
In addition, the theory suggests that regimes are formed on the basis of a formal 
power relationship between those that wield economic power (usually in the form 
of large corporations) and those in government (Stone, 1989). Urban coalitions in 
India however build on personal networks that are grounded not only in economic 
relations but also caste, community and kinship networks (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig, 2007). Actors, in this case, elite urban actors, draw on relationships 
based on personal associations whether based on kinship, community, caste, 
school ties or personal friendships to mobilize resources into a coalition. This 
considerably changes the dynamic that leads to the formation and dissolution of 
alliances. While issues of trust, cooperation and collaboration are vital to the 
formation and maintenance of regimes anywhere (Mossberger and Stoker, 
2001), trust in urban coalitions in the Indian context  is assured through 
modalities which differ from more formal, legally contractual forms that 
                                                                                                                                            
often did change up to 20 per cent of the plan document. He also mentioned that there was little that the city 
planners could do in response to these changes that the state government requested.  
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predominate elsewhere in the US or even the European context. Regimes or 
coalitions in the Indian context are also more transient; often dissolving after their 
specific goal has been achieved.  
 
Regime theory therefore points us to relevant questions about “socio-economic 
and political change in the global era: What political and economic interests do 
urban development outcomes represent? What alternative sources of power 
exist?” (Shatkin, 2007: 10) To paraphrase Strom (2007: 149), by placing the 
relationship between those who hold economic power and political power at the 
centre of urban analysis, regime theorists shed light on aspects of city 
development in India that are not well understood or documented. It also helps 
us locate these changes within the larger framework of economic globalization 
and liberalization that is currently taking place in India and understand the 
manner in which governmental and non-governmental actors form alliances to 
achieve specific goals (policy change, development goals or personal ambitions) 
and their constraints and opportunities (Shatkin, 2007). Although regime theory 
does not explicitly account for the specific types of social and political 
relationships particular to the Indian context, I argue that it is possible to ask 
similar questions about power and politics in a new context, examining, as 
regime theory suggests, the changing relationship between economic and 
political stakeholders. 
 
The following chapter examines economic and urban policy reforms that have 
taken place in India over the last two decades, since 1990. In particular, it 
focuses on the decentralization reforms mandated by the 74th Constitutional 
Amendment and the national urban renewal program tied to these reforms: the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). Chapters 4 and 5 
build on this chapter and the next, using empirical data to explain and analyze 
the changing nature of urban planning, development and governance in 
Bangalore and Pune.  
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CHAPTER III 
UNDERSTANDING URBAN INDIA: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
To say that the nineties represent a watershed in Indian economic and political 
history would not be an exaggeration. The budget of 1990-91 ushered in the 
most comprehensive economic reforms that the country had seen since 
independence. These were different from the earlier incremental economic 
reforms of the 1980s in that they were based on a clear recognition that there 
was a greater need to integrate India with “the global economy through trade, 
investment and technology flows and…to create conditions which would give 
Indian entrepreneurs an environment broadly comparable to that in other 
developing countries” (Ahluwalia, 1995: 2). The 1990-91 reforms included a 
reduction of and a future cap on the Indian government’s fiscal deficit, removal of 
barriers to entry in industry (in particular, the abolishment of the complex system 
of licensing that governed Indian industry), government disinvestment of public 
sector industries, easing the regulations for foreign direct investment (FDI), 
liberalizing trade policy (especially dismantling the elaborate import control 
regime), tax reforms (such as reducing tax rates for businesses and individuals 
as well as reduction of excise and import duties), and banking sector reform 
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(allowing the entry of private banks and financial institutions) (Ahluwalia, 1995; 
Aghion et al., 2008). The gradual process of liberalizing the Indian economy has 
continued over the last two decades, with further sectors being opened up to 
private investment and encouraging greater international investment in India. A 
key sector that was deregulated was real estate (2005), prompting an increase in 
foreign and domestic investment in real estate as well as rapid urban 
development (Just et al., 2006; AFP, 2007; Chaudhary, 2007; Ganesh, 2007; 
Khaleej Times, 2011).43  
 
Following on the heels of the economic reforms, several fundamental legislative 
changes were implemented particularly targeting urban regions. These included 
the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (1992) mandating the devolution of power 
to local governments and municipal authorities and the repeal of the Urban Land 
Ceiling Regulation Act (ULCRA) that regulated the amount of land individuals 
were allowed to hold and develop in urban areas. Continuing this trend of urban 
reform, in December 2005, the Indian national government also launched the 
country’s most ambitious urban reform program: the Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), committing to investing over USD 20 billion 
in India’s cities over a period of seven years. In May 2011, the Indian national 
government announced a second phase of the JNNURM to be launched in 2012, 
with plans to invest approximately an additional USD 25 billion in India’s cities.  
 
The changes that the country has witnessed over the course of the last two 
decades must be understood within the larger framework of the neoliberal project 
that the Indian government embraced with these reforms, leading to a greater 
involvement of “quasi- and non-state actors in a variety of state functions” like 
                                                
43 The global financial crisis of 2008-09 did affect Indian real estate, particularly the collapse of several US 
financial institutions that had considerable investments in Indian real estate projects. This resulted in several 
projects being abandoned, while others were left incomplete. However, recent data (2011) from the 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) shows that despite the slowdown, the 
Indian real estate sector has continued to grow since 2008 at an average rate of 10 per cent annually 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) (2011). Current State of Indian Economy, 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). .  
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infrastructure provision, urban planning and governance (Roy, 2003: 142).44 
Although the nation-state is still very important politically and national institutions 
continue to be vital to the formulation and implementation of policy, the principal 
level of political and economic coordination is shifting and being reconfigured as 
urban regions emerge as key sites in this process of rescaling (Jessop, 1994; 
Roy, 2003; Brenner, 2004). Liberalization reforms reduced the national 
government’s control over economic management at the state-level, leaving state 
governments more free to pursue their own economic and developmental goals, 
which have increasingly been concentrated around metropolitan economies in 
each state (Shaw, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2000).45 This has been complemented by 
simultaneous legislative reform empowering urban government and 
decentralizing power to urban local bodies. The actual process of empowering 
local-level government agencies, however, has been slow and varies widely from 
state to state in India. As a result, although decentralization reforms were passed 
almost two decades ago, the impacts of these reforms, in practice, is as yet 
indeterminate. Nonetheless, as state power begins to be reconfigured in post-
liberalization India, urban regions are emerging as “targets for a variety of far-
reaching institutional changes and policy realignments designed to enhance local 
economic growth capacities” (Brenner, 2004: 3).  
 
                                                
44 According to Jessop (2002: 454), neoliberalism needs to be understood as both an economic and political 
project. As an economic project, it calls for “liberalization and deregulation of economic transactions not only 
within national borders but also…across these borders; the privatization of state-owned enterprises and 
state-provided services; the use of market proxies in the residual public sector; and the treatment of public 
welfare spending as a cost of international production, rather than as a source of domestic demand”; as a 
political project, it looks to “roll back routine forms of state intervention” typically associated with the 
Keynesian welfare state or with mixed economies while simultaneously encouraging state intervention in the 
establishment and creation of “new forms of governance (including state intervention) that are purportedly 
more suited to a market-driven (and, more recently, also allegedly knowledge-driven) globalizing economy” 
Jessop, B. (2002) Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State–Theoretical Perspective. 
Antipode, 34 (3), 452-472.. It is in this sense that I use the terms ‘neoliberal’ and ‘neoliberalism’ 
45 However, not all states in India have benefited equally from the economic reforms. Some states (like 
Gujarat and Maharashtra) have been much better at creating an economically attractive environment than 
states like Bihar and Orissa (which are also among the poorest states in India) Kothari, S. (1997) Whose 
Independence? The Social Impact of Economic Reform in India. Journal of International Affairs, 51 (1), 
85(1); Shaw, A. (1999) Emerging patterns of urban growth in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 34 (16-
17), 969-978; Ahluwalia, M. S. (2000) Economic Performance of States in the Post-Reforms Period. 
Economic and Political Weekly, 35 (19), 1637-48. 
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While the coming chapters examine specific ways in which national economic 
and policy reforms have influenced particular Indian cities, this chapter takes a 
step back and examines the larger picture. It has two interrelated aims: the first is 
to situate Indian cities in the context of larger level economic, political and 
legislative changes that have been taking place nationally. I examine specific 
government initiatives and their impact on urban India. The second aim of this 
chapter is to position, compare and contrast Bangalore and Pune, the two case 
study cities, within this rubric and to understand how the changing circumstances 
have empowered certain social groups or actors over others in each city, giving 
them the ability to shape development and governance policy. In particular, I find 
that the decentralization reforms included in the 74th Constitutional Amendment 
have opened up avenues of participation for non-state actors in Bangalore and 
Pune. While the state governments of Karnataka and Maharashtra have been 
slow to devolve power to urban local bodies, non-state actors like corporate 
leaders, academics, and civic activists have used the existence of the 
decentralization reforms, particularly the requirement to increase public 
participation in planning processes, to demand a greater role in planning and 
governance in Bangalore and Pune.  
 
Although the emergence of various urban policy reforms is changing the urban 
political environment, personal networks continue to be important for non-state 
actors to form alliances and achieve specific developmental goals. This 
convergence of new formal mechanisms of governance and the existing, more 
informal, means of accomplishing urban development is creating a new hybrid 
urban politics in India where informal networks converge with formal governance 
mechanisms. In this new political environment, non-state actors are being co-
opted into more formal government processes through a variety of ways such as 
public-private partnerships, participatory models of planning and governance and 
as consultants to national, state and city governments. Whether the current more 
informal arrangement by which coalitions are formed and developmental goals 
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are achieved will eventually be replaced with more formal governance 
mechanisms is an open question.  
 
The first half of this chapter focuses on urban government in India, examining its 
evolution and functions under colonial rule as well as in independent India. Using 
this as context, I then focus on the recent urban policy reforms, specifically the 
decentralization reforms mandated by the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act 
(CAA) and the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). In 
doing so, I draw on a variety of data sources, including the actual texts of the 
reform legislations, other government documents and reports, reports from 
independent researchers and consulting firms and newspaper articles. The 
second half of the chapter focuses on the two case sites: Bangalore and Pune. I 
examine the specific histories of urban governance and development in these 
cities and also the impact that the recent economic and legislative reforms have 
had on each city. For this, I draw on primary data sources (personal 
observations, interviews during fieldwork) as well as a variety of secondary data 
including government reports and newspaper articles.    
 
2. Urban Local Government in India: 
The political legacy of colonial rule has played an important role in shaping 
contemporary Indian government. It has often been suggested that the political 
weakness of the Indian municipal system is a result of colonial legacies (Pinto, 
2000; Fahim, 2009; Weinstein, 2009). The first instance of colonial municipal 
government in India dates back to the Madras (present-day Chennai) Municipal 
Corporation (1687), followed by similar municipal corporations in Bombay 
(Mumbai) and Calcutta (Kolkata) in 1726 (Pinto, 2000). The British had always 
relied on the local Indian population by recruiting them as civil servants and 
soldiers to help them establish control over the country, particularly in the early 
half of the nineteenth century (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). However, after the 
revolt of 1857, to retain control over India, the colonial British government 
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needed to obtain at least a measure of support from the urban elites in India. As 
Corbridge and Harriss (2000: 7) explain, this led to a gradual and “limited 
introduction of local self-government”, beginning in 1861, when the first Provincial 
Councils were set up in Bengal, Madras and Bombay with mostly British 
members along with a handful of Indian ‘non-official’ nominated representatives.  
 
The declaration of Lord Mayo’s resolution in 1870 brought greater 
decentralization to Indian local governments, encouraging increased involvement 
of Indians in administration as well as introducing elected presidents at the 
municipal level (Pinto, 2000; Aijaz, 2008; Fahim, 2009). However, this form of 
local self-government was little more than an administrative mechanism for tax 
collection and to ensure the stability of British rule in India (Pinto, 2000). 
Substantial local governmental reform came to Indian cities with the declaration 
of Lord Ripon’s resolution of 1882. As Pinto (2000) writes, Lord Ripon advocated 
for the extension of local self-government to tap into local knowledge and interest 
to improve administration. Among other things, the resolution provided that no 
more than one-third of local officials would be nominated with the rest being 
directly elected by the people and that financial responsibility would be 
transferred to local government officials including control over taxes collected 
within the jurisdiction. However, the resolution met with considerable opposition 
from other senior British officials in India and was not implemented in its entirety 
(Pinto, 2000).  
 
Lord Ripon’s resolution was followed by the Morley-Minto reforms in 1909, the 
Montague-Chelmsford reforms in 1918, and the Government of India Act in 1919, 
that reinforced the notion and implementation of local self-government, bringing 
greater decentralization to colonial Indian municipal government (Corbridge and 
Harriss, 2000; Pinto, 2000). However, despite these reforms that brought some 
measure of democracy to local self-government in colonial India, the emphasis 
remained on “administrative efficiency” (Pinto, 2000: 60) and limited the extent of 
the involvement of Indian politicians, especially keeping them away from political 
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responsibilities that directly affected the interests of the colonial government such 
as “land-use powers and industrial policy that would directly impact the colonial 
economy” (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Weinstein, 2009:132). 
 
Although independent India did inherit a weak municipal governmental structure 
from the British, the lack of power at the local level in India is also an outcome of 
a deliberate decision taken by the Constituent Assembly of independent India: 
leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, and Vallabhbhai 
Patel believed power at the local level to be organized around communal and 
ethnic principles rather than democratic ones and that the less local the Indian 
governmental system, the more democratic it would be (Corbridge and Harriss, 
2000; Weinstein, 2009). Therefore, although independent India was envisioned 
as a democratic, secular, federal republic, the application of the federalist 
principle in India is weak in practice (Stepan, 1999; Corbridge and Harriss, 
2000).46 The Constituent Assembly and national leaders, like Nehru, Patel and 
B.R. Ambedkar, were concerned that a stronger federalist structure would 
weaken the overall unity of the union and make it more difficult for national 
governments to push for economic and social development (Stepan, 1999; 
Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). So, while the Indian government is structured 
along federalist lines, the Indian constitution only outlines powers for the central 
and state governments, leaving the three-tier federalist structure incomplete 
(Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Weinstein, 2009). Local self-government is part of 
the state list in the Indian constitution, giving state governments considerable 
discretion over the role and powers of local bodies (Pinto, 2000; Ministry of Law 
and Justice (Legislative department), 2007). Moreover, although state 
                                                
46 As Corbridge and Harriss (2000: 28) write, the application of the federalist principle in India is evident in 
the “Rajya Sabha (or the Council of States) at the Centre, in a division of powers, responsibilities and 
resources between the Centre and the States, and in the direct election of members to the lower houses of 
State parliaments”. Moreover, state governments are responsible for maintaining law and order and the 
provision of other services such as education, health, power, roads and urban development within their 
jurisdictions and have their own High Courts. State governments also have some degree of financial 
freedom in that they are permitted to raise their own funds through taxes and fees. Corbridge, S. & Harriss, 
J. (2000) Reinventing India: liberalization, Hindu nationalism and popular democracy, Cambridge, UK 
Malden, MA, Polity Press ; 
Blackwell. 
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governments may devolve power over urban development and planning 
(including housing, infrastructure and economic development) to local 
governments, most have chosen not to (Pinto, 2000; Weinstein, 2009).  
 
Since urban planning and development are listed under the State schedule of the 
Indian constitution, the Indian national government has little direct control over 
these issues (Shaw, 1996). However, as Shaw (1996) argues, since few state 
governments have actually exercised their ability to make urban policy, the Indian 
national government’s urban policy guidelines as laid out in the Five-Year plans 
have assumed a greater importance. As I briefly discussed in Chapter 2, there 
was little attention paid to urban areas in national planning until the Third Five-
Year (1961-66) plan. The Third plan provided funds for the development of city 
master plans (to be prepared by state governments), the enactment of key 
legislation to facilitate this process, and also, the increase of government control 
over urban land, its use and development (Shaw, 1996).  
 
Consecutive plans put considerable emphasis on urban development: the Fourth 
plan (1969-74) saw the establishment of the Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation (HUDCO), and the beginning of several large urban development 
projects such as the development of new state capitals like Gandhinagar, 
Chandigarh, Bhubaneshwar and Bhopal; the Fifth plan (1974-79) emphasized a 
need for urban land policy, building on the Third and Fourth plans, provided for 
financial assistance for metropolitan development and also saw the passage of 
the Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act (ULCRA) in 1976; the Sixth plan (1980-
85) continued the funding provided for metropolitan development in earlier plans 
while also providing for the development of smaller towns through the 
establishment of the Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns 
(IDSMT) scheme (Shaw, 1996). Interestingly, as Shaw (1996) demonstrates, 
while the 1960s and 1970s saw increasing centralization of urban management, 
especially financial management, there was also a continued rhetoric in the Five-
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Year plans (beginning with the Third Plan) that emphasized decentralization of 
urban government.  
 
There were no concerted efforts undertaken to actually implement any form of 
decentralization until the mid-1980s, however. This was triggered in part by the 
growing realization at the time of the drawbacks of excessive centralization of 
urban growth and management of the 1960s and 1970s (Shaw, 1996: 224). The 
first serious attempt at decentralizing of power and resources to local 
governments as well granting them constitutional recognition was made in the 
Seventh Plan period (1985-90). In 1989, Rajiv Gandhi, the then-Prime Minister of 
India introduced a bill, the 65th Constitutional Amendment Act, in Parliament that 
would strengthen urban local bodies (Pinto, 2008). This bill included suggestions 
made by the National Commission on Urbanization (1988) and attempted to 
create an effective third-tier of government at the municipal level in Indian cities 
(Shaw, 1996). However, this bill did not pass mainly because it “eroded the 
domain and authority of the state governments” (Shaw, 1996; Corbridge and 
Harriss, 2000; Pinto, 2008: 54). A few opposition party politicians questioned the 
competence of Parliament to pass such a bill, claiming that it “altered the basic 
features of the constitution”, protesting that the bill was politically motivated, and 
that it bypassed the Chief Ministers of state governments (Pinto, 2008: 54).  
 
Urban local government in India therefore continued to be the “weakest link in the 
political fabric of the country” (Pinto, 2000: 61). This was partly an outcome of 
financial and technical shortcomings, and partly, as I discussed in Chapter 2, due 
to the lack of quality personnel. Often, municipal corporations in Indian cities lack 
the capacity or technical training to undertake planning and development 
functions, and responsibility for planning and development often lies largely with 
state government-appointed parastatal bodies like the development authorities 
(see, for instance, The Gazetteers Department, Maharashtra). Moreover, as 
others have argued, state-level politicians and bureaucrats have been unwilling 
to devolve power to their counterparts in municipal government although they 
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had the power to do so, tending to view municipal officials as competitors rather 
than collaborators (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Pinto, 2000; Weinstein, 2009; 
Weinstein, 2010). In 1992, therefore, the Indian national government made a 
second attempt at reforming urban governance through the 74th Constitutional 
Amendment Act.   
 
a) Reforming urban local government: The 74th Constitutional 
Amendment Act  
The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) was drafted keeping in mind the 
issues that had jeopardized its forerunner, the 65th Amendment. As a result, 
although it specifically targeted the weakness in urban local government and 
mandated the transfer of strategic governance to urban local bodies and 
encouraged participatory democracy, it was careful to avoid the issue of state 
autonomy (Pinto, 2008; Fahim, 2009; Dupont, 2011). As a result, it considerably 
diluted the provisions by allocating significant discretion to the state governments 
in its implementation (Pinto, 2008; Harriss, 2010). 
 
The main aim of the 74th CAA was to decentralize government with the transfer 
decision-making and governance responsibilities to state and municipal level 
governments (Kennedy, 2007). It also promoted participation by a wider base of 
players at the local level, making room particularly for marginalized communities 
and underrepresented interest groups by reserving seats for these groups in 
urban local bodies (Mahadevia, 2003). The 74th CAA provides for changes in the 
“constitution, composition and functioning of urban local governments” (Aijaz, 
2008: 132). Explicitly it: 
• “Confers constitutional status on urban local bodies (such as 
Municipalities), which are provided with elected councils and constitute the 
third tier of government (the other two being the Central Government and 
the government of each state of the Union); 
• Allows for the participation of women and the weaker sections of society 
through the reservation of seats (one third for women, and for the 
scheduled castes – i.e. former untouchables – and tribes, in proportion to 
their demographic weight in the population of the corresponding 
constituency); 
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• Transfers to urban local bodies the responsibility of urban development, in 
particular of providing urban infrastructure and services as well as 
mobilizing the required financial resources – through taxes, levying users’ 
costs and by attracting private national and foreign investments;” 
(Government of India, 1992; Dupont, 2007: 91) 
 
In a nutshell, the main changes that the 74th Constitutional Amendment provides 
for are: the formation of three types of municipalities, determined by the 
population of the urban area they were serving, thereby simplifying the structure 
of municipal government; the transfer of responsibility of urban development to 
urban local bodies; and granting local governments greater financial and 
functional responsibility with respect to their own jurisdictions (National Institute 
of Urban Affairs (N.I.U.A.), 2005; Harriss, 2010; Dupont, 2011).47 It is the first 
instance since independence where provision has been made in the Constitution 
to empower local urban government, particularly municipalities, with the aim of 
creating a third-tier of government in urban areas that would play a similar role as 
that of the Panchayats in rural government. Until the passage of the 74th 
Amendment Act, local governments in India were organized on the basis of the 
‘ultra vires’ principle, which meant that the state governments could alter the 
functions of local governments through executive decisions without having to 
alter legislative provisions (National Institute of Urban Affairs (N.I.U.A.), 2005).48 
However, since 1992, municipal governments are gradually being empowered to 
take on a more active role in local urban governance (Aijaz, 2008). These 
reforms have created opportunities for municipal governments to be more directly 
involved in developing strategies for urban development (Kennedy, 2007).  
 
                                                
47 Prior to the implementation of the 1992 Act, urban local government was defined by the Municipal 
Corporations, Municipal Councils, Town Area Committees and Notified Area Councils/Committees. Hence, 
the structure and composition of municipalities varied considerably, with wide differences in definition and 
structure between States. The three kinds of municipalities that the 74th Amendment Act created were: (i) 
Nagar Panchayats for areas in transition from a rural area to urban area; (ii) Municipal Councils for smaller 
urban areas (population over 25,000); and (iii) Municipal Corporations for larger urban areas (population 
over 3,00,000). Government of India (1992) The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. ; National Informatics 
Centre (NIC) (2005a) National Portal of India. Department of Information Technology, Ministry of 
Communications & Information Technology, Government of India. Accessed on August 8, 2011, 
http://www.india.gov.in/citizen/nagarpalika/nagarpalika.php 
48 The ‘ultra vires’ principle ensures that any act that is carried out by an organization (in this case, the local 
government) that extends beyond its capacity or scope to act will be considered invalid.  
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The Amendment specifically lists the functions of urban local bodies, outlining 
their “planning, regulation and development powers” (Fahim, 2009: 3). Some of 
the more specific changes that it mandates include the provision of ‘Ward 
Committees’ in areas with population exceeding 300,000 people, as means of 
increasing local participation in decision-making processes (Harriss, 2010); the 
conducting of regular elections to urban local bodies such as the municipal 
council; the transfer of urban development functions to local government, 
including raising the necessary financial capital through a variety of public and 
private sources; and a division of power at the local level through elected and 
nominated officials (Fahim, 2009; Dupont, 2011). The successful implementation 
of these provisions would undoubtedly result in a significant rescaling of power at 
the state and municipal levels of government. At present, state-level politicians 
control urban governance and development through a complex network of local 
patronage politics. These reforms would significantly reduce the influence that 
both state governments and the parastatal bodies they control would have on 
local government and its decision-making processes (Harriss, 2010).  
 
The 74th CAA is modeled on the more ambitious 73rd Amendment, which deals 
exclusively with decentralization of rural government.49 However, while the 73rd 
Constitutional Amendment explicitly creates a three-tier regional-local 
government in rural areas, the 74th Amendment is less bold. Fearing that regional 
level politicians would yet again oppose the bill, the amendment gives a great 
amount of discretion to state governments over the manner in which governance 
powers are to be decentralized, in effect maintaining their current hold on urban 
policy and decision-making (Pinto, 2008). The main intention of the 74th CAA was 
to empower urban local governments by handing over decision-making authority 
to them, which unfortunately has not succeeded. The attempts to appease its 
                                                
49 The 73rd CAA mandates the decentralization of governmental power in rural India. It creates a three-tier 
system of local government comprising of gram (village) sabhas, gram Panchayats and zila (district) 
Panchayats, with separate elections for all three tiers, creating the potential for a much more vibrant 
democratic electorate, bringing politicians closer to the voters. de Wit, J., Nainan, N. & Palnitkar, S. (2008) 
Urban decentralization in Indian cities: Assessing the performance of neighbourhood level Wards 
Committees. IN Baud, I. S. A. & de Wit, J. (Eds.) New forms of urban governance in India: shifts, models, 
networks & governance. First ed. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, Calif; London; Singapore, Sage. 
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opponents have left it a somewhat weaker reform than it could have been. 
Provisions in the 74th CAA have been criticized for being much too weak and 
open-ended, and critics point out that it almost seems as though these were 
added as “ an afterthought after the more ambitious 73rd CAA” (de Wit et al., 
2008: 79).  
 
A recent report by the National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA, 2005) evaluating 
the implementation of the 74th Amendment reforms states that there has been 
compliance in principle with most provisions of the Amendment Act. In practice, 
though, few of the 74th Amendment’s reforms have been implemented. This is 
largely due to the discretion granted to the state governments in deciding how 
these reforms are to be carried out. Although the Amendment Act does list the 
general functions that municipalities are expected to perform, it leaves the 
specific allocation of duties to the discretion of the state government (Fahim, 
2009). It also specifies that local bodies should have the power and authority to 
perform these functions but leaves the decision of the extent of this authority to 
the state government. Since several of the specified municipal functions such as 
land use planning and urban development overlap with those of state-
government controlled agencies, it is unlikely that these will be transferred to the 
local level soon.  
 
There has also been little success with the implementation of the Ward 
Committees.50  These Committees were designed to be the chief mechanism for 
delivering increased public participation and deliberative decision-making at the 
local level in urban areas with populations larger than 300,000 people (National 
Institute of Urban Affairs (N.I.U.A.), 2005; Harriss, 2010). However, as the NIUA 
report shows, Ward Committees have been organized in only eight states and 
                                                
50 The ‘Ward Committees’ are urban local bodies situated below the level of municipal governments, with the 
intention of creating a two-tier structure in urban government and providing better local governance and 
improved service delivery to all urban residents. For more on the composition, functioning and evaluation of 
Ward Committees in Indian cities, see Ibid. 
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one Union Territory out of a total of 28 states and seven Union Territories.51 
However, of the states in southern India where Committees have been formed, 
“they are functional in Tamil Nadu and in Kerala. In Andhra Pradesh and 
Karnataka, they are practically not functional except in Hyderabad and in 
Bangalore municipal corporations. In the case of Bangalore, it is further learnt 
that they are neither meeting regularly, nor working effectively” (National Institute 
of Urban Affairs (N.I.U.A.), 2005: xiii). The northern states have a similar story to 
tell. In effect, therefore, the promise of taking local government to the urban 
populace has yet to be realized. As is evident, municipal governments continue 
to remain largely under the control of the state legislature with state governments 
deciding the extent to which the reforms will be implemented. Moreover, these 
changes that have taken place are largely on paper only, in practice, little has 
changed. The state governments continue to dominate local urban governance 
debates and decision-making. For example, not only does the state government 
appoint members to urban local bodies like Ward Committees but it also decides 
the composition, finances and the functions of these Committees, rendering 
decentralization pointless. The implementation of the 74th CAA has therefore 
been weak and arbitrary across the country and ranges widely from state to 
state.  
 
Despite the shortcomings in its implementation though, the 74th Amendment has 
had a few important outcomes. It has provided local populations with the legal 
right to demand greater public participation. Moreover, by requiring an increased 
presence of women and other marginalized groups in local government through 
affirmative action, the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) has opened up 
the playing field, encouraging the involvement of a variety of players – both 
public and private – in the urban arena. As a result of the amendment, state 
governments were required to decentralize certain functions to local government 
                                                
51 The states where Ward Committees have been implemented include: Andhra Pradesh, Chhatisgarh, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal as well as the Union 
Territory of Delhi. National Institute of Urban Affairs (N.I.U.A.) (2005). Impact of the Constitution (74th 
Amendment) Act on the Working of Urban Local Bodies, National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA). New 
Delhi 
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and grant local governmental bodies “administrative, political and fiscal 
autonomy” and enable them to “prepare long-term plans for their local 
administrative area” (Sridharan, 2008: 293). While decentralization of powers has 
yet to take effect, the impact of this requirement has been the creation of ‘invited 
spaces’ (Brenner, 2004) where the government actively seeks and encourages 
participation in governance and planning processes by the private corporate 
sector, as well as other urban actors including civil society leaders.  
 
Moreover, while state governments in India have been slow to implement 
reforms, non-state actors are taking advantage of the existence of the 
decentralization reforms to demand a more active role in planning and 
governance (for example, through Resident Welfare Associations and other non-
profit citizen groups). Consequently, a variety of non-state actors, ranging from 
corporate leaders to NGOs have emerged to take advantage of the ‘invited 
spaces’ that the state has created (Brenner, 2004; Sridharan, 2008). However, 
recent research on this issue has pointed to an “elite capture” of participatory 
governance processes (Kundu, 2011). While the new decentralization reforms 
emphasize increased public participation in governance processes, this process 
of participatory governance seems to be disenfranchising marginalized groups 
(Coelho et al., 2011). Several scholars have argued that rather than empowering 
all urban residents to participate, these reforms have targeted a very specific kind 
of ‘elite public’, namely middle-class residents, NGOs and Resident Welfare 
Associations, consultants, and corporate leaders who in turn are furthering a very 
particular development agenda (Benjamin, 2007; Zerah, 2007b; Harriss, 2010; 
Coelho et al., 2011; Kundu, 2011). While this particular ‘public’ is co-opted into 
governance and development processes, the urban poor and other marginalized 
groups are unable to express their opinions through a similar forum (Benjamin, 
2007; Coelho et al., 2011; Kundu, 2011). I discuss specific examples that 
illustrate the growing role that elite non-state actors are playing in urban planning 
and governance in these two cities in the next chapter, i.e. the Bangalore Agenda 
Task Force (BATF) and the Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure and 
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Development Task Force (ABIDe) in Bangalore and the Green Pune Movement 
in Pune. The decentralization reforms laid out by the 74th Amendment have 
provided key individuals in Pune and Bangalore (and in other Indian cities as 
well) with the opportunity to successfully demand a greater role in urban 
planning.  
 
The implementation of the 74th CAA, although weak and arbitrary, has paved the 
way for rescaling and restructuring of state functions and capacities in India. 
“New geographies of governance” are emerging as a result of the “territorial and 
functional reorganization of state capacity” (Roy, 2003: 142). Urban regions in 
India are becoming centers for the transfer of governmental power and authority, 
as state capacities are “devolved to restructured local or regional levels of 
governance” (Jessop, 1994: 264). This devolution of power, however, has been 
not been uniform across India, with some state governments decentralizing more 
powers to urban local bodies than others. Meanwhile, the demands of a rapidly 
burgeoning urban population, an increasingly vocal middle class and the 
pressure to compete for a place in the national and global hierarchy compounded 
with the lack of clear leadership and urban policy reforms in flux have led to a 
political and power gap in Indian cities, although the extent to which this gap 
exists will differ from city to city.  
 
There is no single agency at the city level that actually controls future urban 
planning and development. In fact, this power is dispersed widely among several 
municipal and state-run agencies, often leading to contentious decision-making 
as jurisdictions and functions of the various agencies tend to overlap. Moreover, 
in the case of parastatal agencies like the developmental authorities, the officials 
involved in planning and governance are more often state-nominated 
bureaucrats rather than democratically elected local officials. This absence of a 
central font of power has been thrown into sharp relief by the legislative and 
economic reforms enacted in the last two decades. The legislative reforms have 
created a platform where non-governmental actors are able to actively participate 
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in decision-making at the city level. The privatization of the economy has opened 
up avenues of interaction and participation that were earlier inaccessible.  
 
One manner in which urban stakeholders are mobilizing to capitalize on 
emerging political and developmental opportunities is, as I have mentioned 
earlier, through the formation of ad-hoc coalitions. These coalitions draw on 
personal, social and political networks of their members, and are often 
temporary, short-term in nature. Urban actors use these as a means of 
accomplishing specific mutually beneficial developmental goals. The coalitions 
often cease to exist once this goal is achieved, although relationships between 
members endure. As we shall see in coming chapters, although these coalitions 
are often successful at accomplishing their goal (for example, a successful 
redevelopment project, or the revision of the comprehensive development plan 
for Pune), they lack democratic accountability.52 Coalitions also often pursue 
projects at the expense of comprehensive planning and coordinated service 
delivery.53   
 
b) The ‘carrot and stick’ approach to urban reform: JNNURM 
In addition to legislative changes, the national government has also 
simultaneously implemented a series of urban development programs, some of 
which provide incentives to state governments to implement the reforms laid out 
in the 74th Constitutional Amendment.54 The most ambitious of these schemes is 
the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). Although the 
some of specific cases discussed in the following chapters predate the 
                                                
52 This has become a very contentious issue in Bangalore, especially with regards to the two urban 
taskforces set up by the Karnataka state government: the BATF and ABIDe. One of the main accusations 
that those opposed to the taskforces have raised is that both the BATF and ABIDe lack democratic 
accountability and are therefore unconstitutional. I discuss this more in Chapter 4. 
53 I am indebted to Liza Weinstein for pointing this out. 
54 The urban development programs implemented by the national government include: the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) the Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and 
Medium Towns (UIDSSMT), the Model Municipal Law (MML), the e-Governance Mission, Report Cards on 
Urban Services, Citizens’ Charter on Municipal Services, the Mayor-in-Council form of government, 
Municipal Accounting Reforms, Property Tax Reforms, issuance of tax-free Municipal Bonds, and schemes 
such as Pooled Finance Development (PFDS) and City Challenge Fund (CCF), promotion of private sector 
participation and community participation. Aijaz, R. (2008) Form of Urban Local Government in India. 
Journal of Asian and African Studies, 43 (2), 131-154. 
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establishment of the JNNURM (like the BATF, and earlier iterations of the Green 
Pune movement), it is nonetheless important to discuss is here, not only because 
it represents a considerably different governmental approach to urban 
development in India but also because one of the cases discussed in the next 
chapter, the BATF, was in a way the precursor to the JNNURM. Several 
members of the BATF were instrumental in the formulation of the JNNURM 
(mentioned below) and continue to be very active and influential at the national 
policy level. The JNNURM therefore demonstrates one manner in which 
coalitions formed at the local level evolve and reform, albeit at a different scale.  
 
The JNNURM was established in 2005 to “encourage reforms and fast track 
planned development of identified cities” (Ministry of Urban Development, 2005: 
5). The JNNURM was shaped by a variety of individuals and institutions. The 
main responsibility of formulating and shaping the Mission lay with the national 
Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) with help from the Planning Commission 
and a few other agencies such as the National Institute for Urban Affairs (NIUA) 
and the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP). In addition, as 
Sivaramkrishnan (2011) writes, international development and financial agencies 
such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) had a significant impact on 
the Mission, influencing the kinds of reforms and incentives that were to be 
provided (Kennedy and Zérah, 2008; Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). However, what is 
perhaps unusual about the JNNURM is the role that corporate leaders and civic 
activists played in its formation. In particular, several core members of the 
erstwhile Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) such as Nandan Nilekani and 
Ramesh Ramanathan leveraged their experience at the state-level to gain 
access to the national policy arena, moving to Delhi to undertake work on the 
JNNURM, using the collaborative (i.e. public-private partnership) model of the 
BATF as a blueprint for key reforms mandated by the JNNURM (Ghosh, 2005).55  
                                                
55 In particular, these reforms include models of ‘elite’ citizen participation and fiscal reform similar to the 
ones the BATF tried to implement in Bangalore Ghosh, A. (2005), Public-private or a private public: 
Promised partnership of the Bangalore Agenda Task Force. Economic and Political Weekly, ; Goldman, M. 
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Benjamin (2007: 180; italics in original) has referred to the Mission as the 
“present and newer avatar” or incarnation of the BATF (Goldman, 2011). The 
initial program targeted 63 cities or urban agglomerations and will last seven 
years beginning in 2005-06. The main objectives of the program are to increase 
efficiency in urban infrastructure and service delivery mechanisms, increase 
community participation and improve the accountability of urban local bodies and 
parastatal agencies towards citizens. In May 2011, the Indian national 
government announced that a second phase of the JNNURM (called JNNURM 
Phase II) would be launched in 2012.  
 
The scope of the Mission, as announced in 2005, is two-fold and will be 
implemented by two sub-missions: the first focuses on Urban Infrastructure and 
Governance (UIG) and is to be administered through the Ministry of Urban 
Development; the second will focus on urban poverty alleviation and the 
provision of Basic Services to the Urban Poor (BUSP) to be administered through 
the Ministry of Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation (Ministry of Urban 
Development, 2005; Mukhopadhyay, 2006; Dupont, 2011). Under the first sub-
mission on urban infrastructure (the UIG), projects eligible for financing include 
water supply and sanitation, sewerage, solid waste management, road network, 
urban transport and redevelopment of old city areas. Urban poverty alleviation 
programs eligible for financing under the second sub-mission (the BUSP) will 
focus largely on the integrated development of slums through projects for 
providing shelter, basic services and other related civic amenities for the urban 
poor.  
 
The national government aims to pump in over $20 billion into India’s cities 
through the JNNURM. However, in return for providing funding assistance with 
urban projects, the government has a set of reforms that state and city 
governments need to implement. At the level of urban local bodies and parastatal 
                                                                                                                                            
(2011) Speculative Urbanism and the Making of the Next World City. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 35 (3), 555-581..  
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agencies, mandated reforms include financial and accounting reforms, land 
reforms and the adoption of e-governance systems, particularly for tax collection. 
State governments also have to implement an additional set of reforms in order 
to make cities within their jurisdiction eligible for funding, including 
implementation of decentralization measures laid out in the 74th Constitutional 
Amendment Act (CAA), repealing the Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act 
(ULCRA), reforming Rent Control laws, a gradual transfer of planning functions to 
urban local bodies and programs to encourage community participation in 
government.56  
 
The emergence of a large urban fund such as the JNNURM marks a shift in the 
financial practices in Indian government. Most government funds until this point 
were grants, while the JNNURM is an incentive-based fund, essentially 
promoting a carrot and stick approach to urban development in India. It makes 
central subsidies for development available contingent upon the implementation 
of a specific set of reforms, which is a marked departure from previous trends 
(Benjamin, 2007; Dupont, 2011). However, while the Mission is “encouraging 
municipalities to project themselves into the future and improve the productivity 
and efficiencies of cities, while simultaneously ensuring that they are equitable 
and inclusive” (Dupont, 2011: 5), critics have voiced considerable skepticism 
especially regarding the implementation of the sub-mission that targets the urban 
poor, questioning whether equity or inclusiveness will actually be a guiding factor 
in the overall reform process (Mahadevia, 2006; Mukhopadhyay, 2006; Dupont, 
2011; Mahadevia, 2011). 
 
                                                
56 The Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act or ULCRA was passed in 1976. The intention was to prevent the 
concentration of urban land in the hands of a few select individuals or groups and therefore reduce 
profiteering and land speculation. It prevented the development of large tracts of urban land, and was 
considered detrimental to urban development. It also led to significant amounts of corruption in government 
and the real estate sector, as developers resorted to bribery in order to gain permission to parcel together 
plots of land that would have been illegal under the ULCRA. One of the conditions to be eligible for funding 
under the JNNURM was the repeal of the ULCRA. Consequently, the act has now been abolished in most 
Indian states. However, considerable confusion remains over parceling together plots of land. 
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In addition, the JNNURM has come under significant criticism for a variety of 
other reasons as well, ranging from the suitability of an incentive-based approach 
for infrastructure development and governance reform to the use of technocratic 
planning tools like spatial master plans to identify appropriate projects 
(Mahadevia, 2006; Mukhopadhyay, 2006; Mahadevia, 2011). Incentive-based 
funds require government at various levels to adopt fiscal, policy and 
administrative changes, such as the ones outlined above (Benjamin, 2007). 
Moreover, Mukhopadhyay (2006) and Harriss (2010) point out that the 
inadequacies of urban infrastructure in Indian cities are merely symptoms of a 
lack of democratic urban governance, which the program does not really 
address.  
 
Below, I focus on three main issues with the JNNURM, beginning with the impact 
of the land reforms that the program mandates. The first step to obtaining 
approval and sanctioning of funds from the JNNURM is the preparation of a 
detailed City Development Plan or CDP. However, JNNURM does not explicitly 
require these plans to be made by urban local bodies like municipal corporations 
with the result that many local agencies, often lacking qualified technical 
professionals to undertake such a task, turn to international consulting firms (who 
often lack a localized knowledge of the city’s various populations and political 
dynamics) to prepare the CDP for them (Mahadevia, 2006; Kennedy and Zérah, 
2008). The JNNURM toolkit for the preparation of CDPs has a list of empanelled 
consultants that city and state agencies may rely on, although this is not an 
exclusive list (Ministry of Urban Development, 2006). Mahadevia (2006) also 
raises the concern that plans prepared by consulting firms may not be required to 
solicit and incorporate public input. Few, if any, of these consultants engage in a 
public participatory process, using state and city government agencies instead as 
proxies for public opinion. This is somewhat ironic when one considers that one 
of the reforms that the JNNURM requires is increased democratic and 
deliberative decision-making at the local level. In laying out the future vision for 
cities and identifying potential projects eligible for JNNURM funds, CDPs have 
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emphasized projects and services that would largely benefit businesses and 
upper-middle class residents and often cause widespread displacement. The 
preparation of master plans, in this case, privileges a certain small section of the 
urban population, particularly the real estate development lobby and business 
interests, at the cost of the large low-income population. Harriss (2010) cites the 
example of the CDP for the Chennai Metropolitan Region that stresses the 
requirements of the IT economy in the city including services, such as housing 
development, that are needed for the growth of this sector. However, as Harriss 
(2010) points out, the sub-mission on Basic Services for the Urban Poor 
including low-income housing takes up only 11 per cent of the plan’s outlay.  
 
In addition to the CDP, the JNNURM requires the implementation of several land 
reforms. Chief among these is the repeal of the Urban Land Ceiling Regulation 
Act (ULCRA). As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, the ULCRA was passed 
in 1976 to limit the size of plots of land that could be owned by private 
individuals. Any land held in excess of the ceiling could be taken over by the 
state governments to provide public housing on the vacant plots of land. The aim 
of this law therefore was to alleviate the demand for low-income housing in urban 
India and to allow the governments or their appointed agencies to provide low-
cost housing to the urban poor. In fact, there were several loopholes in the Act 
that led to widespread governmental corruption and the Act was not strictly 
enforced. While the repeal of this act has been welcomed by developers and 
investors, it also has its share of critics (Mahadevia, 2006). Although flawed, the 
ULCRA was one of the only tools that was available for municipalities to legally 
obtain land at affordable prices for the urban poor. While the JNNURM does 
mention the issue of creating security of land tenure for the urban poor, it does 
not explicitly outline how this is to be made possible. There are no mechanisms 
in place in the program to make land affordable or to replace the Urban Land 
Ceiling Regulation Act (ULCRA). The repeal of the Act has left nothing in its 
place, leading to a fear that housing rights as well as the security of land tenure 
for the poor may be under threat (Mahadevia, 2006).  
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The other land reforms required by the JNNURM include the simplification of 
legal and procedural frameworks for conversion of land from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses; streamlining building approvals; and the computerization of 
property titling and land registration (Mahadevia, 2006; Mukhopadhyay, 2006). 
These tools are increasingly being used to benefit the large real estate lobby by 
making it easy for them to identify, acquire and develop land (Benjamin, 2007; 
Goldman, 2011). Simplifying the conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural 
land facilitates large-scale development on the peripheries, creating, in several 
instances (for example, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, Pune, and Kolkata) 
facilities like integrated townships, software parks, and international airports for 
‘new’ economy service sector industries like Information Technology (IT). The 
JNNURM has been criticized as essentially being a subsidy for large project 
development under the rhetoric of ‘progressive urban development’ (Mahadevia, 
2006; Benjamin, 2007).  
 
The second criticism of the JNNURM focuses on the implementation of the sub-
mission on the provision of Basic Services to the Urban Poor (BUSP). 
Mukhopadhyay (2006) objects to the manner in which the program itself has 
been organized, with one mission focusing on Urban Infrastructure and 
Governance and the other on Basic Services to the Urban Poor. He argues that 
this division indicates that the government does not recognize the poor “as an 
integral part of the urban economy” and reflects “the mindset that the rich need 
infrastructure and the poor need amelioration” (Mukhopadhyay, 2006: 3401). I do 
not agree entirely with this argument: the upgrading of urban infrastructure would 
arguably benefit most urban residents and moreover, the existence of a separate 
program focusing on the urban poor does not necessarily mean that the 
government does not consider them part of the urban economy.  
 
However, the division of financing between the two sub-missions does seem to 
favour urban infrastructure and governance. Mukhopadhyay (2006) points out 
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that little thought has been paid to designing the distribution of funds. The 
JNNURM awards a uniform share of the grant to all large cities (35 per cent) 
regardless of the population of urban poor, which ranges from over half of the 
total urban population in Mumbai to less than one per cent of the city’s population 
in Patna (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 2001; vom 
Hove, 2003).57 Moreover, as Mahadevia (2006: 3400) demonstrates, in mega-
cities (defined by the Government of India as those with population over four 
million), the national government would contribute up to 35 per cent of the total 
cost for projects under the Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) sub-
mission and up to 50 per cent of cost under the Basic Services to the Urban Poor 
(BUSP) sub-mission. In cities with population between one and four million, the 
national government will contribute up to 70 per cent of project costs under UIG 
but only 50 per cent of costs under BUSP whereas in all other urban areas, the 
national government will fund between 90 and 100 per cent of UIG projects while 
contributing between 80 to 90 per cent for BUSP projects. Overall, therefore, the 
financial assistance provided is skewed in favour of the UIG sub-mission. 
Moreover, according to the Housing and Poverty Alleviation minister, Kumari 
Selja, as of February 2011, less than 50 per cent of the money allocated to the 
BUSP sub-mission had been utilized (ENS Economic Bureau, 2011).  
 
The third issue, although not directly relevant to this dissertation but important 
nonetheless, deserves a brief mention here. Given the emphasis on 
infrastructure development and urban renewal, it is indeed surprising that the 
JNNURM all but omits to address urban environmental issues (Mukhopadhyay, 
2006). This is all the more astonishing given the role that India as a country plays 
in global environmental debates, its increasing contribution to green house gas 
emissions, growing consumption, and the constant drain on the country’s natural 
resources. Beyond expressing that during the seven-year period of the JNNURM, 
“the Mission will seek to ensure sustainable development of select cities” 
                                                
57 I have used data from the 2001 Census of India rather than the 2011 Census, since these data are not yet 
available as of August 2011.  
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(Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, 2005: 3), the JNNURM does 
little else.  
 
Urban policy in India has evolved over the last two decades, beginning with the 
decentralization reforms of the 74th Amendment and continuing with the recently 
announced Phase II of the JNNURM. The power and political dynamic in Indian 
cities has simultaneously changed in response to these policy initiatives. As 
Ghertner (2011) demonstrates, new forms of urban governance are emerging in 
Indian cities that are privileging an urban elite and in doing so, gentrifying the 
very process of urban governance. In particular, state and city governments are 
co-opting a variety of non-state actors and their agendas into the formal 
governmental planning processes. This renewed emphasis on increased public 
participation has indeed encouraged non-state actors to actively take part in a 
variety of governmental processes. However, since state governments continue 
to dictate the extent of this participation and the specific actors to whom this 
privilege is extended, marginalized groups and their representatives continue to 
be excluded from these discussions. Moreover, since the state governments also 
control the extent to which the reforms are implemented, the impact of the 74th 
Constitutional Amendment has been significantly different across India (Baud 
and de Wit, 2008).  
 
In the following section and in more detail in the next chapter, I show how this 
has played out very differently in Bangalore and Pune. In Bangalore, one of the 
main avenues of non-state participation was through the formation of 
government-appointed urban task forces like the BATF and ABIDe. In Pune, by 
contrast, the increasing non-state participation was a much more grassroots, 
bottom-up process. In each case, I argue that these differences are a result of 
the distinct social and political networks in Bangalore and Pune that the specific 
individuals involved were able to mobilize.  
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3. A Tale of Two Cities: Situating Bangalore and Pune 
For most of the twentieth century, the four metropolitan areas: Delhi, Mumbai 
(Bombay), Chennai (Madras) and Kolkata (Calcutta) dominated the urban system 
in India (Shaw, 1999). However, since the early 1990s, former ‘secondary’ cities 
like Bangalore, Hyderabad and Pune have emerged as centers of urban growth, 
partly as an outcome of rapid economic growth in India and partly in response to 
greater global economic forces and the liberalization of the Indian economy 
(Shaw, 1999; Shaw and Satish, 2007). During the last two decades, the 
economic and political environment in Indian cities has changed considerably as 
a result of and in response to economic liberalization and urban policy reforms. 
This dissertation examines the impacts of these changes in two cities in India: 
Bangalore, Karnataka and Pune, Maharashtra. I examine how elite groups in 
both cities are able to mobilize in the wake of economic changes and governance 
reforms to take advantage of emerging opportunities, focusing specifically on 
urban governance and development. This section has two aims: to discuss the 
urban governance and development histories of Bangalore and Pune and 
simultaneously to examine the social and political networks that are instrumental 
in shaping these cities. 
 
Located in two of India’s fastest growing states (Karnataka and Maharashtra) 
(Sankhe et al., 2010), Bangalore and Pune are good candidates to study how 
Indian cities have changed in the light of the economic, political and legislative 
changes of the last two decades. The population in both cities has grown rapidly 
in the last two decades following economic liberalization. The provisional data 
from the 2011 Census of India show that Bangalore has registered a population 
growth of almost 47 per cent in the last decade (2001-2011) to reach an 
estimated 9.5 million whereas Pune has grown by approximately 40 per cent in 
the same time, with an estimated population of 2.5 million. During this time 
(1990-present), the economies of both cities have also grown as Bangalore and 
Pune emerged as hubs for ‘new’ service sector economies like Information 
Technology (IT) and biotechnology with several domestic and international 
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corporations such as Wipro, Infosys, Microsoft and IBM locating offices there, 
attracted partly by the numerous academic institutions in both cities and the 
skilled workforce they produce (Kulabkar, 2002a; H. S. Sudhira et al., 2007). In 
addition to the new service sector industries, both Bangalore and Pune are also 
strongholds of domestic industries such as textile manufacturing (Bangalore) and 
heavy industry (Pune). However, there are two specific aspects that make 
Bangalore and Pune particularly relevant to this dissertation.  The first is the 
tremendous urban development that is taking place within both cities as well as 
on their peripheries due to rapid economic and population growth.  The second is 
the growing role that non-state actors have been playing in urban development 
and governance in both cities. Not only are both Pune and Bangalore home to a 
very active and vocal civil society that is playing an increasingly important role in 
the development of each city, but also have a wide range of other non-state 
actors such as corporate leaders, academics, farmers and large landholders 
influencing development decisions, as the next two chapters will show.  
 
Moreover, while the specific changes taking place in Pune and Bangalore are 
unique to each city, they are also representative of a political and economic shift 
that is taking place in urban areas all over India. As urban regions have emerged 
as key sites of economic development and political action, non-state actors are 
particularly eager to take advantage of this reconfiguration of political power to 
insert themselves into planning processes (Roy, 2003; Weinstein, 2009). One 
approach, I argue, is the formation of urban coalitions by powerful elite actors. 
These elite groups in Indian cities are well connected socially and politically. 
They tap into these networks, mobilizing their connections into urban coalitions to 
take advantage of the developmental opportunities that this economic and 
political rescaling has created. The different social networks and groups in Pune 
and Bangalore offer an opportunity to examine how specific individuals are able 
to leverage their unique social and political connections to achieve 
developmental goals.  
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a) From the Garden City to the Global City:  
The growth patterns of Bangalore and Pune in the colonial period were similar in 
many respects. Until the British conquered Pune and Bangalore, both had been 
the seats of powerful regional empires.58 Under colonial rule, both cities 
developed two distinct faces. One was that of the new city – the Cantonment – 
that initially grew as a military post for the British army, built according to 
European notions of military and city planning, with broad roads and large plots 
of land for European bungalows. The other face was that of the old city, tightly 
knit and densely packed with a variety of land uses situated next to each other. 
This pattern of separating the ‘white town’ from the ‘black town’ often by large 
stretches of public space such as parks and squares was a familiar pattern of 
colonial urban development (Chattopadhyay, 2005; Kamath, 2006). This 
separation between military and municipal spaces was also evident in local 
government – the municipal government for the Cantonment area was different 
from that of the old town. This practice continues to an extent today as well – the 
Cantonment in both Bangalore and Pune is now controlled by the Indian Army 
and has a separate planning and development division responsible for the 
administration of these areas in each city.  
 
After independence, Bangalore and Pune developed slightly different trajectories. 
This was partly the outcome of Bangalore emerging as the capital of the state of 
Karnataka, whereas Pune grew in the shadow of Mumbai. However, it was also a 
result of national-level planning policies. After independence, the Indian national 
government pursued a policy import-substitution industrialization, creating 
several large public sector corporations (Kohli and Mullen, 2003; Heitzman, 
2004). As Heitzman (2004: 44-45) writes, this policy had a significant impact on 
Bangalore’s growth and development. With support from the national 
government, four public sector units (PSUs) were set up in Bangalore. Bangalore 
                                                
58 Pune had been the seat of the Maratha Empire from the mid-seventeenth to the early nineteenth century 
when the British defeated the Marathas and established colonial rule. Bangalore had a succession of rulers 
from the Gowdas (1537-1638), the Marathas (1640-1690), Haider Ali and his son, Tipu Sultan (from 1759 to 
1880) and, the Wodeyars (1690 – 1759, and again from 1880 – 1947, although Bangalore was under British 
administration by this time).  
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was attractive as a location for multiple reasons: state-sponsored 
industrialization, the temperate climate of the city, the presence of premier 
academic institutes that provided a technically skilled workforce, cheap power, 
and also Bangalore was beyond the range of potential Pakistani air raids 
(Heitzman, 2004: 45). The first was Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which 
was founded during World War II and was employing close to 21,000 people by 
the early 1960s (Heitzman, 2004). Indian Telephone Industries (ITI) followed in 
1948, set up as a collaborative enterprise between the Central ministry of 
transport and communication and the state of Mysore and employed close to 
4,000 people (ibid). Bharat Heavy Electronics Limited (BHEL) was set up by the 
department of defense in 1954 and rapidly grew to be the second-largest 
manufacturer of electronic goods in India, after ITI, employing 3,300 people in 
Bangalore. The fourth PSU to be set up was Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) in 
1995 as a collaborative project between the Indian national government’s heavy 
industries department and the Swiss company, Oerlikons to manufacture 
machines for grinding, drilling and cutting, employing 5,500 people in the city.  
 
The establishment of the four giant PSUs (HAL, ITI, BHEL and HMT) was a 
considerable influence on the development of Bangalore. In total, these 
industries added almost 30,000 new jobs to Bangalore, together with other 
related industries, the total number of new public sector jobs by the early 1960s 
was over 110,000 (Heitzman, 2004; Nair, 2005). The growth of public sector units 
as well as research and academic institutions in the city changed the 
demographic profile of the city, attracting a considerable middle-class, white 
collar workforce to Bangalore (Heitzman, 2004; Nair, 2005). In just two decades, 
the proportion of Bangalore’s workforce involved in the primary sector 
(agriculture and related activities) had fallen by almost 30 per cent (from 71 per 
cent in 1951 to 40 per cent in 1971) (Heitzman, 2004). By the end of the 1970s, 
the planning imaginary in Bangalore was dominated by the “middle class citizen”, 
which included the public sector worker (Nair, 2005: 130). By the 1990s, this 
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imaginary had expanded to include the Non-Resident Indian (NRI) and the IT 
worker. 
 
New extensions to the city in the form of ‘industrial suburbs’ were built in the late 
1950s and early 1960s to accommodate these industries and their employees: 
HAL led the way by setting up the HAL sanitary board that was responsible for 
the housing of its employees, eventually building the first industrial township 
(Vimananagar, or Aircraft township) on the periphery of Bangalore that housed 
about 35 per cent of its workforce (Heitzman, 2004; Nair, 2005). The other PSUs 
followed suit – for example, ITI built accommodation (Duravaninagar or 
‘Telephone City’) that housed half its employees (about 1,500), BHEL housed 
about 665 employees and HMT about 1,500 – all in industrial townships that 
these companies built and had administrative control over (Heitzman, 2004: 45). 
Most of these industrial townships were located on the northern and eastern 
edges of Bangalore, separated from the city itself by large tracts of open space 
and agricultural land. Forerunners of today’s gated communities, these townships 
were well planned, providing spaces for diverse land uses (educational 
institutions, recreational facilities and commercial space), and urban 
infrastructure such as sewerage, water provision and power. The public sector 
companies that built them also administered most of these townships. These 
companies also ran their own buses to transport employees to and from work. 
These townships were an attempt to curtail large-scale industrial production in a 
manner that would not impinge on Bangalore’s natural and financial resources 
(Nair, 2005).  
 
However, this accommodation fell considerably short of demand, prompting the 
city and state governments to develop additional ‘industrial housing’, like the 
then-suburb of Rajajinagar in west Bangalore as well as five ‘satellite’ towns 
(Nair, 2005: 128). Nevertheless, demand continued to outstrip the supply of 
housing, leading to a proliferation of illegal construction, especially on agricultural 
land (Nair, 2005). In fact, as Nair (2005) writes, the early years of Bangalore’s 
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City Improvement Trust Board were occupied with finding a solution to the 
housing needs of the city, focusing specifically on industrial workers and 
government bureaucrats. To accommodate growth, Bangalore grew out in the 
form of ‘layouts’ or planned neighbourhoods that the Bangalore Development 
Authority (BDA) (the successor to the City Improvement Trust Board) developed 
and sold.59 New forms of providing housing also emerged in Bangalore in order 
to keep up with housing demand.60  
 
As public sector entities struggled to keep pace with housing demand, there was 
a rise in the number of private builders in Bangalore by the 1970s (Nair, 2005). 
This considerably transformed urban development in the city in two important 
ways. First, there was a shift from the low-rise, horizontal development 
(consisting chiefly of single-family homes and the ‘bungalow’) that had 
characterized post-independence Bangalore as private developers built an 
increasing number of apartment buildings, creating an alternative “vision of city 
growth and housing” (Nair, 2005: 132). Second, Nair (2005) argues, was the 
growing involvement of private builders in providing group housing and office 
space. In particular, private development was increasingly attractive since these 
developers were able to offer residents amenities and basic infrastructure that 
was often lacking in public sector developments. Real estate development in 
Bangalore today is almost entirely privatized. Although the Bangalore 
Development Authority (BDA) continues to develop layouts, a private developer 
or a sub-contractor more often than not completes the actual construction (as 
real estate developers and sub-contractors in Bangalore explained to me). In 
addition, since the real estate sector was opened up in 2005, there has been a 
                                                
59 I discuss the urban governance structure of Bangalore in more detail in Chapter 4. 
60 Two of these were the ‘revenue layouts’ and the housing board cooperative societies (HBCS) ‘Revenue 
layouts’ were sites that groups of citizens or independent builders could develop as housing, subject to the 
permission of the BDA (and more recently, the newly-formed Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development 
Authority or the BMRDA). HBCS were organizations formed by citizen groups in Bangalore (typically 
industrial workers, and government bureaucrats) to develop sites for housing, again, subject to BDA 
approval.  
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flurry of large development projects, both within the city of Bangalore as well as 
on its peripheries.61  
 
The economic reforms of the 1990s marked two distinct changes in Bangalore: 
while the 1950s to the 1980s had been characterized by public sector investment 
in the city, the 1990s saw the growth of the private sector, particularly information 
technology (IT) and related industries. Companies like Texas Instruments, 
Infosys and Microsoft are constructing large campuses on the edge of the city – 
like the Whitefield IT Park located on the eastern edge of the city. To entice 
businesses to locate here, the state government of Karnataka is offering several 
land and tax incentives as well as building infrastructure like roads connecting 
these areas to the city and the airport, or ‘geobribes’ (Roy, 2009b).62 This rapid 
growth of new economic sectors in Bangalore has considerably boosted the 
prospects of the real estate industry, locally and regionally (Nair, 2005; Benjamin, 
2006).  
 
I argue that the middle class forms the power elite in Bangalore. However, the 
middle class itself is far from uniform. It includes public sector workers, young 
private sector employees (especially in information technology and other 
emerging service sector industries), government bureaucrats and the corporate 
elite. Specific middle class actors therefore have particular agendas that they are 
interested in furthering. Contemporary planning and policy decisions in the city 
are influenced and shaped by the conflict between the demands of the academic, 
the retired government bureaucrat, the returning NRI and the corporate leaders 
of IT firms who are competing with each other to push their specific agendas. 
These urban actors come from common socio-economic backgrounds: some 
                                                
61 I discuss the specific aspects of contemporary urban development in Bangalore in more detail in Chapter 
5. 
62 Roy (2009: 79) describes ‘geobribes’ as the “exceptional benefits” that state governments offer corporate 
investors in the context of global capitalism to entice them to locate within their jurisdictions. These often 
take the form of “exorbitant public subsidies that underwrite capital accumulation…near-free gifts of valuable 
land and tax subsidies” without any promised return in the form of employment or revenue generation. The 
purported argument that state governments make in favour of this practice is that without these ‘geobribes’, 
global capital will locate elsewhere to the detriment of the economic development of their region.   
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have attended school together, while others are members at the same elite clubs 
and still others build on old family associations. They draw on these networks in 
order to influence planning and development decisions in Bangalore in keeping 
with their specific developmental goals. The formation and working of 
Bangalore’s two urban taskforces: the BATF and ABIDe are a case in point. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, the formation of both taskforces relied on the 
social and political networks of a few key individuals who were able to mobilize 
these associations into a coalition of like-minded individuals with specific 
developmental goals.   
b) Developing Pune: 
The Indian national government’s focus on developing Indian industry also had 
an impact on Pune’s development. Another factor that was critical to Pune’s 
development as an industrial center was its proximity to Mumbai (Bombay). As 
industrial expansion in Mumbai was limited in the 1960s, Pune’s industry 
expanded (Bapat, 2004). Several industrial clusters were set up along the 
Mumbai-Pune highway (as well as along the Pune-Solapur and Pune-Satara 
highways), in part due to the incentives provided by the Maharashtra Industrial 
Development Corporation (MIDC) (Narkhede, 2008).63 However, by contrast with 
Bangalore, most of the industries that located in and around the city of Pune 
were private and not the large public sector units we saw in Bangalore. The first 
industrial group to locate in Pune was the Kirloskar Group, one of India’s largest 
engineering firms. Other manufacturing firms have followed. For example, 
several large automotive companies have set up manufacturing facilities on the 
peripheries of the city, particularly in Hadapsar (on the eastern edge of Pune) 
beginning in the 1960s. These include domestic firms like Tata Motors, Bajaj 
Motors, and Mahindra and Mahindra and more recently, in the 1990s, 
international firms like General Motors (GM), Volkswagen and Daimler-
Mercedes-Benz (Wilbur Smith Associates (WSA) and IL&FS Urban Infrastructure 
Services Ltd, 2008). Economic liberalization in the early 1990s and the adoption 
                                                
63 These incentives included the provision of land to set up industrial facilities, infrastructure and financial 
benefits as well.  
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of specific incentive schemes that favored ‘new’ economic sectors like 
Information Technology (IT) and Information Technology Enabled Services 
(ITES) by the government of Maharashtra have made Pune an attractive location 
for several domestic and international IT firms including Wipro, Infosys, Microsoft, 
Hewlett Packard (HP) and IBM (Kulabkar, 2002a; Government of Maharashtra, 
2007). This has been complemented by the presence of several premier national 
academic institutions ranging from the University of Pune to engineering colleges 
and business administration institutes.  
 
In addition to manufacturing and service sector industries, Pune is an important 
regional agricultural centre. In addition to the active farming that takes place in 
and around the city, Pune is the regional wholesale market for food commodities 
and functions as a distributing centre for agricultural implements, fertilizers and 
forest products such as timber (Wilbur Smith Associates (WSA) and IL&FS 
Urban Infrastructure Services Ltd, 2008). It is also the home of one of the most 
successful agricultural cooperative movements in India: the sugar cooperatives 
(Chithelen, 1980/1981; Attwood, 1992; Lalvani, 2008). Not only was the sugar 
cooperative movement extremely successful, it was also very influential in local 
and state level politics. This was partly due to the important role that agriculture 
in general and sugar cultivation in particular played in the regional economy. As I 
discuss in more detail below, the agricultural community in Pune is very closely 
involved in local and regional politics and plays a prominent role in land 
development as well.64  
 
Formal planning had been introduced in Pune under colonial rule in 1915 with the 
passage of the first Town Planning Act, resulting in low-rise, low-density 
development, “characterized by separation of residential, commercial and 
                                                
64 The case study from Pune discussed in Chapter 5 examines the complex relationship that particular 
farmers in Pune have with politics and land in the Pune region specifically and in the state of Maharashtra 
more broadly. For more on the role that the farmers have played in Pune and Maharashtra politics, see 
Chithelen, I. (1980/1981) Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra. Social Scientist, 9 (5/6), 55-61; Attwood, D. 
W. (1992) Raising cane : the political economy of sugar in western India, Boulder, Westview Press; Lalvani, 
M. (2008) Sugar Co-operatives in Maharashtra: A Political Economy Perspective. Journal of Development 
Studies, 44 (10), 1474 - 1505. 
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industrial activities in specific zones” (Bapat, 2004: 8). Although this legislation 
was modified, first in 1954 and then again in 1966, to increase the area under its 
purview, the mode of planning remained unchanged (ibid). Being a regional 
industrial and agricultural centre, Pune has always been attractive to migrants, 
both low-wage labourers as well as the white-collar workers (Kulabkar, 2002a; 
Bapat, 2004). As the population of the city increased with industrialization and 
economic growth, Pune faced a severe housing shortage. Initially, in keeping 
with the national trend, the main urban local body in the city: the Pune Municipal 
Corporation or the PMC (established in 1950) was responsible for housing and 
building development (Bapat, 2004). In addition to migration and economic 
growth, there was one other important event that has significantly influenced 
urban development in Pune. In 1961, two dams on the Mutha river (one of two 
rivers that flows through Pune) collapsed, causing tremendous damage to 
buildings on the banks of the river, particularly destroying significant portions of 
the historic old city, leading to a spurt in new housing development in Pune’s 
suburbs, especially in the western part of the city (Bapat, 2004; Narkhede, 2008). 
By the early 1970s, it was abundantly clear that the PMC would not be able to 
meet the demand, thereby creating an opportunity for private builders to step in. 
With the entry of private developers, Pune’s development pattern, like Bangalore, 
changed from low-rise, single-family homes to apartment buildings and 
complexes.  
 
Most real estate development in Pune today is privately developed. Mr. Sanjay 
Deshpande (CEO, Sanjeevani Developers and committee member of the Pune 
Builders Association – CREDAI-Pune) describes the city’s development sector as 
homegrown. According to him, private development in Pune began in the late 
1960s-early 1970s, in response to the PMC’s inability to provide adequate 
housing. Mr. Deshpande also characterizes the 1990s as an important phase in 
Pune’s development history. With the growth of IT and related industries, he 
claims that development in Pune has changed from relatively small apartments 
(one or two bedrooms) in two and three storey buildings to higher buildings and 
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bigger apartments (four to five bedrooms). Most of the developers in the city, he 
says, are local to Pune, either second and third generation migrants or former 
agriculturalists who are gradually making the move from agricultural occupations 
to non-agricultural ones, capitalizing on their most important asset: their land. 
They are also extremely well placed, politically, to capitalize on the rapid 
urbanization in Pune.  
 
Wealthy farmers, more specifically, the “sugar barons have constituted an 
important power structure in the state, and the sugar co-operatives have played a 
pivotal role in shaping the socioeconomic fabric of Maharashtra” (Lalvani, 2008: 
1474-5). Lalvani (2008) argues that there is probably no other economic sector 
that is as well represented in the Maharashtra government as the sugar sector. 
This dominance is largely an outcome of the support that the state government 
provided the sugar cooperatives, acting as a mentor to the growing movement 
(particularly the Congress party). As the sugar cooperatives grew financially 
prosperous, the power associated with managerial positions such as the Director 
or Chairman of a specific cooperative also grew. Lalvani (2008) documents how 
individuals in these positions were able to exercise considerable influence on 
Maharashtra state politics: several of these individuals went on to hold positions 
of power at the state-level, including that of Chief Minister of the state. In recent 
years, allegations of corruption and the Congress party’s loss of power at the 
state level have somewhat weakened the hold that sugar cooperatives had on 
Maharashtra politics. However, as I shall show in Chapter 5, farmers are still 
powerful enough to leverage their social and political connections enabling them 
to achieve specific developmental goals.     
 
Processes of state restructuring that are taking place in contemporary urban 
India and the impacts that these processes have cannot be explained without 
understanding the particular political and socio-economic histories of Indian 
cities. In the case of both Bangalore and Pune, the groups that are benefiting 
from governmental and economic restructuring are those that have been 
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politically and economically dominant in both cities (working professionals in 
Bangalore and wealthy farmers in Pune). These elite power groups leverage their 
personal political, social and financial resources to further very specific 
developmental goals. Examining how they respond to and take advantage of 
emerging governmental and economic reforms is essential to understand how 
the cities themselves develop.  
 
This chapter aimed to lay out a broad overview of the changes that have taken 
place in India over the last two decades in order to provide a context for specific 
examples and cases discussed in the following chapters. The focus here was on 
using particular national-level legislative and policy reform to discuss broader 
trends in Indian government and politics. The second aim of this chapter was to 
provide an overarching context within which to situate the specific case sites in 
Bangalore and Pune. Both exemplify the ‘new’ Indian city that is emerging as a 
key location for the rescaling of state functions, as national and regional 
government reconfigures state power.  
 
The following chapters explore specific aspects of these changes. The next 
chapter examines the changing trends in urban governance and the growing 
involvement of ‘civil society’ as government invites a select few to participate 
while leaving out a vast majority. It discusses master planning processes in Pune 
and the growth of public-private partnerships as a form of governance in 
Bangalore. In both cases, it highlights the working of individual political and social 
networks as being instrumental in gaining the power to act. It also points to the 
growing role that ad-hoc coalitions between urban stakeholders are playing in the 
more formal processes of urban governance. Chapter 5 examines real estate in 
Bangalore and Pune, discussing two very different models of urban development. 
Once again, it points to the importance of political and social networks as well as 
the formation of temporary coalitions to successfully accomplish development.  
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CHAPTER IV  
POWER TO THE PEOPLE?  
URBAN GOVERNANCE AND COALITION BUILDING 
 
1. Introduction: 
In July 2003, the Sunday edition of the Indian newspaper, the Times of India ran 
an article with the headline “If a CEO runs your city…”. The article discussed the 
findings of the Vision Mumbai report (2003) prepared by global consultants 
McKinsey & Company, stating that if Indian cities were to become “world-class”, 
they needed to be run by ‘CEOs’ (Chief Executive Officers) rather than 
bureaucrats and politicians (Sachdeva and Rajadhyaksha, 2003; Kamath, 2006: 
iv). This statement is illustrative of a change in Indian urban politics that has 
taken place over the last two decades. This transformation has been driven by a 
combination of factors, including a government that is increasingly assuming the 
role of facilitator rather than participant and financier, a growing multiplicity of 
urban actors, policy reforms that mandate increased public participation, 
decentralization and devolution of responsibility to local government and 
economic reforms that have made it easier to source and obtain financial capital. 
The passage of urban governance reforms and economic liberalization has 
created new spaces of participation in Indian urban politics and increased 
opportunities for elite non-state actors to participate in urban planning processes 
than were earlier available (Milbert, 2008; Sridharan, 2008).  
 
In addition, the combination of the lack of political power vested in local or city-
level governments as well as the fragmented nature of political and economic 
power in Indian cities has created a gap in leadership. As a result, new centers of 
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economic, political and discursive power are emerging in Indian cities as 
powerful economic and social groups maneuver to achieve their objectives. In 
particular, networks of elite actors are coming together to address issues that 
state and city governments are unable to address adequately (such as the 
development of urban infrastructure and housing), and in some cases, to take 
advantage of the dysfunction or weakness of the local state to pursue particular 
class, caste, or business interests.  In some cases, these elite networks are very 
politically influential due to their ability to shape the economic fate of cities (as is 
the case with the IT corporate leaders in Bangalore), or because the elite 
networks overlap with networks of state power (for example, people in 
government and in private industry share family, caste or community links or 
other social links like membership in the same elite clubs or attendance of elite 
schools, as we shall see in the cases that follow in this chapter and the next).  
There are other instances where state actors like the Chief Minister, his/her 
cabinet and other government officials are deliberately mobilizing very powerful 
networks of elite actors to accentuate state power and pursue state goals (as in 
the case of the urban taskforces in Bangalore discussed in this chapter). In this 
chapter, I focus on two cases of non-state actors forming alliances with each 
other and with specific state actors to change the urban governance and policy 
agenda in Bangalore and Pune.  
 
The first case is a narrative of how the state government in Karnataka has 
created elite task forces comprising of high-profile individuals to shape the future 
development agenda for Bangalore. The formation of the Bangalore Agenda 
Task Force (BATF) and its successor, the Agenda for Bangalore Infrastructure 
Development Task Force (ABIDe) was also a reaction to the growing pressure 
that the state government of Karnataka and the Bangalore city government were 
facing from the city’s growing corporate sector and an increasingly vocal middle 
class, demanding greater involvement in urban governance and development 
processes in Bangalore (Ghosh, 2005). In response, successive state 
governments of Karnataka invited well-known business leaders, leaders of 
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NGOs, and prominent citizens of Bangalore to participate in a series of 
taskforces designed to provide a roadmap to convert Bangalore into a ‘world-
class city’ (Ghosh, 2005). However, these taskforces and their actions have been 
at the center of much conflict and contentious debate. This chapter explores the 
formation and working of each of these taskforces and the impact that both 
groups had on urban governance and development in Bangalore. Using these 
taskforces as an example, I demonstrate how government officials (in this case, 
consecutive Chief Ministers of Karnataka) used personal social networks to 
mobilize powerful elite groups and their resources in a coalition to pursue specific 
government developmental goals (for example, to make Bangalore more 
attractive to foreign and domestic investment). Examining the BATF together with 
the taskforce that followed (ABIDe), I draw attention to a growing trend in urban 
government to rely on “flexible governance networks that involve not only 
entrepreneurial local state institutions but also various private actors and ‘third-
sector’ community based organizations” (Brenner, 2004: 216).  
 
The second case tells the story of the master plan process in Pune and how a 
loose, almost spontaneous coalition of NGO activists, environmentalists, 
journalists, municipal officials and citizens – the “Green Pune” movement – has 
repeatedly raised objections to particular aspects of government-developed city 
plans, often successfully demanding more equitable policies. Following the 
incorporation of 23 neighboring villages, a new master plan for Pune was created 
in the early 2000s that contradicted earlier urban policies, violated environmental 
norms by developing areas of the city reserved for open space and public 
recreation, and would have also displaced a significant proportion of Pune’s low-
income population. An alliance emerged between key community leaders, NGO 
activists, journalists and some governmental officials to revise this plan and 
propose an alternative, more inclusive form of development. However, this 
coalition has its roots in an older and long-running civil society campaign in Pune 
that has resurfaced at regular intervals to protest specific government plans for 
the city and has been largely successful in its endeavors. The Green Pune 
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movement illustrates a more grassroots-based, bottom-up approach to involving 
non-state actors in urban planning processes. In this case, a coalition of elite 
actors (academics, urban planners, journalists and civic activists) proposed an 
alternate plan for Pune’s development with broad public support. As a result, the 
Pune city government was compelled to rethink the existing plan. Two members 
of the Green Pune movement were subsequently invited to be on the committee 
that was tasked with revising the master plan document, thereby ensuring that 
their vision was represented in government discussions.  
 
Comparing the taskforces in Bangalore to the Green Pune movement, I find that, 
in both cases, non-state actors are becoming increasingly important in shaping 
urban policy, and that government is coming to rely on these actors to help it 
create more flexible urban governance networks (Brenner, 2004). I also find that 
informal networks and individual social and political connections are critical in the 
formation and the functioning of these groups. In both cases, the push for change 
and demand for greater public participation in governmental decision-making 
processes came from middle-class constituents that had access to key resources 
like financial capital and technical knowledge. Moreover, the nature and extent of 
the social networks in both Bangalore and Pune have a significant impact on the 
types of coalitions that have emerged in both cities. The historical political 
dominance of specific elite groups (such as sugarcane farmers and old Brahmin 
families in Pune and white-collar professionals in Bangalore) continues to endure 
in contemporary Bangalore and Pune as these groups translate the power of 
their social networks into political and economic influence. While the coalition that 
emerged in Bangalore was an attempt to bring together different elite networks to 
achieve a common goal, the coalitions in Pune are an example of how different 
elite networks (the government and the real estate lobby on the one hand and 
the Green Pune movement on the other) formed coalitions with contrary aims. 
This chapter will illustrate these processes of coalition formation and functioning 
in both cities using urban governance as a lens, while the next chapter will focus 
on similar processes in real estate development.     
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2. Reconfiguring Bangalore: The BATF and ABIDe: 
Governments in India at the national and state level often rely on various 
committees and task forces for assistance in governing and making policy 
decisions. While some committees are constituted as “Standing Committees” that 
are reelected or reappointed on a regular basis and whose work is more or less 
continuous from one term to the next, there are also several ad-hoc committees 
or task forces that are constituted with special aims in mind that cease to exist 
once their task has been completed (National Informatics Centre (NIC), 2005b). 
The taskforces discussed in this section fall in the latter category. Both the 
Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) and the Agenda for Bengaluru 
Infrastructure and Development Task Force (ABIDe) were constituted through a 
government order sanctioned by the Chief Minister of the state of Karnataka with 
a broad mandate of improving Bangalore.  
 
Urban coalitions in Bangalore, in particular the Bangalore Agenda Task Force 
(BATF), have attracted some media and academic interest in the last few years. 
Recent articles (Ghosh, 2005; Pani, 2006) as well as a dissertation thesis 
(Kamath, 2006) have examined the creation and working of the BATF in some 
detail. Kamath (2006) particularly focuses on the role of the BATF as an urban 
coalition and also briefly discusses the relevance of personal networks in the 
formation of this body. These authors have also raised relevant critiques of the 
taskforce, especially its exclusion of key (low-income, marginalized) populations 
in the city from its agenda. The discussion of the BATF in this section draws 
heavily on their work. In addition to these, I also draw on other secondary data 
sources like newspaper archives, the reports of the task forces themselves as 
well as by independent consultants. While several attempts were made to meet 
with former BATF members, not many of them were available for interviews. 
Most of the primary data on the BATF were therefore collected from government 
officials, journalists, academics and activists who had been engaging with the 
BATF. They also provided valuable information on ABIDe and how it differed 
from the BATF and where it did not. I was also able to meet with two of the four 
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members of ABIDe’s core functioning group who were very forthcoming and 
generous with their time, providing me with firsthand information on the working 
of the group.  
 
The creation and functioning of both the BATF and ABIDe has had a polarizing 
effect among government officials, politicians, urban researchers and activists in 
Bangalore. The task forces are not without their supporters, but there are also 
several groups both within government and in Bangalore’s civil society who were 
opposed to the BATF and are against ABIDe. I will discuss this dynamic, 
especially the opposition and the reasons for it in more detail below. Briefly, 
however, urban activists and civil society groups argue that the constitution and 
operation of both the BATF and ABIDe is unconstitutional, undemocratic and 
non-representative. The conflict between other non-governmental groups and the 
government-created taskforces is emerging as a conflict between the invited 
spaces created by governmental restructuring within which the two task forces 
operate versus the participatory spaces that these NGOs and activists have 
created for themselves (Sridharan, 2008).65 
 
The conflict within government stems from overlapping jurisdictions, power 
sharing between various local and parastatal agencies and the role that these 
agencies have played, or rather, not played in both the BATF and ABIDe. The 
state government controls the governing and planning of Bangalore through a 
variety of parastatal agencies. Being the state capital, Bangalore also houses the 
governmental and administrative machinery needed for the functioning of the 
state, which further complicates matters with respect to sharing of governance 
powers between the state and city governments. The local (city) government has 
little autonomy in decision-making and what little there is, is hindered by political 
and bureaucratic hurdles. There are multiple agencies with similar functions 
                                                
65 Sridharan (2008: 293) differentiates between ‘invited’ spaces and ‘participatory’ spaces. According to him, 
‘invited’ spaces (a term that he borrows from Brenner [2004]) are created by government or state institutions 
where governments may invite other (non-state) actors to participate, for example by becoming providers 
and distributors of various services. ‘Participatory’ spaces are spaces that civil society groups create for 
themselves to function in.  
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acting at different levels in the city, often leading to a lack of coordination 
between agencies as well as a struggle to maintain control over individual 
jurisdictions (see Table 2). Few of these agencies, parastatal or local, had a 
presence on either of the taskforces. Moreover, members of both taskforces 
rarely involved or consulted with governmental officials from parastatal agencies 
like the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) or local bodies like the Greater 
Bangalore City Corporation (BBMP) but rather informed officials of decisions 
already taken that their agencies would have to then implement. This led to 
repeated conflict between the heads of these government agencies and the 
members of the taskforces. 
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Table 2: Local and parastatal governance institutions in Bangalore. Source: (H. S. Sudhira et al., 2007; 
Karnataka Slum Clearance Board (KSCB), 2011) 
 
 
 Name of agency Level of 
government 
Jurisdiction 
(See map below) 
Functions 
1  Bruhat Bengalooru 
Mahanagara Palike 
(BBMP) or the 
Greater Bangalore 
City Corporation 
City 
government: 
key urban local 
body 
Greater 
Bangalore 
Region (yellow 
and green zones 
in the map 
below) 
Responsible for overall 
delivery of services – 
roads and road 
maintenance; solid waste 
management, education 
and health in all wards, 
storm water drains, 
construction of few Ring 
roads, flyovers and grade 
separators 
2 Bangalore 
Development 
Authority (BDA) 
Parastatal 
agency 
Bangalore 
Metropolitan 
Area (yellow, 
green and blue 
zones in the map 
below) 
Land use zoning, 
planning and regulation 
within Bangalore 
Metropolitan Area; 
Construction of few Ring 
roads, flyovers and grade 
separators 
3 Karnataka Industrial 
Areas Development 
Board (KIADB) 
Parastatal 
agency 
Statewide 
agency. In 
Bangalore, 
jurisdiction 
overlaps with the 
BDA, but scope 
is limited to 
industrial areas 
only. 
Land acquisition and 
development (including 
agricultural land) for 
private entities as well as 
for government 
infrastructure projects. 
4 Bangalore 
Metropolitan Region 
Development 
Authority (BMRDA) 
Parastatal 
agency 
Bangalore 
Metropolitan 
Region 
(comprising of 
Bangalore urban 
district as well as 
some rural 
areas: the BDA’s 
jurisdiction falls 
within that of the 
BMRDA) 
Planning, coordinating 
and supervising the 
proper and orderly 
development of the areas 
within the Bangalore 
Metro Region. 
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Figure 3: Governance zones in the greater Bangalore region. Source: (H. S. Sudhira et al., 2007) 
 
a) The Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF): 
The Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) was an elite coalition of like-minded 
individuals who shared the vision of making Bangalore a more competitive city on 
an international stage, particularly to emerging service sector industries. The 
Chief Minister of Karnataka invited these individuals to be a part of the task force 
in 1999 with the aim of creating and implementing a specific developmental 
agenda for Bangalore. While the coalition was given the broad (and somewhat 
vague) mandate of making Bangalore “the best city in India” (Ghosh, 2005: 
4916), the actual focus was much more narrow, focusing on land and 
infrastructure development within Bangalore, echoing the then Chief Minister’s 
(Mr. S.M. Krishna) vision for the city’s development. A new state government, 
formed by the Congress Party had been elected to power in Karnataka in 1999. 
Karnataka’s economy, at the time, was facing pressure from both industrial and 
agricultural sectors that were in decline (Kamath, 2006; Pani, 2006). This period 
in Bangalore’s economic development also coincided with the time when the city, 
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already a national centre for ‘new’ industries like information technology (IT), was 
facing serious competition from other cities (like Hyderabad) in its bid to remain 
the leader for emerging industries like IT and biotechnology.  
 
In an attempt to revitalize the state’s economy, the newly elected Congress 
government and its Chief Minister, Mr. S.M. Krishna emphasized the need to 
build a ‘modern’ state using ‘modern infrastructure’ (Pani, 2006). Towards this 
goal of modernizing Bangalore, nine taskforces (including the BATF) were 
formed.66 While the other taskforces were given a statewide mandate, the BATF 
was focused only on Bangalore city. The newly elected government’s aim was to 
use the BATF to tap into the vast pool of knowledge in the city to help transform 
Bangalore into a world class city (Ghosh, 2006). Members of the BATF included 
corporate leaders, financial experts, architects, an NGO leader, a retired 
academic, two government bureaucrats and a Member of Parliament, although 
there were no urban planners or experts on issues of urban infrastructure 
included nor any elected members from the local city government (Ghosh, 2005; 
Pani, 2006). The members of the BATF were clear that the group was not a non-
governmental organization (NGO) but an extra-constitutional civic body created 
by the state government that engaged actively with governmental institutions to 
promote urban reform. The taskforce saw its role as being twofold: on the one 
hand, it strove to improve supply-side service provision by working with specific 
government agencies; on the other, civil society organizations like Janaagraha 
(whose leader was a BATF member) created demand-side pressure through 
citizen advocacy (Ghosh, 2005).  
 
The BATF was intended to further a very specific development agenda. Mr. S.M. 
Krishna, the newly elected Chief Minister of Karnataka, looked towards 
Singapore as a model for Bangalore’s development (Nair, 2005; Pani, 2006). He 
                                                
66 The remaining task forces addressed health and family welfare, education, IT in higher education, 
infrastructure, the revival of the Government Flying Training School, IT and biotechnology, emphasizing the 
state government’s commitment to fostering IT and biotechnology development in Bangalore specifically and 
Karnataka more broadly.  
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not only admired “the material aspects of Singapore” like its infrastructure and 
urban development plans, but also “the value systems adopted by the citizens of 
Singapore like accountability, civic sense and respect for law” and hoped to 
cultivate a similar ethos in Bangalore and other cities in the state as well (Pani, 
2006: 247). In addition, there was a significant financial motivation to form an 
alliance with Singapore: several government-linked companies (GLCs) from 
Singapore as well as the government of Singapore itself were interested in 
investing in the Karnataka economy at the time (Pani, 2006). Moreover, in an 
attempt to attract and retain domestic and foreign investment in emerging 
technology sectors like Information Technology (IT) and biotechnology, the 
Karnataka state government was offering what Roy (2009) calls ‘geobribes’, i.e. 
several financial and other incentives (like easy and cheap access to prime urban 
land, uninterrupted power supply) to entice companies to move to and remain in 
Bangalore. The BATF was therefore intended to come up with policy 
recommendations to improve Bangalore’s infrastructure and development 
process to make the city more attractive specifically to IT and biotech companies.  
 
As Kamath (2006) writes, the idea of a public-private partnership (PPP) was one 
of the major pillars on which the Congress government in Karnataka was built. 
She argues that Mr. Krishna and several senior-level bureaucrats were in favor of 
the PPP model for several reasons: to use non-state actors to help reform what 
they perceived as corrupt and inefficient local (city) government politicians and 
bureaucrats, improving management practices in government and also signaling 
to corporations that the new government was serious about creating a favorable 
and welcoming business environment. The BATF, as a model PPP, was meant 
to be a vehicle through which non-state (especially corporate) actors were to be 
given the means to contribute to Bangalore’s urban reform.  
 
The BATF had three distinct components: a core five-person working group, a 
nine-member advisory group and seven civic agencies or ‘stakeholders’ (Ghosh, 
2005; Kamath, 2006). In addition, there was a sizeable back-office staff that 
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implemented BATF projects, consisting of largely young professionals like 
planners, engineers and architects (Interview, BATF staff member, 2009). To 
head the BATF, Mr. S.M. Krishna turned to a personal friend, Mr. Nandan 
Nilekani, who was then in a senior position at Infosys, a very successful domestic 
IT corporation and an individual with a reputation for integrity and philanthropy.67 
As multiple interview respondents in Bangalore explained to me, the rest of the 
task force was built through Mr. Nilekani’s social network and comprised of 
people that he was friendly with or knew as social acquaintances. Kamath (2006: 
123) also corroborates this, saying that Mr. Nilekani had stated that he knew 
people who would be willing to “contribute to an effort like the BATF,” bringing 
two personal friends to the core working group: Mr. Naresh Narasimhan, a 
prominent Bangalore-based architect and Mr. S. Ravichander, the head of a local 
market-research firm.  
 
The two other members of the core group, Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan and Ms. 
Kalpana Kar were also social acquaintances. According to Kamath (2006) and as 
one of the members of the BATF core group told me, on hearing of the formation 
of the BATF, Mr. Ramanathan emailed Mr. Nilekani expressing interest in being 
involved and offering his experience as a financial analyst to the group.68 This led 
to an invitation to participate in initial BATF meetings and eventually being co-
opted into the core group. Ms. Kar, married to the CEO of a local IT company, 
was invited to be part of the BATF to draw on her experience in media and event 
management, working with NGOs and other pro bono work (Kamath, 2006). 
Personal social networks therefore played an important role in the formation of 
this core group and in the subsequent framing of the task force’s aims. It was this 
                                                
67 Mr. Nilekani was then the Managing Director of Infosys and later went on to become its Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO). Infosys is one of a few homegrown IT companies that have become extremely successful 
and have come to epitomize India’s technological success and entrepreneurship. During field research, 
several respondents (academics, journalists and knowledgeable city residents) commented on the close 
relationship that Mr. Krishna and his family shared with the founders and senior officers at Infosys, which is 
common knowledge in Bangalore. Mr. Krishna and his wife had also been large shareholders in Infosys 
during his tenure as Chief Minister and the shares were sold the year after Mr. Krishna’s government was no 
longer in power Srinivasaraju, S. (2005a) How Many Shares? Outlook India. Web ed. Bangalore, India, 
Outlook Publishing..  
68 At the time, Mr. Ramanathan had newly returned from the US to India to contribute to improving public 
governance in Indian cities. He was also a friend of Mr. Narasimhan, another of the core group members.  
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core group that decided the agenda of the BATF and built on their personal 
social and political connections to implement projects. 
 
The BATF was different from other government taskforces because its members 
took upon themselves to not only recommend reforms to the government but also 
implement them. The core working group agreed that the BATF should not be 
contributing to the already large pile of reports filed with the government but 
rather act upon its recommendations by creating “best practice” examples 
building on their broader objectives (Kamath, 2006). This greater orientation 
towards action was largely made possible due to the financing structure that the 
BATF had set up for itself. The BATF and its activities were largely funded 
through an independent source of private capital that came from wealthy private 
sector individuals, in particular through the ‘Adhaar Trust’ that Mr. and Mrs. 
Nilekani set up with an undisclosed amount of personal funds (Kamath, 2006). 
This financial independence, argues Kamath (2006), enabled the BATF to 
support its own initiatives while other taskforces were dependent on state 
funding. Using these funds, the BATF implemented a series of short-term 
projects or what the core group called “owned projects” including building bus 
shelters, public toilets and the conversion of an out-of-use jail into a park. There 
were also a series of “non-owned” projects that the BATF core group facilitated 
and coordinated, but their final implementation was left to one of the civic 
stakeholder agencies.  
 
As Kamath (2006) writes, the other two components of the BATF (the advisory 
group and the seven civic stakeholder agencies) were not as powerful as the 
core working group. The nine-member advisory group comprised of prominent 
city residents that that state government selected and invited. This group only 
participated in the working of the BATF when the core group solicited its input but 
was otherwise absent. Finally, the BATF core group also identified seven 
governmental institutions or ‘stakeholders’ that it would partner with to 
accomplish its agenda. Almost all of these stakeholder institutions (Table 3) were 
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parastatal bodies, controlled by the state government.  The selection of the 
seven stakeholder government institutions shows a bias towards urban 
infrastructure and development. Omissions from this list include social welfare 
departments such as education and health and also specific agencies that 
addressed the needs of the urban poor and low-income groups like the 
Karnataka Slum Clearance Board (KSCB). In particular, the KSCB was excluded 
from the list because the BATF considered it to be a “political cesspool” and did 
not want to “open that can of worms” (Ghosh, 2005: 4916).  
 Name of agency Function 
1. Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) Land development and planning 
2. Bangalore Water Supply and Sanitation 
Board (BWSSB) 
Water supply, wastewater 
management, sewage treatment 
3. Bangalore Electricity Supply Company 
(BESCOM) 
Power services 
4.  Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL) Telecommunications services 
5. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport 
Corporation (BMTC) 
Public transportation and traffic 
management 
6. Bangalore City Police Enforcement of law and order 
7. Bangalore Mahanagar Palike (BMP) 
(Merged in 2007 into a new administrative 
body: the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagar 
Palike or the Greater Bangalore City 
Corporation,) 
Municipal budgeting 
Table 3: List of civic 'stakeholders' identified by the BATF. Source: (Ghosh, 2005) 
 
The state government (i.e. the Chief Minister and several senior-level 
government bureaucrats) laid out broad objectives for the BATF following 
informal conversations with the core working group (Kamath, 2006; Interview, 
BATF staff member, 2009). Labeled as the “Bangalore Forward” goals, these 
were (Kamath, 2006):  
(1) To stimulate private sector involvement in Bangalore through public-
private partnerships, creating and maintaining (or funding) public 
amenities; 
(2) Developing an infrastructure plan for the city, especially focusing on better 
roads, flyovers, markets, plazas, etc.; 
(3) Improving capacity in the seven civic stakeholder agencies; 
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(4) Developing new and upgrading existing information systems, to improve 
decision-making abilities, focusing on new technologies like Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) and information technology (IT).  
 
These objectives were perceived to be important in effecting Bangalore’s 
transformation into a world-class city and were operationalized by the BATF core 
group in consultation with the heads of the seven civic stakeholders (mostly 
senior-level bureaucrats). These objectives also clearly reflect the interests of the 
core working group members and their constituents. For example, as several 
journalists and academics pointed out to me, among the first infrastructure 
projects to be approved was a series of road and flyover construction projects 
that improved the connectivity of the IT hub on Bangalore’s periphery with the 
central city in a move to appease the growing new technology sector of the city.69 
Another project that was given pre-eminence was the development of a new 
international airport for Bangalore, which was also considered important to attract 
and retain business to the city. The emphasis on using new technologies like GIS 
and IT in government also benefited the IT sector in the city by providing 
increasing business opportunities for local firms. 
 
The BATF also recommended the reform of urban governance in Bangalore as 
well as the adoption of better, more transparent planning processes and a move 
towards e-governance. The core group encouraged the adoption of Western 
methods of urban planning and facilitated the hire of a French planning 
consultancy firm to prepare a new master plan for Bangalore. In addition, the 
BATF financed and implemented several new urban management practices, for 
example, the new funding-based accounting system (FBAS) at the Bangalore 
Mahanagar Palike (now the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagar Palike or the BBMP). 
                                                
69 A particularly telling example of this is Mr. Krishna’s reaction to Mr Azim Premji’s (CEO of Wipro another 
domestic IT giant) criticism of Bangalore’s infrastructure. Mr. Premji complained about the condition of the 
roads going to and from Wipro’s offices and the unreliable power supply in the area: three days later, Mr. 
Krishna had announced a special task force to address infrastructure issues specifically along the Sarjapur 
road, where Wipro is located. Rozario, C. (2004), Cyber Myths and the Rest who also live in Silicon valley 
Alternate Law Forum, September 21, 2011, http://www.altlawforum.org/globalisation/research-
publications/cyber-myths-and-the-rest-who-also-live-in-silicon-valley. 
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This emphasized centralized management of public funds, which would increase 
transparency in public finance. However, as Ghosh (2005) explains, this change 
was implemented without taking local councilors or elected officials into account. 
This is important because local councilors are directly responsible for the 
allocation and distribution of funds for specific projects at the neighborhood level 
(Ghosh, 2005). There were several other instances where reforms implemented 
by the BATF or related organizations like Janaagraha were integral to the 
functioning of locally elected representatives but bypassed them entirely.70 
 
This was also directly related to the failure to include the urban poor in its 
agenda. As Benjamin (2000, 2008) shows, the urban poor and other 
marginalized groups in Bangalore typically interact with government through local 
level elected officials, using the bureaucratic-political system to safeguard their 
interests (especially in land). However, by not explicitly including these officials in 
their deliberations, the BATF also excluded a significant proportion of the 
population from its agenda. In addition, there were few BATF programs that 
explicitly targeted the urban poor. In fact, Mr. Nilekani later expressed regret for 
not having included any pro-poor programs in the BATF’s agenda (Ghosh, 2005). 
In addition, the ‘demand-side pressures’ that formed the counterpart to the 
BATF’s ‘supply-side reforms’ stemmed mainly from a non-profit organization 
called Janaagraha that served a largely middle-class constituency in Bangalore 
set up by Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan (who was also part of the core working group 
of the BATF) (Ghosh, 2005; Kamath, 2006; Coelho et al., 2011). As Coelho et al 
(2011: 18) explain, Janaagraha emerged as a result of two “perceived limitations 
of the BATF”: first, while the BATF could create mechanisms for public sector 
reform, it could not enforce or implement these; and second, since the BATF was 
a government-appointed body, it could not confront the Karnataka state 
government on “issues concerning power relations between actors within and 
                                                
70 For more detailed information on the various programs that the BATF implemented, see Ghosh, A. (2005), 
Public-private or a private public: Promised partnership of the Bangalore Agenda Task Force. Economic and 
Political Weekly, ; Kamath, L. (2006) Achieving global competitiveness and local poverty reduction? 
Examining the public-private partnering model of governance in Bangalore, India. Urban Planning and Policy 
Development. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. 
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outside the state”.  This led to further concerns that the considerable power that 
the BATF wielded was being directed chiefly at serving a very specific middle-
class constituency.  
 
Different groups access the institutional framework of government in different 
ways. The activities of the BATF focused largely on “corporate” economies and 
interacted with government largely through top-level officials and politicians in the 
state government (Benjamin, 2000). By constituting the BATF through a 
government order, the Chief Minister, Mr. Krishna, created a new form of 
engagement through which non-state actors could interact with government 
(Ghosh, 2005). The government order also ensured that the BATF reported 
directly to the Chief Minister, thereby bypassing all local governmental agencies 
and officials. However, the urban poor and other marginalized populations in 
Bangalore interact with government through “local” economy actors like local-
level municipal councilors and locally elected officials (Benjamin, 2000). The 
BATF and the networks through which its members operated provided new 
opportunities for upper and middle class residents to participate in urban 
governance but were out of reach for a significant proportion of Bangalore’s 
population: as researchers and activists working in Bangalore have pointed out, 
the reforms recommended and implemented by the BATF had the unfortunate 
effect of excluding certain (especially marginalized) populations of the city 
(Interviews with Bangalore-based activists and journalists, 2008-09; Ghosh, 
2005; Benjamin, 2006; Pani, 2006; Benjamin, 2007). As Ghosh (2005: 4916) 
explains, the BATF’s agenda, supported by the initiatives of Mr. Krishna’s state 
government, promoted the development of physical infrastructure and provided 
techno-managerial solutions to urban problems in Bangalore “without 
comparable emphasis on social and economic requirements of the city.”  
 
Concerned activists and civil society leaders also raised the issue that the BATF 
was unconstitutional and unrepresentative (Rozario, 2004; Benjamin, 2005a). 
The chairman of the BATF and the core working group reported directly to the 
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Chief Minister of the state. There were few elected representatives that were 
invited to participate in the BATF’s deliberative processes with most of its 
meetings taking place behind closed doors. Rarely were decisions deliberated in 
public. Those government officials that did participate were senior bureaucrats 
from the various parastatal bodies that govern Bangalore. Local government 
officials and elected representatives were absent, partly because the state 
government and its officials regarded these agencies as corrupt and inefficient 
and were trying to use the BATF to ‘clean up’ local urban government (Kamath, 
2006). 
 
Another concern was the close relationship between the IT industry, especially 
Infosys and the Karnataka state government. As Pani (2006) points out, the 
BATF was a mutually beneficial association for almost all of its members. Their 
close association with government officials brought the corporate heads at 
Infosys in closer contact with those who made investment decisions on behalf of 
large public sector mutual funds, one of which (Unit Trust of India) was found to 
have a significant investment in Infosys (Pani, 2006: 253-4). The role that 
Nilekani was playing at the BATF helped to boost the investor image of Infosys 
as a socially responsible corporation. Infosys also benefited from increased 
institutional investment: during the first two years of the Krishna government, 
when the BATF was most powerful, the government of Singapore became the 
third largest shareholder in Infosys. The Singapore government’s shareholding 
percentage in the company rose from 0.62 per cent on March 31, 1999 to 5.48 
per cent on March 31, 2001 (Pani, 2006).  
 
The benefits were not limited to financial or monetary gains. Although the formal 
coalition ended with the end of Mr. Krishna’s term, the influence of its individual 
members did not. In the five years that the BATF had been in existence, the 
members of the group were able to make sufficient inroads into the government 
at the state and the national levels such that their reform agenda was being 
institutionalized (Ghosh, 2006). The BATF and its reform agenda have been 
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incorporated into urban policy at the national level in the form of the Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), which was framed by 
several former BATF members (Benjamin, 2007). For example, PROOF (Public 
Review of Operations and Finance), a Janaagraha program has grown into the 
Public Disclosure Law in the JNNURM; JNNURM’s Community Participation Law 
emerged out of Janaagraha’s work with model Area Sabbas in Bangalore and 
the BATF’s experiments with e-governance and asset mapping form the basis of 
the National E-governance Strategy (Coelho et al., 2011: 22). Moreover, Coelho 
et al (2011) quote a former BATF member who claims that Mr. Nilekani used his 
wide circle of connections to set up meetings with key national politicians and 
bureaucrats. As a result, three of the four individuals who were instrumental in 
shaping JNNURM were erstwhile BATF members. Mr. Nilekani, the former 
chairman of the BATF, continues to be involved in national policy and is now 
heading the Unique Identification (UID) project for the Indian national government 
while Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan and his organization, Janaagraha, are acting in 
advisory capacities to several state governments as well as the national 
government.71  
 
The BATF was a coalition between key elite actors in Karnataka’s state 
government — the Chief Minister and several senior bureaucrats and important 
non-state actors like Mr. Nilekani and Mr. Ramanathan. The main motivation 
behind the formation of this coalition was to retain Bangalore’s position as an 
economic leader in information technology and other emerging industries, which 
was a mutually beneficial goal for the state government actors as well as the 
non-state actors that were part of the BATF. As I argued earlier, the centres of 
economic and political activity in India are being rescaled (Roy, 2003; Brenner, 
2004) and urban regions are emerging as key sites within which this rescaling is 
taking place. In this context, regional level leadership is becoming increasingly 
                                                
71 The Unique Identification (UID) project is a national-level policy initiative that aims to provide identification 
for each resident across the country. The UID would be used primarily as the basis for efficient delivery of 
welfare services. It would also act as a tool for effective monitoring of various programs and schemes of the 
Government (Unique Identification Authority of India (2011) Unique Identification Authority of India,. Planning 
Commision, Government of India. November 15, 2011, )  
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important. Recognizing this, S.M. Krishna attempted to leverage his social and 
political networks to form a coalition that would harness economic and political 
resources in Karnataka to promote Bangalore’s economic development. 
 
b) The Agenda for Bangalore Infrastructure and Development Task 
Force (ABIDe): 
From 2004-2008, the state of Karnataka experienced considerable political 
instability. The political coalition that formed the state government in 2004 
collapsed within two years because of disagreements between the various 
members of the coalition over transfer of power. Karnataka was then brought 
under President’s rule until the state assembly elections in 2008. Most state 
government activities, including urban development and planning activities in 
Bangalore, were at a standstill during this time. In May 2008, a new government 
led by the right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) was elected to power. The 
mandate of the new government was to break away from the practices of the 
previous governments, especially the Congress government led by Mr. Krishna.  
 
Bangalore was in as much need of urban reform in 2008 as it had been in the 
late 1990s. Although several former BATF members approached the new 
government with the aim of reviving the taskforce, the new BJP government 
decided against reviving the BATF to set up its own version. The Agenda for 
Bengaluru Infrastructure and Development Task Force (ABIDe) was set up in 
October 2008 with the new Chief Minister of Karnataka, Dr. B.S. Yeddyurappa as 
chairperson. ABIDe’s objective is to “revive and rebuild Bengaluru through a 
combination of comprehensive planning, improved municipal services and new 
investments into infrastructure” (Agenda For Bangalore Infrastructure 
Development (ABIDe), 2009). The taskforce will also “deliberate upon the 
challenges facing the city, develop blueprints for possible solutions to these, 
consult with city agencies, the public and other stakeholders, and provide 
recommendations for the way forward. Wherever needed, ABIDe will also 
facilitate the work of agencies and departments by resolving bottlenecks” 
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(Agenda For Bangalore Infrastructure Development (ABIDe), 2009). The 
taskforce focuses on four key areas within Bangalore: (1) governance, (2) road 
traffic management and transportation, (3) the urban poor, and (4) public 
security. The group has prepared draft reports, blueprints and action plans for 
each of these areas, setting a clear agenda and outlining what it expects to 
accomplish.  
 
While the BATF was formed around a clear economic agenda, ABIDe’s agenda 
is more political. The emphasis is on reforming urban governance and planning 
processes in Bangalore rather than catering to any specific economic agenda. 
ABIDe’s proposed governance reforms, as I explain in more detail below, 
continue the trend started by the BATF, of providing greater opportunities for 
middle and upper class residents to participate in planning processes in 
Bangalore while excluding low-income groups and other marginalized 
populations. ABIDe emerged from the idea that there needed to be a peer 
environment outside government where a separate space can be created for 
public administration to focus on specific agenda items and issues, since, as one 
of ABIDe’s core group members suggested, it is often easier to accomplish 
things outside the framework of government than from within. He and the others 
in this core group saw ABIDe as distinct from the government – an independent 
body that could facilitate urban reform. He added that it was like ABIDe had 
made a deal with the government where the government agreed to provide 
political cover and backing, ensuring that agencies would respond to initiatives 
and the members of ABIDe would provide outcomes.  
 
Officially, ABIDe has 23 members. In addition to the Chief Minister, it includes 
two Members of Parliament, several corporate leaders, present and retired 
government officials and bureaucrats, academics, members of the press and 
from Bangalore-based non-profit groups. Most of the members however act as 
advisors to a core group of four members, similar to the BATF. Interestingly, no 
former BATF members are part of ABIDe. Although this is partly due to 
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differences between the two political parties (the Congress and the BJP) and the 
new BJP government’s desire to establish a clear break with the earlier Congress 
government and everything that it stood for, it also stems from personal 
differences between former BATF members and current ABIDe members.72  
 
While the Chief Minister officially chairs ABIDe, it is run and managed by the 
convener of the taskforce: Mr. Rajeev Chandrasekhar, a Member of Parliament 
with close ties to the BJP.73 Mr. Chandrasekhar manages the daily working of the 
taskforce, acting as a liaison between the Chief Minister and the rest of the 
members. The members of ABIDe’s core working group were chosen and invited 
by Mr. Chandrasekhar, all of whom were part of his social or political circles. In 
addition to Mr. Chandrasekhar, the core group consists of three others: Mr. A. 
Ravindra (a retired senior bureaucrat and the former commissioner of the 
Bangalore Development Authority), Mr. R.K. Misra (a local entrepreneur and 
political activist) and Mr. Ashwin Mahesh (an academic and private 
entrepreneur).74 The remaining members that form the larger advisory body of 
ABIDe were either invited by the state government (i.e. the Chief Minister’s office 
or other senior bureaucrats) or were nominated by the core working group.  
 
                                                
72 A person deeply involved in ABIDe told me that initially, several BATF members had expressed an 
interest in continuing their work in collaboration with the new BJP government. Mr. Ramanathan in particular 
had reached out to Mr. Rajeev Chandrasekhar, the convener of ABIDe. In response, Mr. Chandrasekhar 
had invited him to attend initial ABIDe meetings. However, apparently Mr. Ramanathan and Mr. 
Chandrasekhar disagreed on how the new group should work and how power should be shared among 
members. As a result, Mr. Ramanathan withdrew his association with ABIDe and is no longer involved with 
the group. 
73 He is also a successful entrepreneur who currently owns and manages Jupiter Capital, a venture capital 
firm in Bangalore Vincent, S. (2011), "Bangaloreans must demand to take their neighbourhoods back" 
Citizen Matters, Bangalore, March 7, 2011, http://bangalore.citizenmatters.in/articles/view/2679-rajeev-
chandrasekhar-
interview?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+citizenmatters%2Fbanga
lore+%28Citizen+Matters+Bangalore+News%29.. 
74 Both Mr. Ravindra and Mr. Misra are also closely affiliated with the BJP, the political party in power. Mr. 
Ravindra also runs a non-profit advocacy group in Bangalore called the Centre for Sustainable 
Development. Mr. Misra (http://rajendramisra.blogspot.com/) is a former Bangalore-based IT entrepreneur 
who is now an advocate for social entrepreneurship and good governance. He was also the winner of a 
popular national competition called Lead India run by the Times of India newspaper. Mr. Mahesh is a 
professor of Public Policy at the Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Bangalore, one of the premier 
business schools in India. He is also a private entrepreneur and runs a firm called Mapunity that specializes 
in social technology applications (http://mapunity.in/). 
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While ABIDe has prepared several reports and action plans outlining 
recommendations in each of its four focal areas since its formation in late 2008, 
the main focus over the last three years has been the reform of urban 
governance and urban infrastructure in Bangalore. Mr. Ravindra, Mr. Misra and 
Mr. Mahesh have all set up organizations in Bangalore that provide services to 
government and non-government groups interested in implementing social 
advocacy and good governance practices. For example, Mr. Misra founded a 
group called SAHYOG that promotes public-private partnerships in Indian cities 
with a focus on public infrastructure provision; Mr. Mahesh runs Mapunity, a 
company that provides technological solutions to address social problems and 
development issues.  
 
ABIDe intends to implement urban governance reform in two related steps: the 
first is to pass the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Governance Act (BMRGA), 
drafted by ABIDe members, which will then facilitate the next step: the 
implementation of ABIDe’s Plan Bengaluru 2020, a comprehensive development 
plan for the Greater Bangalore Region. The main aim of the Regional 
Governance Bill is to abolish the multitude of parastatal and local government 
agencies that currently manage and service Bangalore and replace it with a 
single large regional metropolitan administrative body as well as a directly 
elected Mayor with a five-year term.75 The bill simultaneously advocates for 
increased decentralization of local government through the creation of 
Neighborhood Area Committees (NACs) comprising of locally elected officials 
and neighborhood residents. However, it is ironic that in the preparation of the 
proposed bill, ABIDe has had very little input from local government officials. 
ABIDe’s Regional Governance Act and the new master plan were framed and 
written by ABIDe’s core group members. These documents were prepared 
without any input from related government agencies like the Bangalore 
Development Authority (BDA) or the newly formed Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagar 
Palike (BBMP, the city corporation). There was also no public input either directly 
                                                
75 The mayor is currently indirectly elected by members of the city council (who, in turn, are directly elected). 
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solicited or through various elected representatives. This violates the public 
participation mandate required by the recent urban governance reforms.  
 
Similar to the BATF, ABIDe is currently involved in techno-managerial decision-
making for the government that is somewhat beyond its mandate as a taskforce. 
On several occasions, it has bypassed the very local governments that it is 
seeking to empower, especially the BBMP, arguing that ABIDe represents the 
public interest. ABIDe’s proposed plan and the Regional Governance Act have 
their merits: they promote greater decentralization and public involvement in the 
planning process. They also advocate for a more comprehensive approach to 
planning rather than focusing merely on land use and zoning in their master plan 
for Bangalore. However, it is unclear exactly how decentralization will work in the 
proposed reforms, since ABIDe simultaneously recommends the concentration of 
all planning decision-making in the hands of the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional 
Development Authority (BMRDA), which is a parastatal body controlled by the 
state government (Daksh India, 2009).  
 
ABIDe has also refused to share any of these documents publicly until the state 
government has approved them despite several requests from urban activists 
and journalists, thereby discouraging any public debate on their content. While 
being interviewed for this dissertation, one ABIDe member defended their 
approach by saying that he and the other members were acting in their capacity 
as private individuals and were not liable or accountable to anyone other than the 
Chief Minister of the state. ABIDe members continue to insist however that these 
proposals are merely recommendations that the state government may or may 
not choose to implement. However, several infrastructure projects recommended 
by ABIDe have already been allocated funding in the BBMP’s budget for 2010-
11, ensuring their implementation (Daksh India, 2009).76 In addition, ABIDe has 
                                                
76 The projects that have been sanctioned in the budget include the development of signal-free corridors in 
the city to improve connectivity with the periphery, and particularly the new airport as well as improved bus 
connectivity for Bangalore’s central business district Daksh India (2009). Master Report on Review of 
Democracy and Performance of the Government of Karnataka, Daksh India. Bangalore. 
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successfully channeled funding from the JNNURM submission on Urban 
Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) towards transportation-related 
improvements in Bangalore. The state government has also recently set up a 
one-man task force (comprising of ABIDe core group member, Dr. A. Ravindra) 
to prepare a draft Urban Development Policy for the state of Karnataka.  
 
ABIDe’s power comes largely from the close association that the core group 
members share with the ruling political party (the BJP). The BJP won the city 
elections held in 2010, giving ABIDe access to the newly elected city council as 
well. However, the BJP government has also been embroiled in several political 
and financial scandals in the last year (2010-11), prompting allegations of 
corruption against the Chief Minister. It is unclear what the impact of these 
allegations will be on ABIDe. While several ABIDe members have now been co-
opted into the formal government structure as advisors or independent 
consultants, it remains to be seen if their influence lasts beyond the next electoral 
cycle (the next state elections will be held in 2013).  
 
The task forces discussed in this section are noteworthy for a number of reasons. 
They represent a trend towards more flexible governance networks as the Indian 
government at the national and state levels comes to rely increasingly on non-
state actors to assist with urban policy and planning. The members of both the 
BATF and ABIDe had access to key resources such as financial capital and 
technology that the government wanted to mobilize. The state government, on 
the other hand, was able to provide task force members with access to 
governmental authority. The power that both the BATF and ABIDe had highlights 
the role the personal political and social networks and how they are being 
mobilized to achieve very specific political and developmental goals. As urban 
regions emerge as centers of political and economic power, these networks 
assume an added significance: the BATF and ABIDe were able to leverage their 
networks to develop “Brand Bangalore” as a competitive and attractive economic 
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destination and were also able (especially the BATF) to influence national urban 
policy. 
 
3. Planning for Pune: 
The Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) is the main government agency 
responsible for the civic and infrastructure needs of the city, including the 
preparation and implementation of master plans for Pune, which it does in 
conjunction with the state’s urban development department (Kulabkar, 2002a). 
The PMC is typically concerned with the daily working of the city, taking a more 
reactive approach to planning and development: it regulates construction and 
new development, and manages infrastructure requirements as needed rather 
than actively planning for the future. Master planning in Pune has not been very 
successful. The last plan that was passed but only partially implemented was for 
a twenty-year period from 1987 to 2007 (Kulabkar, 2002b). Furthermore, 
subsequent plan proposals have been mired in controversy and have yet to be 
approved. Consequently, for the last three years when growth in Pune has been 
at its fastest, the city has been lacking a blueprint with which to plan for this 
growth.  
 
This section discusses how elite actors with contradictory goals formed separate 
coalitions to achieve them. On the one hand, there is the alliance between local 
(Pune-based) real estate developers and the PMC that is pushing for increased 
urban development on prime urban land currently reserved for public uses. 
CREDAI-Pune, formerly the Promoters and Builders Association of Pune 
(PBAP), largely represent the real estate sector in Pune. This is a group of over 
300 Pune-based developers that constitute a very powerful lobby with political 
connections not only at the local (city-level) but also at the state-level. In addition 
to the group’s efforts, individual developers also have extensive political networks 
that they continually mobilize to reach their development goals.77 On the other 
                                                
77 I discuss real estate development in Pune in more detail in Chapter 5, focusing on one particular project.  
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hand, there is a loose coalition of prominent citizens of Pune comprising of 
planners, environmentalists, journalists, civic activists and former government 
officials, now called the Green Pune movement, that has repeatedly come 
together to protest against plans and policies that the PMC has proposed, 
arguing that these plans largely favor the development lobby at the cost of the 
other residents of the city. The members of the Green Pune movement are also 
very well connected individuals, politically and socially. As we shall see below, 
they have successfully mobilized these networks to compel the PMC to rethink its 
proposed plans. The Green Pune movement emerged as a formal coalition in 
2002, in response to proposed changes that the government intended to make in 
the new master plan or development plan for the city.78 As the name suggests, 
the members of the group are largely concerned with environmental issues, in 
particular, with the preservation of open space in Pune. However, they have also 
formed alliances with other interest groups, especially squatters on public land 
and various student groups, thereby broadening their support base. This is not 
the first time that the core members of the Green Pune movement have agitated 
against government plans: this alliance has a longer history and has been 
forming and reforming in various iterations with essentially the same core 
members since the late 1980s – early 1990s to draw attention to a variety of 
issues in Pune’s master plans.  
 
One of the major issues that the Green Pune movement has been lobbying for is 
the preservation of the hills that surround Pune. These hills form an important 
part of the city’s cultural, social and natural heritage. While most city residents 
use the hills for recreational purposes, several of these also hold religious 
significance for the city’s populations. Consequently, in most of the city plans 
thus far, the hills were reserved as public space with little, if any, development 
sanctioned on the hillsides (Kulabkar, 2002b). In addition, some of these hills are 
also home to a large section of the urban poor of the city who live in squatter 
settlements on the hillsides (Kulabkar, 2002b; Bapat, 2004). However, as the city 
                                                
78 This plan would ideally have come into affect in 2007, when the last master plan’s mandate ended. 
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grew, local developers began to view the hills as prime real estate. A prominent 
case was that of a developer who bought a part of hill land in 1982 called Survey 
No. 44 in the then-draft plan (Kulabkar, 2002b). Although he made several 
attempts to get the land dereserved, i.e. get the zoning converted to urban land 
that would enable him to develop the land as private residences, this attempt was 
unsuccessful due to a public campaign against the proposed development of the 
hills through a partnership between journalists, environmentalists, government 
officials, academics, social activists and urban planners. This coalition was able 
to successfully petition the state and even the national governments to prevent 
the development of Survey No. 44 (Kulabkar, 2002b; Kulabkar, 2002a).79 The 
Green Pune movement was a reformation of this same group of people when the 
new development plan proposed similar changes.  
 
In 1997, 23 adjacent villages were incorporated into the city of Pune. As a result, 
the city needed to revise the existing master plan to include the newly 
incorporated villages. The PMC formed a committee that came up with a new 
development plan in 2002. Part of this new plan recommended opening up the 
hillsides to development. In earlier plans for the region, these had been reserved 
as protected areas and unavailable for development. However, these locations 
were also extremely attractive as potential development sites for luxury 
residences. The local developer lobby, led by CREDAI-Pune, successfully 
lobbied the city as well as state governments to dereserve a small percentage of 
the hills in order to enable development. In the new draft plan, the city 
government proposed that 4% of the hills would be dereserved and slated for 
development. When the plan was sent to the Maharashtra state government for 
approval, the state’s urban development department directed the city to permit 
not 4% but 20% of the hills to be slated for development. Following this decision, 
                                                
79 Kulabkar has documented the detailed story and the politics of the implementation of the earlier plans in a 
series of papers. For more details on these, see Kulabkar, P. (2002a) NGOs and Urban Planning in India: 
The Case of Pune’s Development Plan. International Society for Third-Sector Research. Cape Town; 
Kulabkar, P. (2002b) The politics of implementing urban plans in India: The case of Pune's development 
plan. International development planning review, 24 (1), 77-103. 
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several local developers submitted proposals for development to the PMC that 
were approved. Shortly after, construction began. 
 
This was the catalyst that spurred the formation of the Green Pune movement as 
a formal coalition. Many of the individuals from the earlier protests of the 1980s 
and 1990s came together again. Several of these individuals were now in very 
different and in some cases, more powerful, positions. The core members of the 
Green Pune movement include Vandana Chavan, the former mayor of Pune and 
a municipal councilor; Aneeta Gokhale-Benninger, a prominent urban planner, 
environmentalist and the founder of the Centre for Development Studies; Vinita 
Deshmukh, a journalist who had formerly worked with the Express Citizens 
Forum (the local arm of a prominent English language daily, the Indian Express) 
during the earlier protests and now ran Intelligent Pune, a local newspaper; Sujit 
Patwardhan, a local architect and activist; Satish Khot, Vijay Kumbhar and Maj. 
Gen. Jatar (retired.), local civic activists. The core members come from a similar 
social background: some of them attended school together while others are old 
family friends. Several of the core members are also members of a few elite 
clubs in Pune, in particular a local jazz club.80 What began as a somewhat 
spontaneous alliance between friends grew into a larger citizens’ movement as 
the result of a strategic use of the resources that the group had at their disposal 
and an intelligent deployment of their political and social networks.  
 
The core members of the Green Pune movement adopted two strategies to make 
their case. First, they mounted a citizen awareness campaign. The key person in 
charge of this was Vinita Deshmukh. As a former journalist and now editor of her 
own newspaper, she had extensive connections in the local media. She drew on 
her professional network to disseminate information about the proposed 
development plan through local newspapers in English as well as Marathi (the 
                                                
80 Another illustration of the closeness between the core members was the relationship between their 
families. For example, while being interviewed for this dissertation, the children of some of the core 
members referred to other core members as “mama” and “masi” (Meaning uncle [mother’s brother] and aunt 
[mother’s sister], respectively, in Marathi, the local language) 
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local language), ensuring wide circulation. In addition, local activists like Jatar, 
Khot and Kumbhar also mobilized citizen groups against the proposed plan. The 
movement was a huge success, with Green Pune collecting a total of 80,000 
signatures protesting the proposed changes to the hills. Simultaneously, the rest 
of the group including Chavan, Gokhale-Benninger and Patwardhan examined 
the proposed plans and devised an appropriate strategy to register their protests 
and propose alternative solutions. In particular, they recommended that the city 
government continue to maintain the hills as open space, for public recreational 
purposes. They also requested that all sanctioned development projects on the 
hills be stayed until a final decision was taken. As a former mayor and councilor, 
Chavan had extensive connections within the city government. As a planner, 
teacher and activist, Gokhale-Benninger also had an extensive professional 
network. Moreover, she comes from a very well respected old Brahmin family 
that has been living in Pune for generations. This also gave her access to a 
substantial social network, which she mobilized as part of the public protest 
campaign. Together, they were able to lobby their contacts in the city 
government to stay development on the hills till an alternative more 
environmentally friendly plan had been considered (Interviews with Green Pune 
core members, 2008). This combined with the public campaigns to create 
significant pressure on the PMC, especially the Commissioner. This forced both 
the Maharashtra state and Pune city governments to reconsider their decision – 
the state government revoked its changes and a new planning committee was 
formed that included Aneeta Gokhale-Benninger as one of its members.  
 
Following the appointment of the planning committee, a new development plan 
was created with a stronger environmental focus. This ‘green’ plan preserved 
significantly larger portions of the hills as open space for public use, created a 
reservation of a biodiversity park that would connect key wildlife corridors in the 
region and also provided for various basic amenities like water and transportation 
infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and parks for the newly incorporated areas of 
the city. This plan was submitted to the city government for approval in 2005. The 
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general body of the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) passed it after a 
contentious vote and sent it to the state government for final approval. This 
process took nearly three years. The state government however, favored the real 
estate lobby and revoked this plan, reinstating the earlier one and ordering the 
city to begin development on the hills.  
 
Not only was this a frustrating setback for the Green Pune movement, but as two 
of them mentioned to me, the core members also viewed this as a blatant 
disregard for public opinion on the part of the Maharashtra state government. In 
early 2008, the Green Pune movement reconvened. The core members 
launched another, more intense public campaign to demand that the city and 
state governments implement the 2005 ‘green’ development plan. The 
stakeholders involved in the campaign had grown – two youth organizations had 
joined forces with Green Pune in addition to the core group that was earlier part 
of the movement. One of these was a teenage youth organization while another 
was a group called Yuth-2-Yuth. The more experienced members of Green Pune 
prepared a letter of objection to the plans and a list of the Green Pune 
movement’s proposed changes and published them in various newspapers.81 
The newspaper articles encouraged Pune residents to sign and send these to 
their local governmental officials. In addition to the media campaign, the two 
youth groups were instrumental in mobilizing a public signature campaign across 
the city. Members of the youth groups approached Pune residents in person 
asking them to sign the letter of objection and arranged to have them delivered to 
the city council.  
 
Chavan and Gokhale-Benninger also met repeatedly with the city government, 
especially the Municipal Commissioner, to petition the city council to reinstate the 
2005 plan. The unexpected support that this movement got from the city 
government was perhaps the most unusual aspect of this entire campaign. 
                                                
81 The letter of objection and the formal list of objections to the proposed plan are attached in the Appendix 
to this dissertation. 
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Voting across party lines, the general body of the municipal corporation upheld 
the new ‘green’ plan and rejected the verdict of the Maharashtra state 
government. This was unprecedented. The city government demanded an 
explanation from the state government for approving development on public 
space in Pune, when the plan prepared by the city’s representatives had clearly 
rejected it. Moreover, the corporators also raised allegations of corruption against 
a group of municipal councilors and ministers in the state government, accusing 
them of being in league with the real estate development lobby and sacrificing 
the ‘public interest’ of the city to short-term personal gain. As of the time of 
writing (March 2011), a decision on the fate of the Pune’s master plan is pending. 
 
The Green Pune movement had won this round. A coalition of various urban 
stakeholders had managed to carve a space out for themselves, and as a 
consequence, had been co-opted into the governance process. It is also clear 
that it was due to the unique set of resources that the members of the Green 
Pune movement had at their disposal that the campaign was able to attain the 
degree of success that it achieved. The campaign also raised important issues 
about the city’s environment and open space preservation. However, the Green 
Pune movement’s agenda was decidedly middle-class and somewhat elitist. 
There were few considerations given to low-income settlements on the hills. In 
fact, some real estate developers I spoke to claimed that the 2005 ‘green’ plan 
would also displace a significant proportion of low-income residents without 
providing them with alternative accommodation. When questioned about this 
issue, Green Pune members refuted this, arguing that the preservation of open 
space in Pune and the continued reservation of the hills was in the public interest 
and would benefit all city residents.  
 
4. Conflicts and contestations 
In the case of both Bangalore and Pune, we have seen a growing involvement of 
non-state actors in urban governance debates. In both cases, stakeholders that 
have initiated the process and formed the core group of the coalition have come 
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from the elite upper middle-class group. However, in Pune and Bangalore, non-
state actors involved in the taskforces as well as in the Green Pune movement 
have insisted that they are not elitist but are undertaking these responsibilities on 
behalf of the larger public and for ‘the greater good’ of the city. One of the core 
members of ABIDe insists that any private citizen in Bangalore can accomplish 
as much by participation (Interview, ABIDe core group member, 2009). Similarly 
members of Green Pune have repeatedly refuted the claim that they are elitist 
and are ignoring more basic issues that the majority of Pune’s population is 
facing such as the provision of basic infrastructure and civic amenities (Interview, 
Green Pune core members, 2008). While it may be possible in theory in 
Bangalore and Pune for any individual to participate and influence government 
decision-making, it is not likely to be the case in practice. Those who are involved 
in the coalitions discussed in this chapter are extremely well connected 
individuals who have access to or constitute political power (like Mr. S.M. Krishna 
in Bangalore, or several members of the Green Pune movement) as well as 
financial capital. Without these resources at their disposal, it is unlikely that either 
coalition would have succeeded.  
 
In the case of Bangalore, there were clear distinctions between those groups that 
were selectively invited by the state government to participate in defining the 
city’s future and those that worked outside the rubric of government to demand a 
broader engagement. The government created a participation model, selectively 
inviting specific groups to participate, excluding others. Given the exclusive 
nature of both taskforces and their deep connections to party politics in 
Karnataka, it should come as no surprise that both the BATF and ABIDe have 
been the cause of severe conflict and contestation between various stakeholders 
in the city. There are three clear conflicts surrounding the taskforces that have 
emerged in Bangalore: the first is a power struggle between the members of the 
BATF and ABIDe; the second is a conflict between the local (city) government, its 
officials and the members of both taskforces; and finally, a fierce debate about 
the legitimacy of both ABIDe and the BATF has emerged between NGOs, citizen 
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groups and community-based organizations that have not been included in either 
taskforce on the one hand, and the members of the taskforce and the state 
government on the other. I will address each of these in turn. 
 
While ABIDe has tried very hard to differentiate itself from the BATF, the agenda 
of both groups remains much the same, as does the manner in which they 
function. Initially, after the state assembly elections in 2008, members of the 
BATF were trying to get the taskforce reinstated. However, after some 
negotiation, the new Chief Minister, Dr. B.S. Yeddyurappa, turned down this 
suggestion. Instead, he appointed his own taskforce, giving the chair, Mr. 
Chandrasekhar a free hand to select other members (Interview, ABIDe core 
group member, 2009). This in itself was a blow to the former BATF members 
who had not expected a new taskforce to be set up. Mr. Chandrasekhar invited 
some of the former BATF members to participate in the new taskforce. While 
several of them declined to do so, a few agreed, chief of these being Ramesh 
Ramanathan – the head of a local NGO, Janaagraha. Mr. Ramanathan had been 
an extremely vocal and visible member of the BATF and is now an influential 
personality in national urban governance policy debates (Ghosh, 2006; Kamath, 
2006). Conversations with ABIDe members revealed that, before long, tensions 
arose between Mr. Chandrasekhar and Mr. Ramanathan over the management 
and running of ABIDe and Mr. Ramanathan finally stopped participating in 
ABIDe. In part, this is a result of party politics in Karnataka. Mr. Ramanathan and 
the BATF were very strongly allied with the Congress party that was defeated in 
the 2008 elections. The identity, power and control that the BATF had drew on 
this association with the Congress. The right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) 
formed the new government in Karnataka in 2008. The new government was 
anxious to distinguish itself from the earlier Congress government and its 
associates. The BJP government and its affiliates were also concerned with 
retaining as much power and control (most of the members of ABIDe have very 
strong pro-BJP tendencies) and were not willing to share power with former 
BATF members with pro-Congress tendencies. Consequently, what could have 
  129 
been a profitable association has now turned into a hostile relationship between 
prominent stakeholders in Bangalore.  
 
A second set of conflicts has emerged between ABIDe and the local (city) 
government officials. ABIDe and its core members have been obtaining 
permissions directly from the Chief Minister’s office and his aides to enable their 
agenda of urban reform. For example, core team members of ABIDe have been 
able to question the spending practices of city transportation agencies, examine 
their finances and recommend and implement changes to the expenditure plans 
of these local agencies. Local officials have resented this intrusion in their affairs 
on two counts. The first is that ABIDe is a taskforce and does not have the 
mandate to implement its recommendations, since there are no elected 
representatives on the task force and these reforms have been implemented at 
the sole discretion of task force members without any public participation. Since 
the passing of the 74th Constitutional Amendment, local urban bodies should be 
in control over decision-making processes within their jurisdictions. Moreover, 
ABIDe is bypassing the very local bodies that it claims to want to empower. 
Several local politicians have publicly spoken out against the practice of ABIDe 
members involving themselves in local government affairs, causing a political 
controversy in the state (Vincent, 2009b). There have also been instances of 
public disagreement between members of the Chief Minister’s cabinet and 
ABIDe, particularly over issues of power sharing and the implementation of 
reforms (Vincent, 2009a).  
 
Perhaps the most consistent protests against the taskforces have come from 
NGOs and community groups representing marginalized groups in the city as 
well as the larger ‘public interest’. Chief among these have been Hasiru Usiru, a 
spontaneous network of concerned Bangalore citizens and the Environmental 
Support Group (ESG) led by Leo Saldanha. These groups have repeatedly 
protested against the free reign that was given first to the BATF and now to 
ABIDe, to proceed beyond the mandate that was assigned to them as taskforces 
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and their attempts to implement their recommendations. Mr. Saldanha has been 
particularly outspoken against ABIDe. The opposition to the taskforces includes, 
among other issues, trouble with their lack of transparency and accountability 
and that the manner in which they function is both undemocratic and 
unconstitutional.  
 
In Pune, by contrast, the organization of coalitions took place almost entirely 
outside the framework of formal governmental structures. That said, the eventual 
support of the city government was essential to the success of the Green Pune 
movement. Coalitions between various stakeholders were formed in response to 
a specific situation created by the actions of the government. Informal coalitions 
were formed and these groups demanded to be allowed to participate and 
eventually succeeded. The Green Pune movement has been able to successfully 
mobilize its core team as well as its larger base with the help of the local print 
media and the support of various citizen groups like the youth groups discussed 
above.  
 
In Bangalore as well as Pune, we are seeing a growth of an active and vocal 
middle class, a trend observed by several scholars in other Indian cities as well 
(Baviskar, 2003; Chatterjee, 2004b; Fernandes and Heller, 2006; Benjamin, 
2007; Ghertner, 2011). In Pune however, the movement was voluntary, and had 
a larger base, and was cast as being much more in the ‘public interest’. This was 
mainly because almost everyone in the vocal middle class in Pune was in favour 
of this change. In Bangalore, however, there are clear divisions within civil 
society. Those that have the ear of the government are considered to be in a 
privileged position by others (like ESG, for example) who don’t, partly because it 
was the government that initiated this participation. There are others, within the 
same socio-economic class that have been excluded and are therefore the 
loudest voices against these coalitions in Bangalore. In both cases, there is 
almost no representative from lower economic sections, although both groups (in 
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Bangalore and Pune) claim to be advocating on behalf of the entire city, ‘for the 
greater good’.  
 
This is a growing trend in Indian cities where a variety of civil society 
organizations are playing increasingly important roles in urban governance 
(Chatterjee, 2004a; Nainan and Baud, 2008). Governments have begun to use 
the ‘third force’ or civil society groups to negotiate the terrain between the formal 
and informal, and act as a liaison between various governmental agencies and 
other stakeholders (Heitzman, 2004). This is especially evident in the case of the 
two task forces in Bangalore where successive state governments co-opted key 
actors from the private sector into the governance and planning processes. The 
74th Constitutional Amendment outlines a specific role for civil society 
organizations like community groups and NGOs as part of Ward Committees that 
have been discussed in the previous chapter. However, the incorporation of 
NGOs and other citizens’ groups into government are not in keeping with that 
policy. These associations are much more informal – groups of people are 
capitalizing on their individual resources like their personal social and political 
networks, taking advantage of opportunities that are becoming available to them 
to claim a space in the debate on urban futures in India. 
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CHAPTER V  
BUILDING UP: URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN BANGALORE AND PUNE 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
The spatial transformation of Indian cities has perhaps been the most visible 
outcome of the economic liberalization program that began in the early 1990s. 
Rapid urban population growth, economic growth spurred by liberalization 
reforms and an influx of domestic and international capital have been 
accompanied by demands for improved infrastructure, better governance and a 
growing need for land and real estate development, making urban India a target 
for real estate-related domestic and foreign investments (Chaudhary, 2007; 
Menon, 2007; Chandrashekhar, 2010; Khaleej Times, 2011). This has been 
complemented by the Indian national government’s efforts to encourage 
domestic and international private sector involvement in urban development by 
relaxing the guidelines for private and foreign investment in real estate (Ministry 
of Commerce & Industry, 2002; Ministry of Finance, 2007).  
 
A change in the focus and priorities of the Indian government at the national and 
regional levels over the last two decades has coincided with and perhaps created 
an environment where urban stakeholders in India have much greater power and 
freedom to act than they have had before.82 In this chapter, I argue that as a 
result of these changes, networks of state and non-state actors in Indian cities 
are able to mobilize and form strategic alliances with other networks to achieve 
specific development goals (such as land assembly, deregulation of land or 
                                                
82 Although this alone does not ensure that these stakeholders will actually be able to influence decision-
making. 
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raising financial capital). Similar to urban coalitions discussed in Chapter 4, the 
alliances discussed in this chapter also have their roots in personal networks and 
are formed around the ability of various stakeholders to mobilize specific 
resources (such as access to land, government authority and financial capital) 
using their personal relations as bargaining tools.  
 
This chapter explores the evolving relationship between developers, landowners, 
politicians and planners in Indian cities, focusing on two successful examples of 
real estate development: one each in Bangalore and Pune. The first is the story 
of the development of a 400-acre township, Magarpatta City, on former farmland 
on the eastern periphery of Pune, Maharashtra. The second examines the 
development of a similar but smaller project, Prestige Shantiniketan, in the heart 
of Bangalore’s information technology (IT) corridor. While a favorable economic 
and political climate was essential to the success of both projects, the 
development of Magarpatta City and Prestige Shantiniketan additionally 
depended significantly on the strategic use of socio-political networks and 
personal connections of those involved. This chapter also examines the manner 
in which power over urban development in Indian cities is under going 
realignment. Using the two urban development projects as a lens, I explore how 
key actors in Indian cities are being empowered as centers of power and politics 
in Indian cities shift and adapt to a changing economic and political environment.  
 
2. Understanding Indian urban development: 
On the southwest fringe of New Delhi, just across the Haryana state border in 
Gurgaon, stands DLF City. Sprawled over 3000 acres and almost a city in itself, it 
is one of Asia’s largest townships, being built by Delhi Land and Finance (DLF) 
Limited in five phases (DLF, 2007). Further south, on Bangalore’s periphery, RG 
Villas, an Italian themed community with luxury villas, an international school, 
malls, movie theatres, an equestrian and polo centre, swimming pools, a ‘village 
square’ and a Jack Nicklaus signature 18-hole golf course proclaims itself to be 
“India’s most exclusive gated community” ((Promotional material, Royal Garden 
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Villas, 2008). DLF City, RG Villas and similar developments are in various stages 
of construction on the peripheries of several Indian cities. They range from 
private enclaves or gated communities of 30 to 40 acres to large integrated 
townships spread over thousands of acres of land.83 Intended to be largely self-
sufficient, these developments include large tracts of residential and office space 
as well as shopping and entertainment complexes, schools, hospitals and hotels. 
Some also provide physical infrastructure such as roads and dedicated water 
and power supply. The building of these projects in the Indian context is 
accompanied both in rhetoric and physical design, by the aspiration to become 
‘global’ or ‘world-class’, echoing the sentiments of city and state governments 
(Times News Network, 2006; PTI, 2009b; The Hindu, 2010). These aspirations 
are also being given considerable governmental assistance in the form of 
financial incentives, easy availability of land, and a speedy approval and 
permitting process for such projects (Roy, 2009b).  
 
This form of urban development is not unique to India alone nor is it a recent 
phenomenon. Regions around the world are witnessing the development of 
similar mega-projects that include a variety of ‘complex components’ such as 
different types of homes (ranging from apartment buildings to stand-alone villas, 
for example), service industries (like information technology, tourism and leisure 
                                                
83 Although specific definitions of what constitutes an ‘integrated township’ differs from state to state in India, 
this form of development is broadly understood to be a single large project, sometimes enclosed within a 
walled boundary. Integrated townships typically include a variety of land uses and services within the project 
boundaries such as housing, commercial premises, hotels, resorts, city and regional level urban 
infrastructure facilities such as roads and bridges, mass rapid transit systems.  
For more on integrated townships and the role that Indian national and state governments envision for these 
projects, see: Joshi, R. (2009) Integrated townships as a policy response to changing supply and demand 
dynamics of urban growth. IN Mohanty, N., Sarkar, R. & Pandey, A. (Eds.) India Infrastructure Report. New 
Delhi, India, 3iNetwork (India) & the Infrastructure Development Finance Company (India). 
For examples of more descriptive accounts of integrated townships and popular writing on the issue, see: 
PTI (2009a) Integrated townships new mantra for developers. DNA. Web ed. Mumbai, India, Diligent Media 
Corporation Ltd; Bari, P. & Savitha, R. (2010) Rush of integrated townships into Pune. The Economic Times. 
Web ed. Mumbai, Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd; Chandrashekhar, V. (2010) As wealth rises in India, so do 
private towns. The Christian Science Monitor. Web ed. Boston, MA. 
Details of what constitutes an integrated township with respect to foreign direct investment may be found 
here: Ministry of Commerce & Industry, G. O. I. (2002) Guidelines for FDI in development of integrated 
township including housing and building material (Press Note No. 3 [2002 Series]), Department of Industrial 
Policy & Promotion. New Delhi, India Government of India  
For an example of a specific state government policy document on integrated townships, see: Government 
of Maharastra (2005) Notification: regarding regulations for development of townships in the area under 
Pune Regional Plan. Urban Development Department 
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industries), shared facilities like recreational spaces and infrastructure (such as 
roads and waste management facilities) and new transport facilities (Lungo, 
2002; Orueta and Fainstein, 2008: 760). While there is little consensus on what is 
causing a proliferation of urban mega-projects globally, a few possible reasons 
have been suggested. Brenner and Theodore (2004) have argued that the 
development of urban mega-projects is part of the agenda of the neoliberal 
national state where the government prefers to act as a facilitator of projects 
rather than developer (Brenner, 2004; Orueta and Fainstein, 2008: 760). 
However, Orueta and Fainstein (2008) suggest that the motivations behind 
mega-project development are not the same in developing and developed 
countries. For example, they argue that mega-project development in cities in the 
developed world (especially those emerging from or engaged in economic 
revitalization efforts) is often a means of “confronting the threat of global 
competition” whereas similar projects in cities like Shanghai or Dubai from the 
developing world “are seen to symbolize their rise to power rather than being 
regarded as defensive actions” (Orueta and Fainstein, 2008: 761).  
 
In the Indian case, the development of large integrated townships like DLF City 
or luxury private enclaves like RG Villas constitutes a departure from the way 
Indian urban development has been taking place from independence to the early 
1990s. Government agencies like the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and 
public sector companies like Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangalore 
were very active in building housing in Indian cities. This was supplemented by 
local private sector developers, although few of them had a national presence or 
the ability to develop large parcels, usually restricting their activities to specific 
regions: for example, development companies such as DLF and Unitech were 
well established in northern India particularly around Delhi and the National 
Capital Region (NCR) but had a negligible presence outside that region. 
However, the demand for sanitized conditions, reliable infrastructure, and other 
amenities like schools and hospitals in close proximity have made gated 
communities and townships desirable residences (Joshi, 2009; PTI, 2009a; 
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Chandrashekhar, 2010; Interviews with real estate developers and contractors). 
The national and state-level governments also view integrated townships as a 
way of addressing the urban housing crisis (Joshi, 2009).84 To encourage a 
greater rate of township development, the Indian national government began to 
gradually liberalize the real estate sector in 2002 (Searle, 2010). 
 
The opening up of the real estate sector to domestic and international private 
sector investors and the simultaneous liberalization of the financial sector has 
impacted real estate developers and development in two important ways. First, 
the liberalization of the finance sector and easing of restrictions on investment 
have made it easier for developers to legally source capital with a variety of 
newly available financial instruments as well as a growing number of institutional 
investors such as mutual funds now available (Menon, 2007; The Economic 
Times, 2007; Khaleej Times, 2011). For example, with the recent changes 
governing foreign direct investment (FDI), FDI is now permitted in development 
and construction projects, without prior approval from the national government or 
the Reserve Bank of India; venture capital and mutual funds are allowed to invest 
in real estate projects; and banks (public and private sector) are increasingly 
offering loans for development and construction (Ministry of Commerce & 
Industry, 2002; Searle, 2010). A growing number of development firms have also 
issued Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), listing their assets on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange to raise capital (Table 4) while some real estate firms (such as K. 
Raheja, Hiranandani Constructions and Unitech) are also listed on the London 
Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) (Searle, 2010). 
 
 
 
                                                
84 The National Urban Housing Policy (2007) explicitly highlights the need to build integrated townships as a 
way of dealing with increasing urban population. Moreover, specific state governments (Gujarat, 
Maharashtra and Rajasthan, for example) have formulated integrated township development policies to help 
the government with creation of urban infrastructure as well as housing development 3iNetwork (India) & 
Infrastructure Development Finance Company (India) (2009). India Infrastructure Report 2009: Land - A 
Critical Resource for Infrastructure, 3iNetwork (India) & the Infrastructure Development Finance Company 
(India). Oxford University Press, New Delhi, India. 
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Name of firm Date of offer Amount 
(In Rs. crores) 
Sadbhav Engineering 2006 53.65 
D.S. Kulkarni Developers, Ltd. 2006 133.65 
Patel Engineering, Ltd. 2006 425.0 
Parsvnath Developers Ltd. 2006 1089.77 
DLF 2007 9187.5 
Table 4: Selected real estate firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange.  
Source: (Searle, 2010) 
 
Second, the combination of increasing domestic and foreign investment as well 
as growing demand for housing, retail and office space have made it possible for 
real estate developers to expand their operations beyond their traditional 
strongholds. While developers earlier limited their activities to specific states or 
regions, domestic development companies are now emerging as national level 
players. For example, DLF has expanded from Gurgaon in northern India to 
become one of India’s largest real estate development companies with projects 
in most major Indian metro areas: the company’s profits have risen from about 
US $9.2 million (Rs. 46 crore) in 2004-05 to over US $1.6 billion (Rs. 78,500 
million crore) in 2007-08 (Searle, 2010). As they expand nationally, private 
development companies have also amassed large tracts of land (or ‘landbanks’) 
that serve both as collateral for loans and to build the company’s asset base 
(Interviews with real estate developers in Bangalore, Pune and Mumbai). For 
example, according to Searle (2010), just prior to announcing their IPO in 2008, 
Emaar Properties had a landbank of almost 13,000 acres, most of which 
consisted of agricultural land (Rai, 2007).  
 
As real estate emerges as a growth sector for the Indian economy, it is also 
simultaneously shaping conflict and contestation around the issue of urban and 
peri-urban land (Dupont, 2007; The Economic Times, 2007; Benjamin, 2008). 
These conflicts are rooted in both the scarcity of land and the growing multiplicity 
of claims being placed on this land (Dupont, 2007). As the “state” in its various 
forms appropriates land in and around Indian cities, it sanctions certain 
developmental agendas over others. For example, state governments have been 
assisting large corporations to acquire large parcels of land on the urban 
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periphery for various uses ranging from developing Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) and industrial plants to large integrated townships and business 
campuses (Searle, 2010). In response, there has been a growing dissidence 
from different interest groups who also have a stake in that land (such as 
farmers, agriculturalists, small landowners, fishing communities and others who 
depend on land for their livelihood). There have been a number of high profile 
cases recently where members of different marginalized impacted communities 
came together to protest against state-sponsored developments, indicating that 
alliances between these interest groups are of increasing importance. These 
protests also often have the support of opposition political parties giving them 
access to political power as well – for example, in the case of the Singur conflict, 
peasant groups were supported by opposition party leaders in West Bengal 
(Bunsha, 2006; Financial Express Bureau, 2008).   
 
In this chapter, I use two projects, one each in Pune and Bangalore, as a way of 
understanding the process by which specific types of projects, namely, large 
integrated townships and gated communities in Indian cities, are being 
developed as well as the power structures in each city entailed in this kind of 
development. I focus particularly on the roles that particular interest groups or 
individual actors play and how they use personal relationships and networks to 
enable them to successfully achieve their goals. I begin with a discussion of 
Magarpatta City in Pune, examining how individual social and political 
connections were key to the successful completion of this project. Studying 
Magarpatta City revealed fascinating connections between state-level politicians, 
bureaucrats and farmers in Pune. The second project is Prestige Shantiniketan in 
Bangalore’s information technology (IT) hub of Whitefield. Examining this project 
laid open a complex hierarchical network in Bangalore of developers, middlemen, 
real estate ‘agents’, large IT corporations, state-level politicians and government 
bureaucrats. In both cases, the developers and landowners used their personal 
social, political and business networks, leveraging connections within and outside 
government to achieve their developmental goals. These cases reflect a planning 
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regime in India that often seems to be antithetical to the very idea of planning 
(Roy, 2009b). 
 
3. Building Magarpatta City: 
 
Figure 4: Location of Magarpatta City, on the eastern periphery of Pune.  
Image source: Open Street; Cloudmade Downloads 
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Located in Hadapsar on the eastern periphery of Pune, (Figure 4), Magarpatta 
City stands on 400 acres of erstwhile farmland that has been owned by the 
Magar farming community for over 300 years.85 The Magar community is one of 
the many sub-groups that make up the elite Maratha-Kunbi caste in Western 
Maharashtra (Kumar, 2007). The members of this caste cluster are typically 
engaged in agriculture or related occupations and are “bound together through 
kin networks and behave as one large social continuum”, acting collectively 
(Jadhav, 2006: 5157). In the Magar community, for example, most of the farmer 
families have strong kinship ties through blood relations as well as through 
intermarriage within the group. Jadhav (2006: 5157) adds that although members 
of the Maratha-Kunbi caste seem to be somewhat socially homogenous, the 
group is “internally stratified on the basis of economic class, ranging from 
landlords to marginal peasants and landless labourers.” There was significant 
economic disparity in the Magarpatta farming community, reflected in the size of 
family landholdings: the smallest farmer owned less than half an acre of land 
while the largest owned over 150 acres (Interview, Staff (MTDCC), 2008). 
 
Hadapsar, the part of Pune where Magarpatta City is located, also houses a 
large industrial estate as well as several Information Technology (IT), Information 
Technology Enabled Services (ITES) and biotechnology companies. 
Consequently there was and continues to be a great demand for housing space 
as well as commercial and retail establishments in the area. Moreover, the 1982 
draft development plan for Pune identified this area of the city as being a 
potential location for increasing urban development (Dalal, 2008). Feeling the 
pressure of urbanization, the farmers in the region (small and medium 
landholders) were worried by the prospect of losing both their homes and 
livelihood if the area were to be developed as part of the city. Small farmers in 
the area had already begun to sell off their land (Dalal, 2008). As several 
                                                
85 ‘Magar’ is the name of the clan that owns most of the land in the area, while ‘patta’ means land strip. The 
name ‘Magarpatta’ therefore means ‘the strip of land owned by the Magars’. 
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respondents associated with the Magarpatta Township Development and 
Construction Company (MTDCC) said during interviews, the Magar community 
knew that it would only be a matter of time before developers began to approach 
them to buy their property. Collectively, the community owned more than 400 
acres of land. Taking advantage of the existing demand in the area, the farmers 
decided to pool their land together and develop it themselves instead of selling it 
to another developer.  
 
Pune’s farmers have been key players in the city’s real estate development 
industry. They are also an extremely powerful community, financially and 
politically as a consequence of their involvement in the region’s sugar 
cooperative movement.86 In addition to fostering a culture of cooperation and 
collaboration, the sugar cooperatives have also been extremely influential 
politically (Chithelen, 1980/1981; Lalvani, 2008). Farmers in Pune are therefore 
no strangers to politics. While land acquisition and development is highly 
politicized in Pune as in most Indian cities, what is unusual is the role that 
farmers play in the development process. They own a significant amount of land 
in and around Pune. They are also highly involved in politics at the local level. As 
a result, in Pune, the farmers, local politicians and the real estate lobby overlap 
to a large extent. Satish Magar (the founder of MTDCC) and his family are an 
example of this overlap: both his grandfather and uncle were prominent local and 
state-level politicians and also owned agricultural land that was actively being 
farmed. Magar’s father owned a civil engineering company that was involved in 
real estate development and construction projects. Satish Magar himself was 
trained at the agricultural college in Pune with the intent of pursuing agro-based 
occupations, but eventually turned to real estate development with the 
                                                
86 A very successful co-operative movement, which began around the 1950s, controls sugarcane farming 
and the manufacture of sugar in Maharashtra. It was also very closely connected to local, regional and state 
level politics. At one time, the leaders of the sugar co-operatives influenced the state government very 
strongly. This led to serious issues of corruption and power grabbing. While the co-operatives are still in 
operation, their hold over state politics is somewhat diminished. For more see Chithelen, I. (1985) Origins of 
Co-operative Sugar Industry in Maharashtra. Economic and Political Weekly, 20 (14), 604-612; Lalvani, M. 
(2008) Sugar Co-operatives in Maharashtra: A Political Economy Perspective. Journal of Development 
Studies, 44 (10), 1474 - 1505. 
  142 
development of Magarpatta City. There are several other examples of farmers 
who were involved in the sugar co-operatives moving on to play important roles 
in the state legislature, a couple of whom even rose to be Chief Minister (such as 
Sharad Pawar) (Lalvani, 2008) While not actively involved in real estate 
development, these farmer-turned-politicians continue to own property and have 
interests in urban development in the Pune region.  
 
Magarpatta City owes its success largely to three key factors: the favourable 
economic climate in Pune at the time, the entrepreneurial nature of the Magar 
community, and the coalitions that one of the farmers – Satish Magar – was able 
to mobilize, by leveraging his social networks. Satish Magar is not an ordinary 
farmer. He comes from a very influential local family, extremely well connected 
socially and politically. His grandfather was mayor of Pune. His uncle was a 
Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) in the Maharashtra state government 
and later, also a Member of Parliament (MP) and was very influential especially 
in state politics (Dalal, 2008). As politicians, both his grandfather and uncle had 
very close ties with the Congress Party, which happened to be in power in the 
state government in the 1990s, when Magarpatta City was being conceived. Mr. 
Magar’s father was an engineer and ran his own civil construction firm. Satish 
Magar was therefore familiar with both politics and project development. 
Moreover, he and his family were the largest landholders in the Magar 
community. Of the 400 acres that collectively belonged to the Magar farming 
community, Satish Magar and his family owned about 150 acres. All of this 
added to the influence that Satish Magar had on the decision-making process 
within the farmer community. 
 
Mr. Magar and his social and political connections proved to be invaluable in the 
development of Magarpatta City. He leveraged his influence with the farmer 
community to encourage them to participate in the project. Several of the farmers 
in the community often looked to Satish Magar, or Satish ‘dada’ as he is fondly 
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known, for advice.87 As several interview respondents involved with the 
development project and close to Mr. Magar narrated to me, he met with the 
farmer families individually and as a group repeatedly, demonstrating the costs 
and benefits of the project. He particularly highlighted the fact that developing the 
land would ensure that the farmers continued to own their land while selling the 
land would be a one-time gain with unclear future prospects. This along with the 
reassurance that Satish Magar himself was going to be contributing all of his 
family’s land helped generate confidence in the project among the Magar 
community.  
 
Satish Magar also tapped into his vast personal social network to request advice 
and assistance from experts in a variety of fields as consultants to the project. 
Essentially two broad coalitions were formed, with Mr. Magar at the center of 
each. The first was an alliance that Mr. Magar formed with the farmer families in 
order to create the parcel of land on which the development was to take place. 
The second was actually a series of smaller alliances with specific individuals 
that came together as the board of directors of the company and in the form of 
various consultants to the project consisting of experts from different fields 
including information technology, education, finance and planning and design. I 
explain these in more detail below.  
 
The favorable economic climate in Maharashtra and Pune was another key factor 
that contributed to Magarpatta City’s success. Following economic liberalization, 
several multinational companies began to establish a presence in the Indian 
market (Clay, 2005; Business Standard staff, 2007). Pune with its proximity to 
Mumbai and ready pool of highly skilled labour emerged as an attractive location 
(Shaw, 1999; The Independent, 2008). As a result, the demand for residential 
and office space in Pune rose (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2006; Bajaj, 2011; Sinha and 
ET Bureau, 2011). As I discussed in Chapter 3, the Pune Municipal Corporation 
(PMC) has been unable to cope with this growth, providing the perfect 
                                                
87 ‘Dada’ means ‘elder brother’ in Marathi, the local language. 
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opportunity for the private sector to fill the void. While several local developers 
jumped into the fray, Magarpatta City was one of the first integrated township 
projects to begin offering mixed-use development i.e. office, residential 
commercial and institutional space located in close physical proximity within the 
project boundary. There continues to be a spate of large project development in 
and around Pune, most of which has been built by various coalitions between 
mostly local (Pune-based) real estate developers and city and state level 
politicians (Bari and Savitha, 2010; Chandrashekhar, 2010; Interviews with Pune-
based developers and former government officials). What is unusual about 
Magarpatta City is that it was a very ambitious project born out of an alliance 
between the landowners, without any real estate developers being involved.  
 
The Magarpatta Township Development and Construction Company (MTDCC) 
was formed as a private limited company to oversee development and 
management of the project. Before forming the company, a variety of models 
were considered, including a co-operative approach. The co-operative approach 
was rejected partly based on the experiences of the sugar co-operative 
movement in Maharashtra but also because landholding sizes within the 
community varied immensely. A co-operative structure would have stressed 
equality rather than equity and might have dampened some of the enthusiasm 
and initiative that the families had. In addition, since landholding sizes ranged 
from one acre to 150 acres, giving equal importance to all landholders would 
have taken away the incentive the farmers had for pooling their land (Deshmukh, 
2008; Ganguli, 2008) Mr. Prakash Deshmukh, the architect (i.e. the physical 
designer) of Magarpatta City, explained to me that the driving idea behind the 
formation of a private limited company was to put a structure in place that 
functioned efficiently but was also democratic, thereby giving the landowners a 
say in the running of the business. He added that the forming of the company 
was made easier by the fact that all the farmers, including Satish Magar, owned 
and farmed their own land. Each family got shares proportional to its landholding 
and has been made an equity shareholder. Each share is equal to one square 
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metre of land. The shares of the company may be held and traded among 
member families only and not publicly traded. The company is run by the 
managing director and the technical director in consultation with the board of 
directors, eight of whom come from the landholding families (Deshmukh, 2008; 
Ganguli, 2008).  
 
Drawing on a personal acquaintance, Satish Magar approached a prominent 
architect and designer from Mumbai, Hafeez Contractor, with the proposal to 
produce the initial master plan for the township. With the preliminary plan ready, 
Mr. Magar approached Mr. Sharad Pawar, the then Chief Minister of the state, 
with whom he had close personal ties, for assistance in getting governmental 
permissions.88 This was a particularly challenging undertaking since permission 
for urban development on agricultural land in India is notoriously difficult to obtain 
(Morris and Pandey, 2009). The recently retired Cabinet Secretary for the state of 
Maharashtra, Mr. B. G. Deshmukh, another acquaintance, was one of the 
consultants on the project. He introduced Mr. Magar to the Secretary for Urban 
Planning in Maharashtra at that time, Mr. D. T. Joseph, who took a personal 
interest in the project. These connections were vital to obtain project approval 
and building permissions from the government. Magarpatta City was one of the 
first projects of its kind to be proposed in the state of Maharashtra. There were 
several legal and regulatory constraints that were in place at the time that would 
have made the construction of such a project challenging, for example, the Urban 
Land Ceiling Regulation Act (ULCRA) that had been put in place to prevent a few 
individuals or entities from controlling large plots of land.89 Navigating 
government bureaucracy and obtaining the requisite permissions would have 
been close to impossible for a group of farmers without these political 
connections.  
                                                
88 Mr. Pawar was then a very high-ranking leader in the Congress Party. He now heads his own political 
party: the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP). He comes from a small village near Pune and is extremely 
influential in the region. He has a very close relationship with the sugar cooperatives and the farmers in the 
area. His daughter and nephew continue to be prominent in regional politics in Pune. Mr. Magar’s family 
knew him as a result of their political background.  
89 Magarpatta City’s proposal to pool land together would have been in violation of this act. This act has 
since been repealed.  
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Another major obstacle to the development of Magarpatta City was the lack of 
financing. As farmers, the Magars did not have significant capital to invest in the 
development of the project. However, they did have one big advantage: since 
they as landowners were themselves developing the land, they did not have any 
land acquisition costs nor any displacement or resettlement issues. Given the 
regulatory structure for lending to real estate companies in India at that time, it 
was difficult to get bank loans for development projects.90 In addition, bankers 
and financiers did not consider the project to be feasible. During interviews with 
bankers at the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC) as well as 
with employees at MTDCC, respondents explained the bank’s reluctance in 
financing Magar’s proposal: a group of farmers with no prior knowledge or 
experience in real estate development did not inspire confidence in lenders. 
However, Satish Magar was well acquainted with the retired Deputy General 
Manager (DGM) of one of the leading development finance institutions in India – 
the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC). On his advice, Mr. 
Magar approached the managing director of HDFC, Mr. Deepak Parekh and 
managed to obtain an initial loan of Rs. 2 crore (approximately USD 420,000) to 
help them start construction (Dalal, 2008).91 Moreover, Mr. Parekh shared a 
personal rapport with Mr. Magar and provided valuable guidance on the actual 
construction and marketing process (Dalal, 2008; Interviews, Banking officials 
(HDFC), 2009). HDFC also entered into a preferential lender agreement with 
MTDCC whereby it offered lower rates of interest for retail home loans to those 
interested in buying property in Magarpatta City (Interviews, Banking officials 
(HDFC), 2009) .  
 
The actual planning and design process was essentially managed and controlled 
by the board of directors. The time that it took to get the necessary clearances 
                                                
90 Loans in India are typically granted for construction costs rather than land acquisition. Once the state or 
city government agency approves plans, the financial institution loans money on a phase-by-phase basis, 
requiring the simultaneous development of a revenue stream and the completion of one phase of 
construction prior to loaning more money. 
91 USD 1 is approximately equal to Rs. 48 at the present exchange rate (2009). 
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from the government was used for capacity building. As I learned during 
interviews with MTDCC staff, the company promoted and encouraged 
entrepreneurship among the farmers by providing special training to develop 
particular skill sets relating to construction, development and associated 
services. At least one working member from each of the 120 farmer families was 
trained based on aptitude tests so that he would be able to assist with the actual 
construction of the project. Some farmers were sent to various construction sites 
across India to study how other projects were being executed while others were 
sent to learn construction management or other specific skills at local technical 
institutes. Satish Magar provided the funds for this initial training personally. As a 
result, the company had its own team trained by the time it was ready to start 
construction. This had a dual purpose: not only did it cut down on the cost of 
construction since most of the work was being done in-house; it also helped 
erstwhile farmers to gradually transition into alternative occupations ensuring that 
they were not unemployed when their land was put to non-agricultural uses. 
 
The farmers themselves did most of the actual construction work from laying 
bricks and shifting soil with their farming equipment to managing the construction 
project. The first phase of construction involved the simultaneous building of 
villas, a few apartment blocks, some commercial space as well as part of the IT 
Park. Magarpatta City targeted IT firms and their potential employees. The 
money that was generated by selling or leasing these developments funded 
further construction. Also, the company assured itself a constant revenue stream 
by not selling any of the commercial space in the IT Park (Figure 5) but only 
leasing it and also retaining control over the maintenance of the entire project. 
The construction process began in 2000: the first residential buildings (Figure 7) 
and part of the school (Figure 8) were ready by 2003 and the first phase of office 
space followed in 2004. As of 2008, Magarpatta City was about 80 per cent 
complete.92 A total of 7,500 apartments have been planned of which about 90 per 
                                                
92 As a result of the global economic crisis in 2009, further development was halted with plans to complete 
the project once demand picked up. As of February 2010, construction was gradually being resumed.  
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cent have already been sold (Interview, Staff (MTDCC), 2008). In addition, there 
are single-family homes or ‘villas’ also being built (Figure 6).93 The total 
residential population, once development is complete, is anticipated to be around 
100,000 people. The current residential population is 50,000 people and the 
working population is 6,500. Most of the people living in Magarpatta City (apart 
from the farmer families) are newer migrants to Pune who moved there to work in 
the IT or related industries. A large number of people living in Magarpatta City 
also work at companies located in the IT Park (Interview, Staff (MTDCC), 2008). 
Several employees of MTDCC also live on the premises.  
 
Figure 5: Office space, Magarpatta City. Source: Self 
 
                                                
93 The master plan for Magarpatta City, as distributed by the company in promotional materials, is attached 
in the Appendix. 
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Figure 6: Single-family homes under construction, Magarpatta City. Source: Self 
 
 
Figure 7: Housing cluster (apartment buildings), Magarpatta City. Source: Self 
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Figure 8: Although the school was operational, parts were still under construction. Source: Self 
 
 
Figure 9: Magarpatta City under construction. Source: Self 
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Post-development, most of the families continue to stay on site and own either 
apartments or villas that they have bought with the money they made through the 
company. As shareholders in the Magarpatta Township Development and 
Construction Company (MTDCC), they continue to earn a proportion of the 
company’s profits. Moreover, a number of them have succeeded in renting out 
some of their property, creating yet another source of income. The land also 
continues to be registered in their name, maintaining ownership and giving them 
a sense of security. Farmer families have also managed to move beyond 
agriculture and into other occupations. Several spin-off subsidiary businesses 
have emerged such as local companies providing cable TV and broadband 
Internet, catering and food supply, laundry, landscaping and a local transport 
system. About 70 per cent of the families are now under tax audits, earning a 
minimum of Rs. 40 lakh (approximately USD 85,000) a year and paying a total of 
about Rs. 10-12 crores in taxes as a community (Dalal, 2008). 
 
Magarpatta City owes its success to the Magars’ ability to leverage their social 
networks and kinship ties to first build an informal working coalition and convert 
that into a more formal arrangement in the form of the development company. It 
has been heralded as a huge success by the media and the government 
(Financial Express Bureau, 2004; Arun, 2006; Ganguli, 2008; Shah, 2009; Nair 
and Ahluwalia, 2010). In part, this is due to sheer disbelief that something of this 
scale could be accomplished by a group of farmers. However, as with any large 
undertaking, it was not without its opponents, from both within the farming 
community and outside.94 Initially the farmers were unwilling to pool their land 
together because of the risks associated with the project and there were a few 
families that resisted and decided to go their own way. Local environmental 
groups and activists are not happy with Magarpatta City either. During interviews, 
                                                
94 During fieldwork, it was very difficult to find anyone who would openly talk about any form of opposition to 
Magarpatta City. Despite several attempts, I was unable to talk to the farmer families that decided not to 
participate in the project. Extensive searches of newspaper archives (in English and the local language, 
Marathi) also yielded little by way of critiques of the development. Despite there being clear evidence of 
opposition to the project, it has not been vocalized very prominently. Most respondents during interviews 
downplayed their concerns and requested that they remained anonymous, citing Sharad Pawar’s 
involvement with the project as the reason. 
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several of them complained that Magarpatta City has begun a trend of using 
agricultural land in Pune to build large projects, raising food security threats. 
They also pointed to other areas around the city not being used for agriculture 
and were zoned for development in the proposed master plan but have not yet 
been developed. Another concern that social activists in Pune raised during 
interviews is that the success of Magarpatta City and similar developments has 
led to an increase in housing for higher income groups but little progress has 
been made in low-income or affordable housing projects. However, the 
opposition has not affected Magarpatta City much. The development is a 
success for the landowners and investors and the Magars are planning their next 
project, to be built a little outside Pune, along the same lines.  
 
The coalitions in this case used personal social and political networks to 
effectively accomplish the development of Magarpatta City. Conditions created 
by the globalizing of the Indian economy presented the Magar community with an 
unusual opportunity that they capitalized on by using their social and political 
networks. The Magar community and more specifically, Satish Magar recognized 
the potential in developing the land themselves. They began by building on the 
mutual cooperation and trust from years of farming in an agricultural co-
operative. They also used their kinship ties and social networks to control 
relations within the coalition – Satish ‘dada’ is a prominent member of the 
community and emerged as the natural leader. He was able to create a coalition 
within the farmers that converted their social capital into a business relationship.  
 
However, merely developing a successful internal coalition would have been 
pointless without the second external coalition that the development company 
formed with city and state level actors like politicians, government bureaucrats 
and bankers. Had the farming community not forged these connections, this 
would have been yet another story of farmer displacement. Once again, these 
were networks that Satish Magar and his family had cultivated over three 
generations. He was able to draw on these networks to identify specific 
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individuals who came to be part of the company’s board of directors and act as 
independent consultants to the project. It is important to recognize here that most 
of the dealings took place outside the ‘formal’ governmental or business 
channels. This is due to the nature of the relationships and networks (informal, 
social, personal) that made the coalitions possible in the first place.  
 
Successful coalition building in this case therefore depended on three factors: the 
access to political and financial resources, strong cohesive leadership and the 
ability to recognize and capitalize on opportunity. In the case of Magarpatta City, 
Satish Magar proved to be a capable leader by uniting the larger community in a 
common goal. He also provided the necessary political resources as well as the 
initial financial capital. The farmer families complemented this by providing their 
labour, in addition, of course, to the initial investment of land.  
 
4. The Bangalore story: Developing Shantiniketan: 
As I showed in Chapter 3, the most prominent player in Bangalore’s development 
post-independence was the public sector. Since Bangalore was home to several 
large public sector industries, large townships were built at the edge of the city to 
house their employees. Since the 1970s however, development has increasingly 
been in the private domain. The 1990s have seen a real estate boom – both in 
the central city and on the edges. The private corporate sector comprising of 
regional, national and international [primarily information technology (IT) and IT-
related] companies now drives real estate development in India (Nair, 2005; 
Padmanabhan, 2006). National and international players are also invested and 
involved in Bangalore’s real estate development (PTI, 2007a). Similar to what 
Fainstein discovered in her study of land markets and real estate development in 
New York and London (Fainstein, 2001), the driving force behind real estate in 
Bangalore is now the sector that has the closest ties to the global economy 
(information technology), apart from the real estate sector itself.  
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Most of the new development is taking place on the eastern and northern 
peripheries of Bangalore, which coincides with the location of most of the IT 
companies as well as the new airport. Most of the residential developments on 
the outskirts of Bangalore are typically high-density apartment buildings built in 
close proximity to other services like schools, retail establishments and offices 
(for example, Figure 10, Figure 11). The development on the peripheries also 
includes large-scale commercial projects such as office buildings, IT parks, 
shopping malls and entertainment centres, mostly targeting private sector 
employees and their families (PTI, 2007a; PTI, 2007b).   
 
 
Figure 10: New housing complexes on Bangalore's periphery. Source: Self 
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Figure 11: New housing complexes on Bangalore's periphery. Source: Self 
 
Bangalore’s real estate sector is a complex network of state and city level 
bureaucrats and politicians, developers, landowners, businessmen, multinational 
corporations, middlemen and real estate ‘agents’. While the development of 
Magarpatta City in Pune relied heavily on the personal social and political 
networks of the actors involved, the development of Shantiniketan relies on an 
intricate many-layered web of relationships that have been institutionalized in the 
city’s development practices. These relationships grow out of the professional 
and political networks of particular players in Bangalore’s real estate sector (like 
real estate ‘agents’, middlemen, developers and politicians) and are valuable 
resources that these players leverage on a daily basis to accomplish specific 
developmental goals. In order to understand how development takes place in 
Bangalore, it is necessary to unpack the relationships between the various 
players in this web and recognize how individual interests interact with one 
another. In part, these differences are a reflection of the scale at which 
development takes place in the two cities. Individual integrated township 
development projects in Pune are being built at a much larger scale than in 
Bangalore, for example, Magarpatta City is spread over a total area of 400 acres 
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as compared to approximately 100 acres for Prestige Shantiniketan.95 However, 
overall, Bangalore has a larger real estate development sector than Pune (Jones 
Lang LaSalle, 2006) leading to the formation of a more complex network of 
actors, each playing a specialized role in the development cycle. This is not 
meant to imply that the process in Bangalore is more complex than in Pune 
simply because Bangalore is a larger city. Similar connections do exist in Pune 
as well. However, the networks in Bangalore are more specialized and separated 
functionally, mainly because developers in Bangalore have to deal with multiple 
government agencies in order to obtain requisite permits and approvals, 
necessitating a many-layered network. In Pune, by contrast, there is a single 
government agency, the Municipal Corporation that deals with all permitting and 
approval processes, thereby making it an easier bureaucracy to navigate.  
 
One of the most difficult aspects of real estate development in Bangalore, as in 
most Indian cities, is land acquisition. Land titles in Indian cities are notoriously 
complicated with no single system of documenting and managing land 
ownership, sale and transfer. As a result, land acquisition for development 
projects, particularly large projects, is a murky process and a grey area legally 
speaking. Ownership is often disputed and court settlements of such cases may 
take several years. Few developers are willing to wade through the procedural 
red tape when a faster, albeit illegal, alternative is available, turning to local 
mobsters like Muthappa Rai who is a Bangalore-based real estate power broker 
and as Carney (2008: 2) describes him, a former ‘gangster’ wanted by the police 
for murder (Carney, 2008: 2, 5). People like Muthappa Rai play a very important 
role in this process and that real estate developers have strong ties with specific 
groups or operators in order to obtain the land required for their development 
                                                
95 This is also due to greater parcels of contiguous land available in and around Pune than in Bangalore. 
Other examples of large township development projects in Pune include Amanora Park Town (400 acres, 
built by the City Development Corporation) located across the street from Magarpatta City in Hadapsar and 
Nanded City (spread over 700 acres being built by MTDCC). Staff (MTDCC) (2008) Personal interview. 
Magarpatta City, Pune, India; Bari, P. & Savitha, R. (2010) Rush of integrated townships into Pune. The 
Economic Times. Web ed. Mumbai, Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. 
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(Carney, 2008).96 In an interview with Carney (2008), Muthappa Rai claims to 
have illegally obtained land in Bangalore for Indian conglomerates like Reliance 
Industries Limited as well as a few American firms. The attraction of obtaining 
land through people like Rai is that he ensures that the process is quick and that 
the land comes with a clean title.  
 
Information on illegal land markets and so-called “black market” dealings in India 
is hard to come by, especially since most evidence tends to be anecdotal and 
few individuals are willing to go on record.97 One of the few academic works on 
the subject is a recent (1999) book on the black economy of India by Professor 
Arun Kumar at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning (CESP) at 
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. In the book, he claims that about 
40 per cent of land transactions typically take place in the black market (Kumar, 
1999; Carney, 2008; Sinha and Singh, 2010). There are, of course, also other 
more legal means that developers use to obtain land. One that is becoming 
popular with developers in Bangalore to acquire land is by piggyback riding on 
the incentives that the Karnataka state government offered to IT (information 
technology) companies. A number of real estate developers have entered into 
agreements with specific companies where IT companies obtain cheap land from 
the government and hand it over to developers, ostensibly to develop housing for 
their employees: a much publicized recent case was that of domestic IT giant 
Infosys where the company has been using government incentives to build land 
banks for future development projects (Srinivasaraju, 2005b; Interviews with 
Bangalore-based developers, real estate agents & middlemen, and journalists). 
Yet another way is to use real estate ‘agents’ or middlemen who operate through 
informal networks. Individuals wanting to sell land get in touch with these agents 
who acquire the land, obtain a clean title and resell it to developers (using a 
                                                
96 For a detailed description on the working of the land mafia in Bangalore, and more on Muthappa Rai 
specifically, see: Carney, S. (2008) The Godfather of Bangalore. Wired. Digital ed. San Francisco, CA, 
Conde Nast. 
97 This was my experience while conducting fieldwork as well. Several respondents had stories and 
anecdotes about how land was acquired and developed in Bangalore and Pune. However, since there was 
little by way of verifiable evidence, I have not included these anecdotes in this dissertation.  
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variety of legal and illegal mechanisms, including threat of violence in some 
cases) (Carney, 2008; Interviews with Bangalore-based real estate brokers, 
middlemen and journalists). 
 
However, according to real estate developers, landowners, consultants and 
brokers that I interviewed in Bangalore, an increasingly popular means of 
acquiring land for development is the ‘joint venture’ model. Typically, individuals 
or small groups with a pre-assembled parcel of land approach a developer with a 
proposition. Either the landowner will sell the land outright for money or, what is 
more common, the landowner asks the developer to develop the plot and work 
out a mutually beneficial profit-sharing agreement, for example, in lieu of a 
certain share of the built-up land. The valuation of this transaction is done on the 
basis of two calculations: the present value of the land and the future value 
(projected value) once the development has been completed. Based on this 
valuation, a pre-arranged percentage of the completed development (either in 
cash or in the form of built-up property) is then returned to the landowner while 
the developer is allowed to sell the rest to recover his costs and make his profit 
on the development. This is convenient for both groups: the large companies 
don’t have to actually go through the process of acquiring land, parceling small 
bits together to get one large tract big enough or actually resorting to strong-arm 
tactics to force evacuations.98  
                                                
98 This is usually taken care of by a complex network of middlemen employed by people like Muthappa Rai. 
Conversations with real estate brokers and middlemen in Bangalore revealed that these middlemen initially 
attempt to convince landowners to release the land for a fraction of the market price (usually in the 25-50 per 
cent range), failing which they adopt more coercive methods, sometimes resorting to violence. This is also 
corroborated by Carney’s (2008) article on the land mafia in Bangalore.  
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Figure 12: Location of Prestige Shantiniketan. While the development is distantly located from both the 
central city and the new international airport (further north, not on map), it is located off Whitefield Road, in 
the heart of Bangalore’s IT corridor. The ITPL is located on the other side of Whitefield Road from 
Shantiniketan.  
Source: Open Streets; Cloudmade Downloads   
 
Prestige Shantiniketan is an example of this joint-venture approach to real estate 
development. It is located a stone’s throw from the International Tech Park (ITPL) 
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on the eastern periphery of Bangalore (Figure 12). Developed by prominent 
Bangalore-based real estate developer Prestige, Shantiniketan is a 105-acre 
mixed-use project. In addition to residential and office space, it will house 
commercial space including a five-star hotel to be built by the Radisson group as 
well as a mall. When complete, the entire project will spread over 13 million 
square feet of constructed area (Interviews, Construction engineers and 
management (Prestige Constructions), 2008-09). The majority of this will be 
residential space in the form of high-rise apartment buildings. A total of 3000 
apartments are being built with sizes ranging from two to four bedrooms. The 
commercial space will be a total of 4 million square feet, including office space.99 
As of 2008, this project was about 70 per cent complete with most of the 
apartments already sold though not occupied. The developers had also begun to 
receive tenants for the office and commercial spaces.100 Occupation was 
expected to begin in late 2009 (Interviews, Management (Prestige 
Constructions), 2008-09).  
 
The development of Shantiniketan was divided into two phases, as described to 
me by various individuals associated with Prestige Constructions.101 The first, 
more conceptual part of the development process took place within Prestige 
Constructions, with their in-house staff of project managers, architects, planners 
and engineers working on the plan and design of the project. The second phase, 
which involved the actual construction, was outsourced to various sub-
contractors. At each step, Prestige Constructions turned to various key 
                                                
99 The master plan for Prestige Shantiniketan, as distributed by the company in promotional materials, is 
attached in the Appendix. 
100 Like other real estate projects in India, Shantiniketan has also suffered as a result of the global economic 
downturn of 2009 as financial capital has dried up. However, the project has also experienced other 
setbacks: in October 2008, a portion of the roof one of the apartment buildings under construction collapsed, 
bringing down the entire building. Shortly after that, one of the security personnel was found dead from 
unknown causes near the construction site Rajendran, S. & Shivakumar, M. T. (2008) Four injured as 
Prestige group’s 15-storeyed structure collapses. The Hindu. Web ed. Bangalore, The Hindu group of 
publications; Times News Network (2008) Shantiniketan site collapses. The Times of India. Web ed. 
Bangalore, Bennet, Coleman & Co. Ltd.. Most recently, in June 2010, while I was conducting fieldwork in 
Bangalore, there was a huge fire in the apartment complex in which a few residents lost their cars although 
there were no casualties reported (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y04yfm-mqmg&feature=relmfu).  
101 I met with and interviewed several respondents employed by Prestige Constructions, including on-site 
construction engineers and managers, the overall project manager as well as key individuals in the 
management of the company as well as sub-contractors who worked for Prestige.  
  161 
individuals ranging from real estate brokers and middlemen to sub-contractors in 
order to successfully complete the project (Interviews, Management (Prestige 
Constructions), 2008-09). In conversations with senior management at Prestige, I 
was given to understand that this is more or less typical of the manner in which 
Prestige Constructions operates in most development projects. The real estate 
development process here is a complex web of symbiotic relationships that 
together function like a well-oiled machine. The smooth working of each of the 
cogs in the machine (or in this case, the individual actors) is essential to the 
efficient working of the larger development machine. I discuss the specifics of the 
development process by which Shantiniketan was developed.  
 
As I mentioned earlier, Prestige does not own the land on which Shantiniketan is 
built. It belongs to a local liquor baron, Mr. Adikesalu, who also owns several 
other properties in the area. Prestige has entered into a joint venture with Mr. 
Adikesalu to develop the 105-acre parcel. Under this agreement, Prestige is 
responsible for the construction of the apartment buildings, the office and 
commercial space. The five-star hotel will be built independently (not by Prestige) 
although it will form a part of the same complex. A pre-arranged percentage of 
the 3000 apartments will be handed over to Mr. Adikesalu in return for the land 
while Prestige will sell the remainder. The responsibility for raising financial 
capital rests with the developer, i.e. with Prestige (Interviews, Management 
(Prestige Constructions), 2008-09). It is interesting to note that Prestige were not 
the initial developers of this site but a small unknown developer from Chennai 
from whom Prestige took over the project. Based on information I gathered 
through interviews with local architects and developers, this is typical of how 
development takes place in Bangalore. For the most part, local developers, 
landowners or middlemen acquire land, parcel it together, start a project and then 
try and find a larger company to buy it up.102 Once land for development was 
acquired, Prestige’s in-house team of planners and architects prepared a master 
                                                
102 One prominent example in Bangalore is the ‘South City’ project that is now being completed by Larsen & 
Toubro (L&T) development but was not originally an L&T undertaking (Interviews with Bangalore-based 
architects and journalists). 
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plan for the project. This plan was then sent it to various government agencies 
for approval, prior to beginning construction. However, Prestige staff was not 
involved in this process. Once the plan was ready, it was handed over to a group 
of middlemen or ‘agents’ whose only role was to help developers navigate the 
labyrinth of government bureaucracy.  
 
While the actual estimates of the total number of approvals required vary from 
project to project, developers and planning officials estimated these to be 
between 15 to 20 approvals on average per project. The requests for approval 
also need to be accompanied by specific supporting documents. In addition, as I 
briefly discussed in Chapter 3, there are several different agencies in Bangalore 
with overlapping responsibilities with respect to urban planning and development. 
It is therefore necessary to understand the nuts and bolts of dealing with each 
separate agency, its requirements (legal and otherwise) and the quirks of the 
bureaucrats employed by these agencies. Consequently, a vast complex 
hierarchical network of middlemen, subcontractors, ‘land agents’ and small-time 
developers has emerged to facilitate the development process. For example, one 
of the most important tasks that government agencies undertake is to supervise 
and approve the conversion of agricultural land to urban land, in order to enable 
development. In order to get this conversion approved, ministerial permission 
from the Karnataka state government is required. However, it is not possible for 
developers to directly approach specific ministers officially. The formal 
governmental procedure goes through several government bureaucrats before 
the plan is presented for approval to the respective ministers.103 Each real estate 
development company like Prestige has its own complex network of middlemen, 
bureaucrats, ‘agents’ and lower-level government officials that it employs to 
                                                
103According to some of the middlemen or ‘agents’ that I interviewed, the cost for conversion of land at the 
time (2008-09) was typically Rs. 2-3 lakh (USD 4,500 to 6,700) per acre of land being converted in addition 
to whatever amount needs to be paid in bribe to ministers as well as to the bureaucrats involved. The 
amount paid as a bribe increases as you move up the hierarchy. The bureaucrats’ share is therefore 
relatively small in comparison to what those higher up in the government demand. 
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coordinate between various state and city agencies to obtain the required 
permissions.104  
 
Prestige, as the developer, is responsible not only for the construction but also 
for raising the financial capital for the project. In general, funding for real estate 
projects comes from money that has been raised through advance sales of 
property prior to construction for this or other projects that the developer might be 
building (Searle, 2010). As was evident in the case of Magarpatta City’s 
development, it is very difficult to raise finances for development in India.105 
However, since Prestige is a large, well-established company, it was able to raise 
a moderate amount of money by way of loans from various financial institutions. 
Most of this capital was used for the construction of the commercial and office 
space in Shantiniketan. The residential development financed itself, as is typical 
with most private housing development projects. Before ground is broken, the 
company has a final plan and drawing prepared and possibly one model 
apartment, which they use to sell the project. Those who choose to buy in the 
project pay a booking fee upfront to the developer (usually about Rs. 30,000 to 
50,000 or USD 650 to 1100), which incidentally is also what you have to pay to 
get a copy of the legal documents. Prestige began this process for Shantiniketan 
fairly early in 2005, and according to them, it was sold out in a very short time 
(Interviews, Management (Prestige Constructions), 2008-09). 
 
Senior management at Prestige Constructions explained to me that there are 
typically three kinds of buyers. The first are those who are buying it for 
themselves (individual buyers) who form the smallest fraction. Second, there are 
agents who buy up the bulk of the proposed development to resell at higher 
prices to individual buyers. The third group is the developers themselves, 
                                                
104 This informal network does not restrict itself to a single developer. Each of these individuals works for 
and with several other developers as well as for individuals. (Interviews with architects, developers, real 
estate brokers and middle men) 
105 While development is a major outlet for investment, it is typically a means to convert ‘black’ or illegally 
obtained money into ‘white’ or legal. Despite significant financial reforms, it is still not easy to obtain 
financing for real estate development in India. Loans are typically also easier to obtain for construction rather 
than land acquisition. Banking Officials (HDFC) (2009) Personal Interview. Pune, India. 
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Prestige held back about 10-15 per cent of the total units, to be sold at a later 
date usually at much higher rates. This enables the company to cover all costs 
and make their profit. The buyers pay the amount remaining after the booking fee 
is deducted in installments that are linked to the completion of certain 
construction-linked targets. That money is used to pay for construction and other 
expenses incurred. The company therefore does not need to resort to private 
equity or other sources of financing. However, the commercial space including 
the mall and office space were not financed in this manner. The group did take 
some loans and raise some private equity for this part of the project (Interviews, 
Management (Prestige Constructions), 2008-09) 
 
Until this point, Prestige developers carried out all project-related decisions in-
house. However, from this point onwards, all development-related activity is 
outsourced, marking the second phase of the development. The brief for the 
project, based on the master plan created in-house, is given to the external 
architects or the designers. Typically the master plan is conceptualized and 
developed by a famous architect (increasingly an internationally well-known firm 
or individual), which, in the case of Shantiniketan, was the RSP Group, based in 
Singapore. Although this architect continues to be a part of the project in a 
supervisory role, once the plan has been created and approved by the company, 
local (Bangalore-based) architects are responsible for the actual execution. 
Similarly, construction is outsourced to individual contractors, for example, for 
plumbing, electrical connections and other civil engineering. In a marked contrast 
from Pune where real estate developers have their own staff of architects, 
designers and engineers who undertake the actual work of development, most of 
the actual development work in Bangalore is outsourced to local level sub-
contractors (Interviews with local real estate contractors, architects & 
developers). In fact, some of the smaller local developers I interviewed in 
Bangalore often undertook contract work for larger development companies like 
Prestige. Prestige Developers however retain the management contract for the 
project, thereby assuring the firm a constant flow of income. 
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Large development companies like Prestige essentially function as project 
managers who undertake the more conceptual aspects of the development 
project and also the marketing and sales. To facilitate actual construction, 
Prestige has formed alliances with several sub-contractors, smaller developers 
and ‘agents’ or middlemen who specialize in particular aspects of the 
development process ranging from obtaining government approvals to 
completing the brickwork and wiring in project. These specialists (several of 
whom I interviewed) like sub-contractors and real estate ‘agents’ in their turn, 
have an established network of people, both within government and outside, to 
help them function efficiently. It is this alliance or coalition between the larger 
developer and the many smaller sub-agents that makes development in 
Bangalore possible. This coalition does not rely on community or kinship 
networks but on the various professional networks of key actors. This is similar to 
the way in which government agencies (at the city and state levels) have 
functioned for some time now. This represents a departure from earlier 
development practices in two ways. First, Bangalore’s rapid growth has attracted 
several regional (such as Sobha developers, the Mantri group and the Brigade 
group) and national (for example, DLF Ltd and Unitech) developers who now 
operate in the city. A simultaneous change has been that government agencies 
like the Bangalore Development Authority and other public sector agencies are 
no longer actively involved in development except as facilitators and regulators. 
Second, the scale at which development is taking place in Bangalore has 
increased exponentially. This has necessitated a more specialized network of 
individuals to facilitate urban development.  
 
The alliances being formed in this case are of a more permanent nature than the 
kind we saw in Pune. Although the importance of informal networks is no less 
important, the networks themselves are much more disconnected. For example, 
the developers at Prestige are not personally connected to the bureaucrats in the 
Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) nor are their social networks crucial in 
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sourcing sub-contractors. However, Prestige developers and their connections 
were very important in obtaining access to the liquor baron, Mr. Adikesalu and 
consequently acquiring the rights to develop Shantiniketan. The sub-contractor 
network, however, is indispensable at another level. As a result, what we see is a 
complex web of development.  
 
The difference between Bangalore and Pune’s real estate development markets 
is not merely one of size of the market or of the city. It is also due to the particular 
governmental structure in each state and city. The fact that developers in Pune 
only have to deal with one agency at the city level (the Pune Municipal 
Corporation) and one at the state level (the Maharashtra State Town Planning 
Directorate) makes it easier for them to leverage their own individual networks 
without the need to develop a more complex hierarchy of various players. In 
Bangalore, on the other hand, there are at least 20 different governmental 
agencies (most of them managed by the state government) that developers have 
to deal with. Collectively, this group forms part of a grey market for urban 
services that often borders on the illegal. The existence of this group and its 
services allow larger developers to build big, high-profile projects without having 
to deal with the more mundane issues and also allow the larger firms to remain 
legal in their activities.  
 
Comparing the power dynamic in Bangalore and Pune, some key differences 
emerge. The scale at which the developments are taking place is one. As I briefly 
mentioned earlier, integrated township developments like Prestige Shantiniketan 
in Bangalore are being built at a smaller scale but in larger numbers than in 
Pune. As a result, a project like Prestige did not require the same kind of large-
scale mobilization of personal and political social networks in Bangalore, as did 
Magarpatta City in Pune. In addition to being conceived of at a smaller scale, 
compared to Magarpatta City, Shantiniketan is also not as significant in terms of 
other factors like land conversion and governmental regulations. Magarpatta City 
was the first project of its kind to be built in Pune, transforming the development 
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landscape in the city. The role that the farmer coalition played was instrumental 
in successfully pushing the project through. Development projects in Bangalore 
come to fruition through navigation of traditional bureaucratic channels and 
extralegal systems while in Pune, Magarpatta City represents a remarkable 
instance where a single coalition was able to push through a major, 
transformative redevelopment project. 
 
On the other hand, when we consider governance issues in Pune and Bangalore, 
a very different story emerges. Personal social and political networks were 
extremely important in creating urban governance coalitions like the BATF and 
ABIDe as well as in the case of the Green Pune movement. However, 
government-corporate partnerships like the BATF and ABIDe participate and 
influence urban planning decisions at a much larger scale in Bangalore than the 
Green Pune movement does.  
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION 
 
 
“It is possible that the absence of a plan – a moral map or imagined 
morphology – is not a bad thing. Perhaps that is how vernacular 
resistance to global designs ultimately succeeds. And yet, I worry about 
the capacity of unselfconscious local practice to beat back the challenges 
posed by the material as well as the imaginative forces of the new regime 
of globality.” 
(Chatterjee, 2004b: 147)  
 
In the above quote, Chatterjee goes on to suggest that rather than 
“unselfconscious local practice”, it is “gatherings of self-conscious people” (ibid: 
148) that will provide clues to thinking through (or planning for) the future of 
Indian cities. However, it is unclear who these “self-conscious people” are, what 
groups they represent and what their agenda is. The data from this dissertation 
provide some answers to these questions. As the cases analyzed in this 
dissertation have shown, the direction of planning, policy, and development in 
Indian cities is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small group of elite 
actors that tend to focus largely on the interests of only a section of the urban 
population.106 The case studies have also shown how these elite actors rely on 
formal planning processes as well as more informal means of exerting influence 
and gaining access to power through personal community, caste and other social 
                                                
106 This has also been documented in the work of several other scholars studying urban India, including 
Chatterjee (2004) himself. For example, see Benjamin, S. (2000) Governance, economic settings and 
poverty in Bangalore. Environment and Urbanization, 12 (1), 35-56; Benjamin, S. (2005a) The Lifestyle 
Advertisement and the Marxist Manifesto as Trojan Horses in a City of Stealth. Ensuring public 
accountability through community action Institute of Social Studies Trust, New Delhi; Fernandes, L. & Heller, 
P. (2006) Hegemonic Aspirations. Critical Asian Studies, 38 (4), 495-522; Benjamin, S. (2007) Lifestyling 
India's metros: the elite's civic reform. IN Sudarshan, R. M. & Pande, S. (Eds.) Ensuring public accountability 
through community action: A case study in east Delhi. New Delhi, Institute of Social Studies Trust, New 
Delhi; Weinstein, L. (2009) Redeveloping Dharavi: Toward A Political Economy Of Slums And Slum 
Redevelopment In Globalizing Mumbai. Department Of Sociology. Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago. 
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networks. Moreover, groups such as the farmers in Pune or the members of the 
Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) have successfully capitalized on the 
economic, developmental and political opportunities that have emerged as a 
result of India’s economic globalization and governmental decentralization 
program. In addition, their actions have been supported and given legitimacy by 
various national and state government policies that have ranged from legislative 
and policy changes to financial incentives.  
 
This dissertation focused on the study of power and politics in contemporary 
Indian cities in the context of recent economic and political reforms. It examined 
the changing dynamics of urban planning and governance in Bangalore and 
Pune, looking at how developers, landowners, business leaders, politicians, 
senior bureaucrats, citizen groups and civic activists mobilize and influence 
urban governance and development processes. Building on work on 
contemporary Indian cities, western urban political theory and the literature on 
globalizing cities as well as on data from field research, this study draws 
conclusions about how specific elite groups are reacting to the current economic 
and political reform process in India and in their turn, influencing urban planning 
and policy. Data from Bangalore and Pune show that the on-going 
decentralization reform program and its implementation by state governments is 
privileging the participation of (mostly elite) non-state actors that come from and 
serve the interests of a particular segment of urban residents, typically higher-
income groups. Individuals from elite groups form formal or quasi-formal 
alliances with other elite actors to gain access to specific resources or to 
participate in planning and policy processes. Personal social networks of 
individual state and non-state actors are instrumental in helping elite groups to 
come together and form coalitions of actors focused on achieving specific 
developmental or governance goals. As a result, an urban planning approach is 
emerging in contemporary Indian cities where regional and municipal 
governments are coming to rely on non-state actors to provide flexible 
governance networks. Non-state actors like business leaders, citizen groups, 
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Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs), and civic activists are playing a growing 
role in providing expertise and specific services to government and urban 
residents alike.  
 
This final chapter ties together the data and analysis of the earlier chapters with a 
higher-level discussion of the contribution that this study makes to the literature 
on contemporary Indian urbanism and to writing on urban politics more broadly. 
In doing so, I also examine what we have learnt from the comparison between 
Bangalore and Pune specifically and the policy and planning implications that 
emerge from these examples. In particular, I try to answer questions about how 
the findings of this research relate to existing theory and practice, what policy 
and planning issues they raise, how different planning actors, whether in local or 
national government or civil society, could think about fostering a more 
progressive agenda in this context, and what can we learn from the cases about 
the circumstances under which more empowering outcomes can occur.  
 
1. A changing urban planning paradigm: 
a) Urban governance: 
The aim of the Indian national government’s urban policy reform through the 74th 
Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) and the decentralization reforms that it 
mandates was to empower urban local government bodies while simultaneously 
increasing public participation in the governance process. However, (as I 
discussed in earlier chapters), the opportunities for participation created by the 
reforms have privileged a certain section of urban residents while 
disenfranchising others.107 As national and state governments come to rely on 
non-state actors to provide more flexible governance networks, a hybrid model of 
urban planning seems to be emerging in Indian cities: one where particular non-
state actors are playing an increasingly important role in the policy and planning 
decision-making process.  
                                                
107 A recent paper by Coelho et al (2011) discusses this issue in relation to specific cases in various Indian 
cities including Chennai (Madras) and Bangalore. 
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This is a cause for concern at two levels. First, as government (at all levels) 
gradually withdraws from “capital investment and operation and maintenance of 
urban services” (Kundu, 2011: 23), various private sector players like Resident 
Welfare Associations (RWAs) and other NGOs are taking on these functions, 
leveraging the decentralization reforms mandated by the 74th CAA to demand 
greater involvement in planning processes. As a consequence, the responsibility 
for the provision of municipal services is being passed on to middle-class 
resident organizations like RWAs, as increasing efforts are being made to 
institutionalize their participation, as we saw in the case of the two task forces in 
Bangalore or with the incorporation of members of the Green Pune movement 
into the planning committee in Pune (Ghertner, 2011; Kundu, 2011).108 Coalitions 
between non-state and state actors in the Indian context are not surprising in 
themselves. However, what is surprising is that these alliances are being 
formalized and legitimized by national and state governments through various 
policy and legislative measures. Secondly, with decentralization reforms, the 
local urban governance structure is undergoing a change and consequently, so is 
the manner in which urban residents, especially the urban poor, interact with 
governmental authority. Since low-income and marginalized urban communities 
typically interact with government through local leaders and municipal-level 
officials, there are concerns that, as elite actors and organizations are 
increasingly co-opted into urban local government, low-income groups lacking 
access to such means of activism will gradually become disenfranchised (Coelho 
et al., 2011; Kundu, 2011) 
 
The growing involvement of the private sector in government, however, is not 
unique to the Indian situation alone: there are examples from the developed and 
developing world where resource-constrained governments are turning to non-
                                                
108 The Bhagidari scheme in Delhi is an example of efforts being made to formalize the role that civil society 
plays in urban service provision and governance. For more on this see: Ghertner, D. A. (2011) Gentrifying 
the State, Gentrifying Participation: Elite Governance Programs in Delhi. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 35 (3), 504-532. 
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state actors to provide key services (Brenner, 2004). While the future of this 
hybrid model of planning in India is as yet unclear, from a policy and planning 
perspective, this approach raises two key issues about urban government in 
India. First, as of now, the move to increase public participation in urban 
government and promote participatory development in Indian cities has provided 
opportunities that seem to be restricted to a few elite actors who have been able 
to leverage their networks and connections to gain access to planning and policy 
processes. Critics of this change have accused this selective participation as 
being unconstitutional, unrepresentative and undemocratic. For example, citizen 
groups in Bangalore have accused the BATF and ABIDe of not being transparent 
in their workings. Taskforce members have countered these accusations by 
saying that since the state government appointed them, they were not 
responsible to the larger public, but only to the government. This creates a larger 
debate about accountability in government and to whom such alliances of non-
state actors should be responsible. Moreover, unlike the government, civil society 
actors are not required to keep in mind the interests of the entire urban 
population rather than just those of a specific sub-section. Civil society groups in 
Indian cities typically tend to focus their attention on providing services and 
addressing the needs of their constituents, which, in this case are largely upper-
income groups. The growing involvement of private sector groups and civil 
society organizations such as RWAs in the operation and delivery of urban 
services becomes a problem if these groups ignore large sections of the urban 
population. 
 
This is especially true in the case of both the Bangalore Agenda Task Force 
(BATF) and the Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure and Development Task 
Force (ABIDe) in Bangalore: both the BATF and ABIDe members came from 
higher income groups and the agenda of both taskforces has been concentrated 
on improving services for corporate enclaves (especially for information 
technology hubs in the city) and for upper income neighborhoods with little 
attention being paid to low-income communities in Bangalore. Pune, on the other 
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hand, has a slightly more inclusive approach to urban governance. Although the 
Green Pune movement comprised largely of elite actors, the movement also 
included members from low-income communities that were living in the affected 
areas. In addition to the overall environmental agenda of the movement, the 
Green Pune movement also emphasized the impact that the proposed master 
plan for Pune would have on the low-income population that lived in areas 
targeted for development in the plan.  
 
The Green Pune movement is more inclusive than Bangalore’s taskforces partly 
due to the nature of the organization and the manner in which it was formed. Key 
actors in the state government created both the taskforces in Bangalore who 
handpicked the members of the BATF and ABIDe. The Green Pune movement, 
on the other hand, was a more bottom-up movement that was formed by 
concerned citizens in protest of city government actions. Several founding 
members of the Green Pune movement are also prominent civic activists in the 
city and, through their activism, are aware of the issues that low-income 
communities face in Pune. As a result, they were able to form an alliance with 
community leaders that resulted in a win-win situation for both groups: the Green 
Pune movement gained another ally whereas the low-income communities 
gained access to city government officials. However, since the final verdict on the 
Pune master plan is yet to be announced, it remains to be seen if the low-income 
communities did indeed benefit from this alliance. In terms of planning process 
however, it offers an insight into creating more inclusive partnerships that could 
lead to more equitable outcomes. In the case of Pune, the Green Pune 
movement proposed a plan that would address both the environmental concerns 
that the middle-class residents in Pune had as well as the issue of displacing 
several low-income communities.  
 
b) Urban development: 
A similar trend is evident in the process of urban development, ranging from 
housing development to provision of urban infrastructure with private sector 
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actors playing a growing role. As we have seen, government agencies in India 
such as development authorities played a very prominent role in the planning and 
development of urban infrastructure and housing. Together with several public 
sector enterprises, these government agencies were especially important in 
providing housing to a variety of income groups (as in the case of Bangalore, 
discussed in Chapter 3). However, with the recent push towards increased 
privatization in the Indian economy, the opening up of the real estate sector to 
foreign direct investment, and increasingly constrained governmental resources, 
contemporary state and city governments in India increasingly prefer to act as 
facilitators and regulators of development, leaving the actual construction to 
private sector developers.  
 
However, since private sector developers are guided by economic incentives 
rather than welfare goals, most of the housing that is being developed in and 
around Indian cities today focuses on providing luxury homes for affluent urban 
residents like Indians returning from abroad or those working in well-paid jobs in 
information technology and other service sector industries, leaving the problem of 
affordable housing unaddressed. There have been a few recent private sector 
initiatives to provide more affordable housing as well as other amenities in close 
proximity to each other, drawing on the integrated township model 
(Subramanium, 2009; Srivastava, 2011). However, few of these have actually 
been implemented. The main problem seems to be the high cost of land and 
development in Indian cities and the low returns on investment that affordable 
housing projects offer. A recent development under construction on the outskirts 
of Mumbai (Bombay) by the Tata Housing group is one of the first few projects 
focusing exclusively on providing affordable housing. The national government 
has also recently announced Phase-I of a program called the Rajiv Awas Yojana 
(RAY) to create “slum-free cities” in India with a corpus of Rs. 1000 crore (or 
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approximately USD 200 million).109 However, the impact of these initiatives is as 
yet unclear.  
 
In addition, the process of urban development, and the acquisition and transfer of 
land on the urban periphery is a complicated, expensive, and bureaucratic 
process. As land in and around Indian cities is acquired for development, there 
are serious issues of displacement and poor mitigation of impacts as well as of 
valuation of land. This especially impacts small and medium farmers and others 
on the urban periphery who depend on their land for employment as well as 
housing. Agricultural land is valued on the basis of its current land use, i.e. as 
agricultural land. However, this valuation does not reflect the true potential of the 
land, since once permission for land use conversion or non-agricultural use 
clearance (NAC) is granted, the value of land rises exponentially. However, strict 
constraints on who is granted the NAC, and when, determines who benefits from 
the increase in value, post-conversion. Typically, the original landowner or farmer 
is not allowed to apply for change of land use from agricultural to non-
agricultural, if he plans to continue farming while simultaneously looking for a 
buyer for his land.  
 
Moreover, farmers cannot obtain the NAC unless they present a proposal for a 
specific non-agricultural use for the land. This was the provision that the 
developers of Magarpatta City used to obtain governmental permission to 
develop their farmland.110 Few farmers have the technical or financial resources 
or the capacity to devise and implement such a proposal. Part of the reason why 
it took almost a decade from plan to breaking ground for Magarpatta City was 
                                                
109 Under the auspices of RAY, the central government will provide funding for a variety of slum upgrading 
projects and other affordable housing initiatives that will be undertaken by the State governments. The 
national government will provide up to 50 per cent of the total cost of the project. For more on RAY, see 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (2011) Rajiv Awas Yojana: Guidelines for slum-free city 
planning, Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, G. O. I. New Delhi Government of India; PTI 
(2011) Rajiv Awas Yojana for slum dwellers approved. The Hindu. Web ed. New Delhi, The Hindu group of 
publications. 
110 This provision was pointed out to Mr. Magar by one of his technical advisors in the early stages of the 
planning of Magarpatta City. However, since this provision had rarely, if ever, been used in the past, the 
Maharashtra state government was unsure of granting permission (Interviews with MTDCC staff and 
management).  
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that Satish Magar was trying to build a coalition of financial and technical 
advisors and raise the initial funding for the project. In addition to restrictions on 
using agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, there are also constraints in 
place on the sale and transfer of agricultural land, which may only be sold to 
farmers. Farmers therefore, typically get compensated at the market rate for 
agricultural land, losing out on the value of developing the land for alternate uses 
even when there is no acquisition involved (Morris and Pandey, 2007; Morris and 
Pandey, 2009). The development of Magarpatta City is being showcased as a 
model for agricultural communities across the country but has yet to be 
successfully replicated anywhere else.  
 
Easy access to prime urban land and simplifying the process of acquisition is an 
important part of national and several state government incentive schemes for 
specific industries like information technology (IT) in Maharashtra and Karnataka. 
Government agencies are acting as facilitators of development, acquiring land for 
development projects through powers of eminent domain (a much publicized 
case was that of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board and the 
state government of Karnataka acquiring peripheral land for Infosys and other IT 
companies). While government agencies are supposed to use eminent domain to 
acquire land for public projects or projects that will serve a public purpose, in the 
Indian context specifically, the scope of eminent domain is unclear. Powers of 
eminent domain have been much abused in the Indian context where 
governments and their agencies have acquired land for the private sector even in 
cases where there was no clear public benefit. Also, private sector actors like IT 
companies prefer to navigate the land market through governmental agencies 
rather than operating directly in the market for a number of reasons: it reduces 
lengthy approval and permitting procedures as well as transaction costs. 
Moreover, if land is acquired under eminent domain, the erstwhile landowner has 
no legal recourse to contest the act of acquisition itself, which reduces liability for 
the private sector. In addition, this often amounts to a state-regulated transfer of 
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wealth from the landowner to the purchaser, as explained below (Morris and 
Pandey, 2009).  
 
Government agencies like state industrial boards and development authorities 
acquire land for urban development from the farmer or landowner at the 
government-approved market price for agricultural land. However, once the land 
is approved for non-agricultural uses, its value increases exponentially. The 
farmer therefore loses out on the appreciation that takes place once the land has 
been approved for non-agricultural uses. That benefit accrues to the acquiring 
agency, which is typically passed on to the final consumer as an incentive. For 
example, several large corporations interested in developing SEZs on the 
peripheries of Indian cities were able to reap this benefit, since state government 
agencies acquired the land for these projects (Searle, 2010). Similar acquisition 
of land preceded the violent protests at Singur and Nandigram in West Bengal as 
well. The Indian national government has recently proposed a significant 
overhaul of the legislation that governs land acquisition, development as well as 
rehabilitation and resettlement measures through the Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (LARR) Bill, replacing the Land Acquisition Act 
of 1894. This bill aims to “ensure a humane, participatory, informed consultative 
and transparent process for land acquisition… with the least disturbance to the 
owners of the land and other affected families and provide just and fair 
compensation to the affected families… and make adequate provisions for such 
affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement thereof” (Government of 
India, 2011: 1). However, the LARR Bill has been heavily contested in Parliament 
and has yet to be approved.111   
 
Of the two examples discussed in this dissertation, Pune offers a more inclusive 
approach to urban development as compared to Bangalore. While Magarpatta 
                                                
111 The most current version of the LARR Bill may be found here: 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=Land+Acquisition+and+Rehabilitation+and+Resettlement+%28LA
RR%29+Bill&source=web&cd=7&ved=0CEkQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Frural.nic.in%2Fsites%2Fdownload
s%2Fgeneral%2FLS%2520Version%2520of%2520LARR%2520%2520Bill.pdf&ei=gO0iT_aQOYeBgweQxN
3iAg&usg=AFQjCNFZnpdmxN5djxOdSmRxx4xS8CPYPQ&cad=rja  
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City does not address the issue of affordable housing, it does offer an alternative 
model to mitigation of development impacts on the residents of the affected area. 
By involving the farmers who owned the land in the process of development, the 
development company was able to not only provide these farmers a successful 
transition to non-agricultural professions but also address the issue of 
displacement and loss of land. However, one of the key criticisms leveled at 
Magarpatta City by local civic activists and developers is the uniqueness of its 
situation and the difficulty of replicating it elsewhere under different 
circumstances. While it might not be possible to recreate every aspect of 
Magarpatta City’s development process, there are definitely aspects that could 
be incorporated into other development projects. For example, rather than 
attempting to merely buy out former residents, which would provide them with a 
short-term capital gain, it would perhaps be possible for developers to work 
together with residents to address the long-term needs of the community by 
providing them with alternative forms of employment. The developers of 
Magarpatta City are acting as consultants to several communities around the 
country and are also trying to replicate their successful development at a second 
larger location on the outskirts of Pune. 
 
2. Building Theory: 
The cases examined in this dissertation have highlighted how elite groups gain 
access to and influence urban planning processes. I began this dissertation with 
questions borrowed from regime theory: who has access to power in Indian 
cities; how are local power groups responding to higher level changes; under 
what conditions do coalitions emerge; and what role do they play in urban 
planning and policy? In this section, I examine the theoretical insights that the 
case studies of Pune and Bangalore have offered. 
 
Asking questions about what groups were powerful and had access to or 
controlled urban planning and decision-making processes in Bangalore and Pune 
pointed me towards groups that had historically been important power groups in 
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both cities. In the case of Pune, the power still remains concentrated in the hands 
of large farmers and old Brahmin families, while in Bangalore, the upper middle 
class white collar professionals continue to influence urban policy decisions. 
However, unlike in regime theory, the power networks were not entirely 
governmental or business-related. In fact, several of these elite actors used their 
personal social networks, based on caste, community, and kinship ties, to gain 
access to and influence urban planning and policy. Satish Magar illustrates this 
well: he drew on old family ties, caste and kinship associations, and old school 
friends to help him realize his vision of building Magarpatta City. The manner in 
which coalitions and alliances are built in Indian urban politics, therefore, is very 
different than in the United States or Europe. For example, mutual trust and 
cooperation are key to the success of any regime in western urban politics, often 
established through formal economic relationships between business interests in 
the city and the local (city) government. While these are no less important in 
Indian urban politics, the modalities through which they are enforced are more 
informal and established long before the coalition itself emerged.  
 
The coalitions formed in Indian cities are also distinct from their American or 
European counterparts. Coalitions in Indian cities tend to be more short-term and 
transient, forming and reforming as the need arises. This is because of the 
nature of the relationships that underlie the coalitions: most members of Indian 
coalitions have long-standing personal relationships with each other. Coalitions 
are formed with the intention of achieving specific goals (like the completion of a 
specific development project). Although the coalition is often disbanded once the 
goal has been reached, the relationships between members endure and can 
easily be picked up to reform a coalition, should the need arise – as in the case 
of the Green Pune movement that consists of the same core group that has been 
forming alliances as the need for action emerged. Also, power (both in 
government and outside) in Indian cities is much more fragmented than in 
American cities, for example. There is rarely a single business or economic entity 
that controls or is heavily invested in urban development (like the Coca-Cola 
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company in Atlanta). Nor is there a single font of governmental power. 
Governmental authority, at the state level in India, for example, is distributed 
between the state government, largely comprising of elected politicians, and 
numerous parastatal agencies, run by high-level bureaucrats. Coalition formation 
in India is therefore necessitated by this spread of power: since no single group 
has all the power or resources to accomplish their goals, they need to form 
alliances with other like-minded individuals.  
 
Another point of difference with regime theory (already anticipated) was the 
strong role that regional or state governments play in urban planning and policy 
decision processes. Regime theory assumes a strong local government 
structure, especially a strong mayor. However, in Indian cities, local governments 
lack the same extent of power and autonomy as their American counterparts 
have. Regional governments and governmental agencies wield considerable 
power through state-level politicians and senior bureaucrats. In Bangalore, for 
example, local government is extremely fragmented, in part stemming from the 
historical structure of government in India. The powerful governmental actors 
were those who were politicians or bureaucrats in the state government – this 
was especially apparent in the formation and operation of the task forces in 
Bangalore. As I learned through interviews, these state-level politicians and 
senior bureaucrats in fact aimed to indirectly use the two task forces to ‘clean up’ 
local government and make it more efficient and less corrupt.  
 
The Indian government’s move towards neoliberalism, the decentralization 
reforms, and economic liberalization have created new avenues through which 
elite urban actors are able to exert their influence and participate in urban 
governance and development processes. However, these changes are not 
simply a narrative of capital becoming all-powerful. While, financial capital is 
certainly a significant motivator, especially as governments are increasingly 
strapped for resources, coalitions in Indian cities between elite actors draw and 
depend on social capital as well. In addition, these changes in urban policy and 
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legislation have not necessarily meant that government or the ‘state’ in India is 
being replaced by capital. On the contrary, the government in India at all levels 
continues to be extremely influential. Regime theory therefore provides a useful 
starting point for investigating power and politics in India. However, based on the 
analysis presented in this study, the answers to questions about power and 
politics in India lead to very different answers that are rooted in the specificity of 
the Indian historical, social and political context. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix I: 
Sample list of questions used during fieldwork 
 
1. Bangalore 
• Who are the different groups or people involved in the development of 
a particular residential project, like a large township or a gated 
community? 
• How do these different people come together to facilitate development 
of these townships? Who initiates the process and brings the various 
groups of people together? Is there a well-established 
system/procedure to do this? 
• What is the real estate development process like? For example, with 
respect to the development of large projects like townships – what are 
the various steps that a developer would go through from conception to 
completion? 
• How are these projects planned and designed? Does anyone besides 
the developer of the project have a say in this process? 
• Who is the target market for these developments? For example, do the 
former residents (if any) of these areas get housing in these? Are they 
being built for the employees of a particular company/industry? 
• How are these townships changing the social dynamic in these areas? 
What is the relationship between the old residents in the area (if any) 
and those associated with the development (developers, residents, 
etc.)? 
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• Who are the large property development consultants? Do they play 
any role in the development of large projects?  
• I’ve been told that the S.M. Krishna regime really changed the face of 
development in Bangalore. What was so different about it and how did 
it change the environment in the city? 
• What is the status of the BATF? What role did it play in facilitating the 
development of the city? 
• What is the role of the city and state governments in the process of 
real estate developments with respect to township building? 
• Where does the financing for these projects come from? Who are the 
major backers/financers of these projects? How much control do these 
people have over the design and planning of the project? 
Data-related questions: 
• Where can I get GIS/digital spatial data on Bangalore?  
• Is it possible to get the master plans of these townships? 
• Can I get a hold of reports on the real estate sector of Bangalore 
prepared by consultants? 
• Is there a list of the current projects going on the city? 
• Where can I get information on the planning process in Bangalore? 
 
2. Pune: 
• Historically, how has Pune grown as a city? 
• What government agencies are involved in the governing and 
development of Pune? At what level – city, state, parastatal?  
• Are they/other governmental actors encouraging certain types of 
development over others, i.e. is it easier to get permission for some types 
of construction over others? 
• Who runs the real estate business in Pune? Are there any big developer 
companies that are local? 
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• Where did the idea for these projects come from – where is the ‘original’ 
concept of the gated community or private enclave from? How are these 
large projects conceived and designed?  
• Is there international involvement – either in the form of investors or 
designers? If yes, to what extent? 
• In the case of Magarpatta, who are the dominant players? Any studies 
already done on Magarpatta? 
• Is there a strong ‘global city’ rhetoric in Pune? Is the city trying to create 
and project a particular image? If yes: Why? What concrete steps have 
been taken to make it conform more to that image? 
• How do the politics of the city work?  
• How has the role of the city changed in urban development? 
• What role does the community play? Is there significant community 
involvement?  
• What libraries/agencies can I go to for information? 
• Is it possible to get copies of the master plans of these places/ the city? 
• At what levels do various players, local and extra-local, interact? 
• How does the existing government machinery help or hinder the 
development process? What role did the government (state as well as the 
city) play in this process? 
• How did the corporate sector in the city influence the design and 
development of each of these projects? 
• Where does the money come from? Who finances these projects? 
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Appendix II: 
Petition circulated by the Green Pune Movement 
 
Green Pune Movement
304, Narayan Peth, PUNE  411 030. Tel:  24441666/24441777. 
Email: greenpunedp@gmail.com
To,                                                                                         9th October 2008
Ms Sadhana Naik
Deputy Director
Town Planning Department
Sahakarnagar, Pune-411009
Sub: Objections and suggestions for improvement to the Part of the Development 
Plan i.e. Sector 1 Baner/Balewadi under Sub Section (1) of Section 31 of the 
Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1966 
Ref: Your Notification TPS-1807/39/CR-1017(A)/07/UD-13 dated 18/09/2008 
Sub Section (1) of Section 31 of the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 
1966
Dear Madam,
We have studied the proposed DP for Planning Unit No1 for Baner-Balewadi. 
We strongly object to the reservations which have resulted in the deletion of several 
civic amenities. A few reservations which have been thrown open for residential 
constructions comprise land reserved for public gardens, access roads, gardens, 
playgrounds and market ottas. We also object to the haphazard manner in which 
this is done. 
Hence, in response to your notification referred to above, we are herewith 
submitting our objections and suggestions for improvement of the Part of the 
Development Plan for Baner, Balewadi area of Pune City entitled Planning Unit No. 
1 of the 23 fringe villages in PMC limits. 
We also request a Personal Hearing (individually) in the matter and request 
you to please communicate a suitable time and date. We would also request that 
the communication should reach us at least 10 days in advance to facilitate 
participation in the process. Upon receipt of your invitation, we reserve the right to 
attend the formal hearing in person and/or through our duly authorized 
legal/technical representatives.
We also expect that a certified true copy of the transcript of our say will be 
given to us after recording our statement on each objection and suggestion listed 
below. We also expect the entire process of hearing to be completely transparent 
and to be made available to all the other concerned citizens on demand under the 
Right to Information Act. 
Yours sincerely,
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Appendix III: 
Suggestions and objections raised by the Green Pune Movement 
 
Suggestion and Objections
AMENITIES AND FACILITIES
1. The reservations meant for High School (HS-1), Primary School (PS-1), 
Hospital (H-1) and Home Guards (HG-1) in Survey no 4 Balewadi, 
should not be changed to Public Semi Public Zone. The earlier 
reservations should be retained.
2. High School reservations in S. no 216 Baner (HS-2), Primary School in 
S. no 203, 216 Baner (PS-15) and others if any sought to be modified to 
residential, should not be reduced or deleted.
3. Space earmarked for Civic Amenities and Facilities are a must and 
therefore the reservations for Fire Brigade at S. no 82 Baner (FB-1), Hot 
Mix Plant in S.nos 49,14,15 Baner (HMP-1), Ota Market at S.no 270
Baner (OM-13) and S. no.2 Balewadi (OM-2), Construction Material 
Yard at S. nos 28, 29 Balewadi (CMY-1) should not be removed and 
converted to Residential. 
? The information provided by the PMC to the state government in 
respect of Gunthewari constructions in some of the areas is 
incorrect and misleading. Hence their reservations in these areas 
should be retained
? It is felt that the Hot Mix Plant may result in pollution and be a 
health hazard to the residents of the area; therefore the said plot 
should be converted to a Garden and/or Playground Reservation as 
the Planning Unit no. 1 of Baner-Balewadi already has a deficit in 
this behalf. This area could also be converted to a new reservation 
called ‘Nature Facilitation Centre’ or an ‘Urban Forest’ as envisaged 
in the XII th Schedule of the Constitution of India.
4. It had been resolved by the planning authority that a Primary School 
reservation in each unit be re-designated as a Rehabilitation Centre for 
Differently Challenged Children (Spastics and Handicapped). 
However, this has not been included in the present sanctioned DP. This is 
also very important in view of the provisions in the XII th Schedule of the 
Constitution of India.
GARDEN AND PLAY GROUNDS
5. Garden reservation in S. no 35 Baner (G-3) , S.nos 34, 35 Balewadi (G-
1), S. no 28 Baner (G-2) should not be converted to residential but 
retained as Garden reservations
6. Reservations for Play grounds in S.no 291 Baner (PG-10), S. nos 67, 
68, 69 Baner (PG-6) that are sought to be converted to residential area 
should not be changed and the reservation of play ground should be 
continued
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CREMATORIUMS
7. It would be wrong to shift the Crematorium in S. nos 46, 47 Balewadi 
(CR-2) and S. nos 177, 178 Baner (CR-3) into the RPB (River Protection 
Belt) zone as their use would then become redundant. Slight shifting to 
ensure continuity for the adjoining road and use of crematorium all year 
round should be ensured and changes made accordingly.
ROADS
8. The modification in respect of the 18 mts. Road which runs East West 
along S.nos 45, 39, 38, 17, 16, 15, 13, 12, 9, of Baner to be widened to 24 
mts. and shifted to North into Survey no. 7, which is reserved as Bio 
Diversity Park, is strongly objected, as this would mean the blatant cutting 
of the hill. Therefore it should be retained in the original position.
BIO-DIVERSITY PARK
9. Preserving the hills of Pune, designated as Bio Diversity Parks (BDP), is 
a matter close to the hearts of the Punekars and it is surprising that the 
decision in respect of the same has been kept in abeyance. We object to 
this, as it amounts to literally trying the patience of the Punekars.
10.The BDP reservation at S. no 1 Baner, sought to be converted to 
Residential is strongly objected.
11. The area reserved for Bio-Tech & Agri-Business Zone in S. no 51
Balewadi is sought to be modified to Residential. The said modification is 
objected..
HIGH LEVEL FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE
The information and justification in respect of reserved lands, to be 
modified to residential, citing reason of Gunthewari or permissions 
sanctioned by the PMC to the buildings, is incorrect and misleading as the 
said lands are still open lands.
Further, it is seen that even today, illegal constructions and cutting of hills 
is taking place in reserved areas before the DP is finalized and the PMC is 
not taking any action. 
It is suggested that a High-level Fact-finding Committee be appointed at 
the earliest to look into the irregularities and action be initiated against 
those who have failed in the performance of their duty.
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Appendix IV: 
Site plan for Prestige Shantiniketan, from the marketing brochures 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Prestige Developers 
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Appendix V: 
Site plan for Magarpatta City, from marketing brochures 
 
 
Source: Magarpatta Township Development and Construction Company 
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